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1.1 Fining Policies in the US and Europe
The problem of deterring antitrust law violations is well known in the literature and
is becoming increasingly important. Antitrust law in Europe consists of the rules on
restrictive agreements and abuse of a dominant position laid down in Articles 81 and
82 EC, while in the US the antitrust laws are collected in the Sherman Antitrust Act
and in the Clayton Antitrust Act. Despite the recent theoretical developments in this
field1, much still needs to be done in practice by competition authorities in order to
prevent collusion and price-fixing in the major industries. In this way competition can
be sustained, which increases consumer welfare. We can recollect a lot of examples of
recent cases of antitrust law violations in the Netherlands and other European countries,
like a tendering procedure in the construction sector or the Cement cartel discovered in
1994. The most striking fining decisions recently made by the European Commission
are the large fines imposed on the Vitamins cartel, equal to 855 million euros, and the
Organ Peroxide cartel, equal to 1 billion euros. In addition, the Microsoft case is at the
moment attracting much attention from the Department of Justice and the European
Commission. All these cases show that it is desirable to further develop and refine
mechanisms that prevent such violations. Those mechanisms should, ideally, be based
1The recent theoretical developments in the US and EC competition policy has been discussed in
Motta (2003), Walker and Bishop (2002), Wils (2002), and Rey (2003).
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on theoretical models of price-fixing and cartel deterrence.
During recent decades, systems of penalties for antitrust law violations in the US
and Europe have been changed several times. There were considerable changes in the
number of infringements discovered and the amounts of the fines obtained owing to
these changes. However, even after all those changes have been implemented, current
rules of antitrust law enforcement still do not comply with the well known result of
Becker (1968), which states that the optimal fine should be a multiple of the gains from
crime. In most countries, the base fine for a cartel amounts to just 10% of turnover.
This scheme provides underdeterrence from an empirical and theoretical point of view,
as will be shown in Chapter 2. The main argument here is that, based on expected
utility theory, fines set below the gain from the infringement divided by the probability
of being punished cannot block the violation. However, taking into account parameters
of current penalty schemes in the EU and US, it appears that fines still fall below this
value. These considerations seem to suggest that the fines for antitrust violations should
be increased. On the other hand, it is shown in Leung (1991) that in a dynamic setting
the optimal fine does not necessarily have to be higher than the harm or social cost of
the crime. This finding can be a reason to look also for other policy instruments that
do not necessarily increase the penalties for cartels.
To give an overview of the current situation, we summarize the results of an OECD
report2 that provides a description of the available sanctions for cartels according to
the laws of member countries. Those laws allow for considerable fines against enter-
prises found to have participated in price-fixing agreements. In most member countries,
the fines are expressed either in absolute terms or as a percentage of the overall an-
nual turnover of the firm3. In addition, there exists an upper bound for penalties for
violations of antitrust law. The fine is constrained from above by the maximum of a
certain monetary amount, a multiple of the illegal gains from the cartel, or, if the illegal
gain is not known, 10% of the total annual turnover of the enterprise. In some cases,
however, the maximum fines determined by these laws may not be sufficiently large to
accommodate multiples of the gain to the cartel, as suggested by expected utility the-
ory. Moreover, according to experts’ estimations (see OECD, 2002), the best policy is
to impose penalties which are a multiple of the illegal gains from price-fixing agreements
to the firms. This, of course, would be difficult to estimate in reality, so it is still com-
mon practice to use a percentage of turnover as a proxy of the gains from price-fixing
2See O.E.C.D. (2002).
3See EC (1998).
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activities.
We conclude that the current penalty schemes for antitrust law violations are based
mainly on the turnover involved in the infringement throughout the entire duration of
the infringement, which serves as a proxy of the accumulated illegal gains from cartel
or price-fixing activities for the firm. To be more precise, in the laws of most countries,
the amount of the fine imposed depends on the gravity and duration of the infringement
and on attenuating and aggravating circumstances, such as the willingness of firms to
cooperate with authorities by providing information about existing cartels or having a
leading part in the infringement.
The main aim of the thesis is to model these features of current penalty systems
employing the tools of game theory, dynamic games, and dynamic optimization4. It
should be stressed that dynamic analysis of competition law enforcement should not be
ignored since it captures better both the current antitrust rules and the crime process in
general. Application of the above-mentioned tools allowed us to compare current US and
EU penalty schemes for violations of antitrust law and to develop policy implications
on how existing penalty schemes can be modified in order to increase their deterrence
power. This also enables us to answer the main questions addressed in the thesis: What
should be the basis for optimal deterrence of violations of competition law? What
combination of instruments (fines, rate of law enforcement, leniency programs) should
antitrust authorities employ in order to achieve cartel deterrence in the most efficient
and least costly way? What is the optimal structure of penalty schemes? This research
can also be considered a step towards the solution of the problem of optimal antitrust
law enforcement in general.
The introduction is organized as follows. We have already discussed the motivation
for the thesis and main questions addressed in the manuscript in section 1.1. Next, in
section 1.2 we give an overview of the literature that deals with economics of crime and
compare static and dynamic approaches to the solution of the problem of optimal law
enforcement. In section 1.3 we move to the discussion of the problem of cartel deterrence
and the role of leniency programs in antitrust enforcement. Section 1.4 gives an outline
of the thesis. Finally, in section 1.5 we summarize the main results and lessons from the
overall work.
4Most of these tools are discussed in great details in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), Dockner et al.
(2000), and Feichtinger (1982).
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1.2 Static and Dynamic Approaches to the Economics
of Crime
The analysis of the economics of optimal antitrust law enforcement is closely related to
the general literature on crime and punishment. In his seminal paper, Becker (1968)
examined the problem of how many resources and how much punishment should be used
to enforce different kinds of legislation. The decision instruments were the expenditures
on police and courts influencing the probability that the offender is convicted, and the
type and size of punishment for those convicted. The goal was to find those expenditures
and punishments that minimize the total social loss. This loss was defined as the sum
of damages from offences, the costs of apprehension and conviction, and the costs of
carrying out the punishment imposed.
The main contribution of Becker’s work is to demonstrate that the best policies to
combat illegal behavior are based on an optimal allocation of resources. Becker (1968)
investigates this problem using a static economic approach to crime and punishment. He
conclude that the optimal fine should be a multiple of the social cost of the crime and
inversely related to the probability of detection. So, since an increase in the probability
of detection causes an increase in the costs of control, the least costly policy for the
antitrust authority would be to decrease the probability of detection and increase the
fine itself. However, as described in the previous subsection, legal limitations concerning
the upper bound of the fine, which are intended to prevent bankruptcy, are likely to
exist. Additional criticism of Becker’s work is that his analysis was confined to a static
environment, in which it is not possible to take into account many important features of
crime and arrest processes like recidivism or intertemporal strategic interactions. Later,
in Leung (1991, 1995), Feichtinger (1983, 1995), and Fent et al. (1999, 2002), dynamic
(intertemporal) trade-offs between the damages generated from the offences and the
costs of the control instruments were studied. These researchers aim to find a mix of
policy variables, like prevention, treatment, and law enforcement, which minimizes the
discounted stream of total social loss. They argue that, for example, in illicit drug
consumption, corruption, or violence, the system dynamics is governed by specific feed-
back effects. The resulting patterns of uncontrolled processes require the allocation of
the policy instruments in a specific way over time. Moreover, dynamic games (rather
than single-player maximization problems) should be applied to cope with intertemporal
strategic interactions like the symbiosis between bribers and bribees. A similar approach
can be applied to the violations of competition law while modelling interactions between
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the firm and the antitrust authority or between two firms in a cartel.
We provide below a more detailed review of the above-mentioned papers. Leung
(1991) introduces a dynamic model of optimal punishment, where the optimal fine is
determined by solving an optimal control problem. Leung also stresses that, in many
circumstances, the crime process is a dynamic one and the dynamic model is a bet-
ter description of reality than the static model. Hence, the dynamic analysis of law
enforcement should not be ignored.
Leung shows that Becker’s findings are no longer valid in a dynamic environment,
and the implications of the dynamic model of optimal punishment are found to be
considerably different from those of the static model. It was found that the optimal
fine was positively related to the social cost of the crime and negatively related to the
hazard rate of arrest. Moreover, the author found that the fine, which would block the
crime, did not necessarily have to be greater than the harm induced by the infringement,
which contradicts the Becker’s findings. This is due to the fact that in Leung’s dynamic
model the flow of the gains from the crime can be sustained only if the offender has not
yet been arrested. As a result of this conditioning, the probability of conviction in the
static model has to be replaced by the conditional probability (or the hazard rate of
arrest) in the dynamic model, which leads to the differences between the implications of
the two models5. Leung argued that Becker’s approach would not generate the optimal
outcome, i.e., the outcome which maximizes welfare, in a dynamic environment. In fact,
according to Leung (1991), it would cause overcomplience because the fine, which is a
multiple of the damages, imposes too heavy a penalty on the offender.
Another important aspect of the dynamic crime process is recidivistic behavior, which
was ignored in both Becker’s static model and Leung’s dynamic model. Fent et al. (1999,
2002) take this aspect into account. They investigate optimal law enforcement strategies
where punishment depends not only on the intensity of crime (offence rate) but also on
the offender’s prior criminal record. This idea was adopted in Fent et al. (1999) in an
optimal control model with the aim of discovering the optimal intertemporal strategy
of a profit-maximizing offender under a given, static punishment policy. In Feichtinger
(1983) and Fent et al. (2002), the framework described above was extended to an
intertemporal approach of utility maximization, considering two players, the offender and
the authority, with conflicting objectives. The authority aims to minimize the social loss
caused by criminal offences, whereas the offending individual aims to maximize the profit
5It is essential for the result that conditional density (which is used by Leung to model hazard rate
of arrest) is not bounded between 0 and 1.
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gained from crime. This leads to a differential game, making it possible to investigate
competitive interactions in a dynamic framework. In Fent et al. (2002), the criminal
record takes the role of a state variable, where a high record increases the punishment
an offender could expect if convicted. Finally, the steady state values of the state and
the control variables of the game are derived. The solution implies that full compliance
behavior is sustainable in the long run, when the penalty increases with the offender’s
criminal record.
Another important stream of the literature on optimal law enforcement is concerned
with the problem of policy design and research on the optimal structure of penalty
schemes. For example, Garoupa (2001) studies the optimal trade-off between probability
and severity of punishment. He concludes that when there is substantial underdeterrence
(alternatively, when offenders are poor) detection probabilities and fines are complements
rather than substitutes. The main assumption that drives this result is that agents are
wealth constrained and the fine cannot exceed the offender’s wealth. This implies that,
in situations when offenders are very poor (the expected fine is significantly less than the
social damage caused by the offence) it makes no sense for the authority to spend money
on enforcement and, consequently, the rate of law enforcement is also low. However,
when wealth goes up, so do the fines. Then it becomes worthwhile for the government
to engage in detection and punishment.
Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991), Dana (2001), and Emons (2003, 2004) investigate
the problem of optimal punishment for repeat offenders. The main question addressed
in those papers is whether the optimal sanction should decrease or increase with the
number of offences. However, full consensus on this topic has not yet been reached, so
that this puzzle still requires a deeper investigation in the law and economics literature.
1.3 Leniency Programs and Their Role in Antitrust
Law Enforcement
The line of economic thinking about the problems of cartel deterrence6 and prevention
of violations of competition law brings us to the discussion of Leniency Programs, which
recently proved to be an effective instrument in the fight against cartels. In the US, for
example, the fines collected in 1993 almost doubled those collected in 1992, which can
6The most fundamental paper that discusses the structure and forms of collusive agreements and
stresses the importance of self-enforcing constraints in cartel formation is Stigler (1964).
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be connected with a major modification of leniency programs7. Leniency programs have
recently been introduced in European antitrust legislation and have quite a long history
in the US8. Leniency programs grant total or partial immunity from fines to firms that
collaborate with the authority. To be more precise, leniency is defined as a reduction of
the fine for firms which cooperate with the antitrust authority by revealing information
about the existence of the cartel before the investigation has started, or by providing
additional information that can help to speed up the investigation. Leniency programs
work on the principle that firms which break the law might report their crimes or illegal
activities if given proper incentives.
There is some empirical evidence that leniency programs improve welfare by sharply
increasing the number of detected cartels and by shortening the investigation. However,
there are also other effects of leniency programs, which are now difficult to identify
in empirical studies due to the absence of data. For example, questions of how the
introduction of leniency programs would influence cartel stability and the duration of
cartel agreements, and whether leniency facilitates collusion or reduces it, require further
investigation. Chapter 6 gives some insights into these issues.
A number of earlier papers have studied the problem of self-reporting, which is at the
heart of leniency schemes. Malik (1993) and Kaplow and Shavell (1994) were the first to
identify the potential benefits of schemes which elicit self-reporting by violators. They
conclude that self-reporting may reduce enforcement costs and improve risk-sharing, as
risk-averse self-reporting individuals may prefer to pay a certain penalty rather than the
stochastic penalty faced by non-reporting violators. Focusing on individual wrongdoers
committing isolated crimes, Kaplow and Shavell (1994) showed how reducing sanctions
against wrongdoers that spontaneously self-report reduces law enforcement costs and
increases welfare by lowering the number of wrongdoers to be detected and the risk born
by risk-averse wrongdoers. Malik (1993) examined the role of self-reporting in reducing
auditing costs in environmental regulation. Innes (1999) investigated a similar problem
and highlighted the value of the early prevention of damages that self-reporting allows
for. He concludes that switching to this policy leads to less government enforcement
activity, and that less deterrence is needed. These papers highlighted important benefits
that a lenient treatment of self-reporting wrongdoers brings about, but did not consider
its ability to undermine trust in cartels and analogous criminal organizations, which was
7This modification implied that the first self-reporting firm could get full immunity. Moreover, full
immunity could also be granted if the case was already under investigation.
8In the US the first corporate Leniency Program was introduced in 1978. In Europe the first Leniency
Programs came into force in 1996.
8 INTRODUCTION
the main focus of the papers discussed in the next paragraphs.
The use of leniency programs in antitrust has been studied by Motta and Polo (2003).
Later, they were followed by Spagnolo (2004), Aubert et al. (2004), and Feess and
Walzl (2004). In Motta and Polo (2003), it is shown that such programs can play an
important role in the prosecution of cartels provided that firms can apply for leniency
after an investigation has started. They conclude that, if given the possibility to apply for
leniency, a firm may well decide to give up its participation in the cartel in the first place.
They also found that leniency saves resources for the authority. Finally, their formal
analysis showed that leniency should only be used when the antitrust authority has
limited resources, so that a leniency program is not unambiguously optimal. Motta and
Polo’s (2003) findings were closely related to those of Spagnolo (2000a) and (2004). In
Spagnolo (2000a), it was shown that only courageous leniency programs that reward self-
reporting parties may completely and costlessly deter collusion, while moderate leniency
programs that reduce or cancel sanctions for the reporting party cannot affect organized
crime. In Spagnolo (2004), it was also shown that optimally designed ‘courageous’
leniency programs should reward the first party that reports sufficient information with
the fines to be paid by all other parties. Contrary to Becker’s result, Spagnolo’s approach
allowed to achieve the first best with finitely high fines. Moderate leniency programs
that only reduce or cancel sanctions, as implemented in reality, may also destabilize and
deter cartels by protecting agents that report from fines; protecting them from other
agents’ punishment; and increasing the risk of taking part in a cartel.
An important closely related study is that conducted by Aubert, Kovacic, and Rey
(2004). They considered rewards in antitrust enforcement in a simpler model that al-
lowed them to focus on important issues complementary to those discussed by Spagnolo
(2004). They considered the costs and benefits of creating an agency problem between
firms and their individual employees by allowing the latter to benefit directly from cash
rewards when they blew the whistle and reported their own firm’s collusive behavior.
They noted, among other things, that the possibility of employees blowing the whistle
reduces the incentives to start a cartel.
A recent paper by Apesteguia, Dufwenberg, and Selten (2004) compared experimen-
tally the performance of moderate leniency and rewards in a one-shot Bertrand setting
analogous to that used by Spagnolo (2000b). The findings confirmed that experimental
subjects understand and make use of reporting as an instrument that affects the stability
of collusive agreements. However, more experimental work in this field appears to be
highly needed.
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Another attempt to study the efficiency of leniency programs in antitrust law en-
forcement was made by Feess and Walzl (2004). They compared leniency programs in
the EU and the USA. For that purpose they constructed a game with two self-reporting
stages, heterogeneous firms with respect to the amount of evidence provided, and ex post
asymmetric information. Differences in leniency programs in the US and Europe include
the fine reduction granted to first and second self-reporters, the role of the amount of
evidence provided, and the impact of whether the case is already under investigation.
Feess and Walzl (2004) elaborated on the role of asymmetric information in deriving the
optimal degree of leniency and used these findings to compare the programs in the US
and the EU.
In conclusion, we would like to stress that only properly designed leniency programs
can induce self-reporting, reduce incentives for firms to participate in cartels, and im-
prove welfare. The possibility of counterproductive effects of leniency programs is also
discussed in Spagnolo (2000b), Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2001), and Ellis and Wilson
(2003). These researchers argue that moderate (in the sense of fine reduction) leniency
programs may greatly facilitate the enforcement of long-term illegal cartel agreements.
They explain that reduced sanctions for firms that self-report provide the otherwise-
missing credible threat necessary to discipline those involved in collusive agreements:
they ensure that if a firm unilaterally deviates from collusive strategies, other firms will
punish it by reporting information to the antitrust authority. We also argue below that
leniency programs that are wrongly designed (too lenient, non-confidential, give a too-
generous fine reduction to the second reporter) may worsen the problems rather than
solve them. They may give additional incentives for firms to form a cartel in the first
place and later also facilitate the stability of the cartel agreement. This implies that
particular attention in the economic and legal analysis of leniency programs should be
devoted to the problem of optimal design of leniency programs. This problem was the
focus of the analysis described in Chapters 5 and 6.
1.4 Outline of the Thesis
The thesis consists of the introduction followed by six chapters. In Chapter 2, we
describe the system of penalties for cartels and the effectiveness of sanctions currently
used in antitrust law enforcement. In Chapters 3 and 4, we analyze the properties
and deterrence power of the current penalty schemes employing tools of optimal control
theory and differential games. In Chapters 5 and 6, the effects of leniency programs
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on cartel stability and optimal design of leniency programs are analyzed. In Chapter
7, an analysis of whether the penalties for repeat offenders should decline or escalate is
described.
The analysis reported in Chapters 3 and 4, where we model intertemporal trade-
offs, requires the application of tools like dynamic programming, optimal control theory,
and, where there is strategic interaction between players, differential games. Most of
the papers mentioned in section 2 of the introduction investigate the problem of optimal
dynamic law enforcement and minimization of social loss from crime by modelling the
interactions between the offender, who commits the crime, and the authority, whose aim
is to prevent the crime. In Chapter 3, we suggest a similar approach. We analyze a
differential game between a firm and the authority, whose aim is to prevent the crime,
to examine the situation of violation of antitrust law by the firm, which illegally fixes
prices above the competitive level. Technically, the analysis reported in Chapter 3 is
close to the study by Feichtinger (1983), in which he investigated a model of competition
between a thief and the police. We extend his framework by allowing the penalty to vary
over time. Moreover, we introduce the fine as a function of the current degree of offence
and probability of law enforcement at each instant of time. In particular, in this chapter
we analyze a differential game describing the interactions between a firm that might be
violating competition law and an antitrust authority. The objective of the authority is to
minimize social costs (loss in total social welfare) induced by an increase in prices above
marginal costs. We found that the penalty schemes which are used now in EU and US
legislation appear not to be as efficient as desired from the point of view of minimization
of consumer loss from price-fixing activities of the firms. We proved that full compliance
behavior (namely, sustaining a competitive price-level) is not sustainable as a Nash
Equilibrium in Markovian strategies over the whole planning period, and, moreover,
that it will never arise as the long-run steady-state equilibrium of the model. We also
investigated which penalty system would enable us to completely deter cartel formation
in a dynamic setting. We found that this socially desirable outcome can be achieved
if the penalty is an increasing function of the gravity of the offence and is negatively
related to the probability of law enforcement.
Chapter 4 of the thesis addresses the problem of whether the fine, determined on
the basis of the accumulated turnover of the firm performing price-fixing activities, can
provide a complete deterrence outcome. The model of Chapter 4 is an extension of the
model used in the study described in Chapter 3 in the sense that, in the former, we
relate the penalty not only to the current degree of offence, but also to the accumulated
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illegal gains from cartel formation. We assume that the fine imposed takes into account
the history of the violation. This means that when the violation of antitrust law is
discovered, the regulator is able to observe all accumulated rents from cartel formation.
Consequently, he will impose the fine that takes into account this information. We also
compare the deterrence power of this system with that of a fixed penalty scheme.
Similar to Fent et al. (1999), the set-up of the problem leads to an optimal control
model. The main difference between our approach and that of both Fent et al. (1999)
and Feichtinger (1983) is that the gain from the cartel accumulated by the firm over
the period of infringement takes the role of a state variable, whereas Fent et al. (1999)
took the offender’s criminal record as a state variable of the dynamic game. An increase
in the state variable was thus positively related to the degree of price-fixing by the
firm, and increased the fine the firm could expect if convicted. By solving the optimal
control problem of the firm under antitrust enforcement, in Chapter 4 we investigate the
implications of the different penalty schedules. Recall the result of the model of Chapter
3, where history of the violation is not taken into account and complete deterrence
outcome cannot be achieved even in the long run. On the contrary, in the model of
Chapter 4, where penalty is related to the accumulated illegal gains from price-fixing,
full compliance outcome is sustainable in the long run.
We start the analysis of the effects of leniency programs on the stability of cartel
agreements in Chapter 5 and continue it in Chapter 6. The models of Chapters 5 and
6 extend the previous analysis in the sense that we take into account the possibility of
strategic interactions between the firms that form a cartel, i.e., the possibility that firms
can break the cartel agreement by self-reporting.
As mentioned above, the main contributions in which analysis of optimal policies
for the deterrence of violations of antitrust law in the presence of leniency schemes is
reported so far are Motta and Polo (2003), Spagnolo (2000), and Aubert et al. (2004).
Most of these papers employed a discrete time framework. Though they considered
collusive behavior in a dynamic setting with antitrust laws, these papers excluded the
important sources of dynamics that were the foci for this thesis: in particular, they
did not allow detection and penalties to be sensitive to firms’ current and past pricing
behavior. However, a number of papers have already looked into this problem, namely,
Hinloopen (2003, 2004) and Harrington (2004, 2005). They investigated settings, in
which cartel detection probabilities were influenced by firms’ behavior and where these
probabilities changed over time. However, penalties which are proportional to the degree
of offence and change over time, and that most closely reflect current antitrust rules were
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not analyzed by the above-mentioned researches. Chapter 5 addresses the problem of
how the introduction of the leniency program influences the duration of cartels under
two different regimes of fines: fixed and proportional. We employ a continuous time
dynamic game, in which accumulated gains from price-fixing are the state variable. We
investigate intertemporal aspects of this problem using dynamic optimal stopping models
and tools of dynamic continuous time preemption games.
In Chapter 5, we suggest a new approach to analyzing the efficiency of the leniency
programs that differs from the approaches put forward earlier and that is based on
the Reinganum-Fudenberg-Tirole Model. Reinganum (1981) and Fudenberg and Tirole
(1985) applied timing games to a technology adoption problem9. We apply a similar
procedure to a cartel-formation game between two firms in the presence of a leniency
program. This framework allows us to investigate not only the duration of cartel agree-
ments, but also the problem of optimal design of leniency programs. One of our aims
was to find out whether, in case both firms cooperate with the antitrust authority, they
should be treated similarly or whether there should be a difference depending on the
timing of application for leniency. In particular, we investigate whether the leniency pro-
grams should be stricter and whether the procedure of application for leniency should
be open or confidential. We find that the occurrence of cartels would be less likely if the
rules of the leniency programs are stricter and the procedure of application for leniency
is more confidential. Moreover, we conclude that, when the procedure of application
for leniency is not confidential, leniency may in some cases increase the duration of
cartel agreements. This occurs when the penalties and the rate of law enforcement are
low. Surprisingly, under a fixed penalty scheme, the introduction of a leniency program
cannot improve the effectiveness of antitrust law enforcement when the procedure of
application for leniency is not confidential.
In Chapter 6, we extend Motta and Polo’s (2003) paper by introducing asymmetric
firms and by explicitly modelling the effects of the degree of strictness of leniency pro-
grams on cartel stability. In general, firms differ in size and operate in several different
markets. In our model, they form a cartel in one market only. This asymmetry results
in additional costs in case of disclosure of the cartel, caused by an asymmetric reduction
of the sales in other markets owing to a negative reputation effect. Moreover, following
the rules of existing leniency programs, we analyze the effects of the strictness of the
leniency programs, which reflects the likelihood of getting complete exemption from the
9For applications of timing games to the problem of investments under uncertainty, see also Huisman
(2000) and Huisman et al. (2004).
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fine even if many firms self-report simultaneously. Our main findings are that, first,
leniency programs work better for small (less diversified) companies, in the sense that a
lower rate of law enforcement is needed to induce self-reporting by less diversified firms.
At the same time, big (more diversified) firms are less likely to start a cartel in the first
place given the possibility of self-reporting in the future. The second important result
is that the more cartelized the economy is, the less strict the rules of leniency programs
should be.
Chapter 7 of the thesis deals with the general problem of optimal punishments for
repeat offenders. That chapter addresses the question whether it is optimal to punish
repeat offenders more severely than first-time offenders. In Emons (2003) it is shown
that, under certain assumptions, it might be optimal to punish only the first violation.
Chapter 7 represents an extension of the two-period analysis by Emons (2003) to a multi-
period repeated game. The results obtained in this set-up are similar to those found
by Emons. We show that, for wealth-constrained agents who may commit a criminal
act several times, the optimal fines, imposed by a cost-minimizing resource-constrained
regulator, are equal to the offender’s entire wealth for the first crime, and zero for all
subsequent crimes. Unfortunately, analogous to Emons (2004), this scheme does not
appear to be a time-consistent (subgame perfect) strategy for a government in a multi-
period setting. In Chapter 7 we investigate the robustness of the two-period Emons’
result in the multi-period repeated game setting.
1.5 Conclusions and Lessons from the Overall Work
In the thesis we try to contribute to the design of optimal enforcement of competition
law. We approach this problem from the angle of possible refinements of current penalty
schemes for violations of competition law. In particular, we determine the optimal com-
bination of instruments such as the amount of the fine and the rate of law enforcement
and the optimal structure and design of penalty schemes. The motivation for this work
comes from the well-known fact that the penalties for violations of competition law that
are currently used in US and European guidelines are not sufficiently large to accommo-
date multiples of the gain of a cartel, as suggested by expected utility theory. Although
penalties were recently increased considerably and new instruments of cartel deterrence,
such as leniency programs, were introduced, still complete deterrence of antitrust law
violations has not been achieved.
Properties of penalty schemes, like dependence on the gravity and duration of the in-
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fringement, and relation to current and past pricing behavior or to accumulated turnover
of the firm, make the history of the violation an important factor for the determination
of penalties. This calls for the application of tools of dynamic games for modelling
situations of violations of competition law. This was the central idea of the thesis.
The application of these tools allows us to compare current US and EU penalty
schemes for violations of antitrust law and to develop policy implications on how exist-
ing penalty schemes can be modified in order to increase their deterrence power. The
main policy implications that can be drawn from our analysis provide justifications for a
further increase of base and maximal penalties for violations of competition law. Given
that there are certain legal limitations on maximal fines in Europe, the solution to
this problem may come from the further development of the mechanism of private en-
forcement of competition law and the introduction of individual fines and imprisonment
together with already-existing corporate fines in Europe. We also argue that the optimal
penalty, i.e., the penalty that allows the achievement of a complete deterrence outcome,
should take into account not only the gravity and the duration of the offence, but also
the rate of law enforcement (or probability of conviction) by competition authorities.
Another important finding, which was also confirmed in earlier studies, is that only
properly designed leniency programs can induce self-reporting, reduce incentives for firms
to participate in cartels, and improve welfare. When leniency programs are wrongly
designed there is a possibility of counterproductive effects of leniency programs being
created. We obtain that cartel occurrence is less likely if the rules of the leniency pro-
grams are stricter and the procedure of application for leniency is more confidential.
Moreover, we conclude that, when the procedure of application for leniency is not con-
fidential, leniency may in some cases increase the duration of cartel agreements. This
occurs especially when penalties and the rate of law enforcement are low.
CHAPTER 2
Optimal Penalties and Effectiveness of Sanctions Used in
Antitrust Enforcement
2.1 Introduction
This chapter gives a description of the current EU and US penalty schemes and provides
a statistical analysis of the effects of recent historical developments in antitrust law in
Europe and the USA on the effectiveness of sanctions used in antitrust law enforcement.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, regulations concerning systems of penalties for antitrust law
violations in the US and Europe have been changed several times during recent decades.
There were considerable changes in the number of infringements discovered and the
amounts of the fines obtained owing those changes in the regulations. However, even
after the implementation of all those changes, current rules of antitrust law enforcement
in the US and Europe1 still do not comply with the well known result of Becker (1968),
which states that the optimal fine should be a multiple of the offender’s benefits from
crime. Moreover, the current scheme provides underdeterrence from an empirical point
of view as well. In this chapter we analyze the main changes of antitrust rules and how
they influenced deterrence rates. Unfortunately, complete deterrence of competition law
violations has not yet been achieved.
1For Europe see Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed, PbEG 1998. For
the US see Guidelines Manual (Chapter 8: Sentencing of Organizations), 2003, URL:
http://www.ussc.gov/2003guid/CHAP8.htm.
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This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a description of the legal frame-
work and introduces some general concepts used in competition law enforcement. To
reflect the economic approach to law enforcement of legal behavior, we give an overview
of the results found by Becker (1968) and Leung (1991). These are the two seminal
papers describing the basics of the static approach and the dynamic approach to the
economics of crime, respectively. In section 3, we give a comparative analysis of cur-
rent European and US systems of fines for violations of competition law. In section
4, recent historical developments in antitrust law are reviewed and statistical data on
how those developments influenced the deterrence power of penalty schemes in the US
and EU are provided. Finally, section 5 summarizes the results of the analysis of the
data on penalties imposed and the number of antitrust cases uncovered and discusses
policy implications. The review of recent laws and new enforcement measures for cartel
deterrence suggested by the US Department of Justice and OECD will also be discussed.
2.2 General Concepts and Theoretical Approach to
the Problem of Fine Imposition
2.2.1 Three Dimensions of Competition Law Enforcement
The EC treaty and secondary legislation based on the Treaty contain three (sets of)
competition rules applying to undertakings: Article 81(1) EC Treaty prohibits agree-
ments restricting competition. Article 82 of the Treaty prohibits the abuse of a dominant
position on the market and the Merger Regulation deals with merger cases. Articles 81
and 82 of the Treaty do not mention fines, but Article 83 empowers the Council to
implement regulations for fine imposition. Similar regulations in the US are fixed in the
Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton Antitrust Act.
There are three main dimensions of competition law enforcement. The first dimension
is the stage of legal intervention. Here, a distinction can be drawn between ex-ante
enforcement (prescreening) and ex-post enforcement (deterrence). According to some
legal studies2 and most economic studies, deterrence is dominant in the case of antitrust
law enforcement relative to prevention. Therefore, antitrust authorities are more inclined
to increase the fine instead of increasing the probability of audit, which is costly.
The second dimension is the form of sanctions. Two main questions must be an-
swered here: who sanctions should be imposed upon (undertakings, companies, individ-
2Cf. Wils (2002).
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uals) and what form sanctions should take (monetary (fines), non-monetary (imprison-
ment)). Monetary sanctions would be more appropriate for antitrust enforcement, but
non-monetary sanctions are also in practice in the US nowadays.
The third important dimension of competition law enforcement is the choice between
public and private enforcement. This concerns the role of private parties (consumers)
versus public agents (competition authorities) in enforcement. The choice between public
and private enforcement depends to a large extent on how much effort must be expended
to obtain information relevant for enforcement. Private enforcement of competition law
is quite popular in the US. However, this is still not the case in Europe. Private damage
suits are almost non-existent in EC competition law enforcement, but private plaintiffs
do, nevertheless, play a significant role in the Commission’s enforcement activity. Ac-
cording to EC Regulation 1/2003,3 the Commission can investigate a case either upon
its own initiative or following a complaint. In practice, many cases leading to the impo-
sition of fines involve a complaint. In the discussion below we will concentrate mainly
on the first and second dimension of competition law described above.
2.2.2 Economic Approach to Fine Imposition
Two main goals of penalty systems are the deterrence of crime (offence) and compen-
sation of the harm that an infringement inflicts on society. The formal definition of a
penalty system is as follows.
Definition 2.1 A penalty system is a corrective measure established in order to elimi-
nate or reduce costly externalities generated by optimizing economic agents.
In general, a penalty system consists of a probability of detection and a fine. In case
of violations of antitrust law, these two parameters are called the rate of law enforcement
by the antitrust authority and the penalty imposed on the firm for either price-fixing
activities or participation in the cartel.
In this chapter we concentrate on the following questions: Why do we need to block
cartel or price-fixing activities? What should be the basis of deterrence? Which instru-
ments should be used? What is the most efficient way to deter violations of antitrust
law?
To illustrate the answer to the first question, we refer to the simple example of the
supply / demand diagram shown in Figure 2.1.
3Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, [2003] OJ L001 P001.
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Figure 2.1: Negative effects of price-fixing on Consumer Surplus.
We see that the increase in prices above the competitive level c, induced by a cartel,
leads to an increase in profits for the firm that is denoted by PS (Producer Surplus).
However, at the same time there are social costs imposed by this change in prices. These
social costs are represented by the area of the triangle marked as ”Net loss in SW” (Net
loss in Total Social Welfare). There is obvious damage to the consumers, since they lose
part of the consumer surplus as a consequence of the price-fixing activities of the firm.
In addition, there is a clear reduction in total welfare, since as a result of the increase in
price above competitive level the reduction of the consumer surplus exceeds the increase
in producer surplus. Hence, the answer to the first question is obvious: it is necessary
to block the cartel in order to reduce this damage.
Further, and this will be the focus of our analysis, the rest of the questions can be
reformulated as follows: What needs to be done in order to deter violation? What is
the optimal combination of two instruments (fine and rate of law enforcement)? Should
deterrence be focused on cartel benefits or social costs? What is the optimal structure
of the penalty scheme?
As mentioned in the introduction, several important contributions to the modeling
of fines were made in the literature. In Becker (1968) it is concluded that, in a static
environment, the optimal fine should be a multiple of the offender’s benefits from crime
and negatively related to the probability of detection. Later, Leung (1991) introduced
a dynamic model of optimal punishment, where the optimal fine was calculated as a
solution to an optimal control problem. Due to the special structure of the dynamic
crime process assumed in Leung’s paper, the main finding of the study was that the fine
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which would block the crime can actually be less than the harm induced by infringement,
which contradicts Becker’s finding.
This provided a puzzle to solve in general and also in relation to violations of com-
petition law. Should the base fines for violations of antitrust law be increased or should
another instrument be used, such as increasing the rate of law enforcement, which can
improve the efficiency of the penalty system? At the same time, a simple numerical
example at the beginning of the next section shows that the fine set in compliance with
static economic theory should be at least ten times higher than the current fine level
described in the European Sentencing Guidelines.
In the following sections we clarify the answers to the questions addressed above
by reporting the results of a comparative analysis of the current European and US
penalty schemes for violations of competition law. There are two main goals of antitrust
enforcement. They are deterrence of violations of competition law and compensation
of damages to consumers in case violation occur. Deterrence is usually accomplished
by public antitrust enforcement agencies, while compensation is mainly done through
the channels of private enforcement. By comparing US and EU rules we find (and we
will show this in more details in the next section) that current European system does
not have much room for compensation, while the US system does take into account the
fact that the total damage to consumers is usually higher than illegal gains. The main
conclusion following from this comparison is that the US system is much closer to what
economic theory would suggest, since it takes into account not only the fact that the
fine should be related to the illegal gains from price-fixing, which correspond to the area
PS in Figure 2.1. The US system also suggests that the fine should compensate the
total loss to consumers that higher prices imply. In other words, consumers should be
compensated for the total decline in Consumer Welfare that is represented in Figure 2.1
by adding up areas PS and Net loss in SW, which is approximately twice as high as the
illegal gains. The second advantage of the US system compared to the EU system is
that, in the US, fines imposed on corporations are combined with individual fines as well
as imprisonment, while in the EU only corporate fines are available. Next, taking into
account recent historical developments in antitrust law and analyzing the data on how
those developments influenced the deterrence power of penalty schemes in the US and the
EC, we aimed to identify the effects of changes in antitrust laws, such as the introduction
of new fining policies and leniency programs, on the effectiveness of deterrence.
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2.3 Comparison of Current Penalty Systems in the
US and Europe
2.3.1 European System
It is determined in the European Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed
that the fines must be in proportion to their intended effect in terms of prevention,
in proportion to the potential consequences of the prohibited practices in terms of the
advantage to the offender and damage to competition, and in proportion to fines imposed
on other companies involved in the same infringement. For these reasons, in determining
the level of the fine, the turnover involved in the infringement, in principle, is taken into
account. In addition, attention is also paid to the importance of the offender in the
national economy. In this regard, in determining the level of the fine, the total annual
turnover of the undertaking is taken into account.
Calculation of Fines
The general algorithm for setting the fine for competition law violations is as follows.
First step is to determine the base fine. Usually, the base fine depends on the type of
offence, its gravity, and duration and is set by European Commission. Next, the fine
can be changed if there are any aggravating or attenuating circumstances. Finally, the
legal upper bound on fines in Europe, which states that the fine cannot exceed 10% of
overall annual turnover, is taken into account.
According to the European Sentencing Guidelines, it is recommended that the total
fine (F ) should be put within the limit of 10% of the overall annual turnover (T ) of the
organization under investigation:
F ≤ 0, 1T,
where T is calculated according to the following rule. If the firm is operating in
several markets (e.g.A, B,C) and involved in price-fixing in only one of them (market
A), then total annual turnover is T = pAqA + pBqB + pCqC , where pi is the price in
market i and qi is the quantity sold in market i. At the same time, turnover involved in
the crime (infringement) is given by t = pAqA. Further, the base fine will be determined
on the basis of t and the type of infringement.
As mentioned in section 2.2, one of the main advantages of the US system compared
to the EC system is that, in the US, fines on corporations are combined with individual
fines as well as imprisonment, while in the EU only corporate fines are available. With
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an example below we show that exclusive reliance on European corporate sanctions in
their current form is unlikely to result in effective deterrence of price cartels and other
comparable antitrust infringements, at least in case the firm operates in one market only
and forms a cartel in the same market. We will show that, given current parameters
of enforcement policies, the fine economic theory would suggest will almost surely ex-
ceed the upper bound suggested in the European Sentencing Guidelines (F ≤ 0, 1T )4.
Expected utility theory suggests5 that the gain obtained from the infringement by the
violator, divided by the probability of being fined, constitutes a floor below which fines
can certainly not deter. It does not seem exceptional for a cartel to achieve a 10% price
markup and to last for 5 years. Taking the case of a price-cartel, the gain which cartel
members obtain from the violation depends on their turnover in the products concerned
by the violation, the price increase caused by the cartel, the price elasticity of the de-
mand which the cartel members face, and the life span of the cartel. Assuming a 10%
price increase, and a resulting increase in profits of 5% of turnover, a 5-year duration,
and a 16% probability of detection and punishment, the floor below which fines would
generally not deter price-fixing would be in the order of 150% of the annual turnover in
the products concerned by the violation. This is about ten times higher than the current
fine level and, if the firm operates and forms a cartel in one market only, this is fifteen
times higher than the upper bound suggested in the European Sentencing Guidelines
(10% of annual turnover). This calls for either an increase in (or even abolishment of)
the upper bound for the fine or the use of some other sanctions, such as individual fines
or imprisonment.
We now consider in more detail current EC fining rules. Depending on the gravity of
infringement The Commission can distinguish between minor, serious and very serious
infringements. Minor infringements are schemes that distort competition to a limited
degree, such as vertical schemes, in particular those that do not have prices and sales
opportunities as their object, and branch schemes that restrict competition, which do
not have prices and sales opportunities as their direct object. The fine in this case will
be put within the limit between 1000 and 1 million euros. So, f gm ∈ [1000, 1.000.000],
where f gm is the fine attributed to minor gravity infringements.
Serious infringements are horizontal schemes, such as discrimination and tied sales,
and vertical agreements that exert a direct influence on prices or sales opportunities,
such as individual vertical price-fixing and prohibitions on reselling. The fine in this
4This numerical example is adopted from Wils (2002).
5See Becker (1968).
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case will be put within the limit between 1 million and 20 million euros. So, f gs ∈
[1.000.000, 20.000.000], where f gs is the fine attributed to serious infringements.
Very serious infringements are horizontal price agreements, collective vertical price-
fixing, collective boycotts, horizontal agreements aimed at partitioning markets and
quota schemes (including limiting sales and prohibited tendering agreements-’bidrigging’),
and forms of abuse of a dominant position aimed at driving or excluding an undertaking
from a market. The fine in this case must be higher than 20 million euros. So, f gv ≥ 20
million, where f gv reflects the fine for the most grave violations.
Depending on the duration we can distinguish between short-duration, medium-
duration, and long-duration infringements. For short-duration infringement (less than
1 year), there is no increase in the amount of the fine. And the fine, fd , is calculated
according to the following formula:
fd = f gi , i ∈ {m, s, v}.
For medium-duration infringements (1-5 years), there is an increase of up to 50% in
the amount determined for gravity. The formula in this is as follows:
fd = kf gi , k ∈ [1, 1.5] , i ∈ {m, s, v}.
For long-duration infringements (more than 5 years), there is an increase of up to
10% per year in the amount determined for gravity. The formula in this case is as follows:
fd = Nkf gi , i ∈ {m, s, v},
where k ∈ [1, 1.1] and N reflects the number of years of existence of the cartel.
Finally, the base fine is calculated as the sum of two amounts established in accor-
dance with the above:
f b = f gi + f
d. (2.1)
Consider the following examples:
minor infringement, short duration: f b = f gm + f





serious infringement, medium duration: f b = f gs + f
d = f gs + kf
g
s = (1 + k)f
g
s ,
very serious infringement, long duration: f b = f gv + f
d = f gv + Nkf
g
v = (1 + Nk)f
g
v .
So, we can conclude that, in general, the European penalty system for antitrust law
violations exhibits linear dependence of the penalty on the level of offense.
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Aggravating and Attenuating Circumstances
The basic amount is increased when there are aggravating circumstances such as repeated
infringement of the same type by the same undertaking, refusal to cooperate, or having
a leading role in the infringement. This corresponds to the variable n in the expression
below.
The basic amount is decreased when there are attenuating circumstances such as
having a passive role in the undertaking, termination of the infringement as soon as the
Commission intervenes, or effective cooperation by the undertaking in the proceedings.
This corresponds to the variable s in the expression below.
The final amount of the fine (F ) is determined as
F = If b,
where I > 1 if there are any aggravating circumstances, and I < 1 if there are any
attenuating circumstances.
To be more precise, the final amount of fine is determined according to the following
expression, which is adopted from Wils (2002)6:





where f b is the base fine that is determined on the basis of gravity and duration
according to expression (2.1), i is the percentage figure reflecting any aggravating cir-
cumstances, j is the percentage figure reflecting any attenuating circumstances, k is the
percentage figure reflecting the application of the 1996 leniency notice, and f is the final
figure of the fine. In this way, Wils translates the various steps contained in the 1998
EC Guidelines for calculating fines into a simple expression (2.2).
In general, according to the 1998 EC Guidelines, the fine is determined as a function
of the following form:
F = f(g, d, s, n),
where g denotes the gravity of the offence, d is duration, s reflects attenuating cir-
cumstances, and n reflects aggravating circumstances. The function f is assumed to be
strictly decreasing in s and strictly increasing in g, d, and n.
6See Wils (2002), supra note 22, p. 252, footnotes 20 and 21.
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Fine after each 
stage in mil. € 
Base fine 
40 Gravity: very serious infringement 
62 Duration: 5 years and 9 months, implying an increase of 55% of the amount 
determined according to gravity and result in a base fine of €62 million. 
 Individual fine 
99.2 Aggravating factors imply an increase of 60% of the base fine 
84.1 Reduction of fine due to the max limit of fines (10% of overall turnover) 
50.4 40% reduction due to application of leniency policy 
50.4 Total fine 
 
Figure 2.2: Determination of the fine for UCAR according to the EC guidelines.
An Example of a Fining Decision7
The determination of the fine by the Commission for the European part of the graphite
electrode cartel, UCAR International, is described in Figure 2.2. The nature of the
infringement was deemed to be very serious, because UCAR had engaged in market-
sharing and price-fixing practices, which were implemented with full knowledge of the
illegality of the actions. In considering the actual impact of the infringement, the decision
notes that during the time of the cartel agreement, prices nearly doubled. Moreover, the
producers represented almost 90% of the worldwide and EEA market for the product
and the prices were not only agreed but also announced and implemented. Hence, the
amount of the fine according to gravity for the two main producers, UCAR and SGL,
was selected to be 40 million euro.
Aggravating factors included UCAR’s role as one of the ringleaders and instigators
of the cartel and the continuation of the infringement after the investigation started.
Although UCAR was not the first company that provided the Commission with decisive
evidence, it contributed substantially to establishing important aspects of the case and
the Commission, therefore, granted a reduction of 40% of the fine.
In the next section, we describe the US penalty system, point out its advantages
and disadvantages relative to the European system, and summarize the results of the
comparison.
2.3.2 US System
According to the US sentencing guidelines, the base fine is the greatest of the amounts
of the ”level fine” from Figure 2.3 corresponding to the offense level, the pecuniary gain
7This example is adopted from Wehmhoerner (2005).
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Figure 2.3: US base fine as a function of offence level.
Figure 2.3, representing the US fine, implies that the penalty schedule exhibits a
convex increasing function of the level of offense. This makes sense, since the higher the
level of offense the higher the gains from the cartel for the firms and, at the same time,
the higher the harm to consumers in terms of loss of consumer surplus.
The base fine for violations of antitrust law is determined according to the following
formula:
f b = max{level fine, gain from offense, loss from offense}
According to the US Sentencing Guidelines8, the gain and the loss from the offense
are estimated as follows:
”The fine for an organization is determined by applying Chapter Eight (Sentencing
of Organizations). In selecting a fine for an organization within the guideline fine range,
the court should consider both the gain to the organization from the offense and the
8See §2R1.1, note 3.
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harm (loss in consumer surplus) caused by the organization. It is estimated that the
average gain from price-fixing is 10% of the selling price. The loss from price-fixing
exceeds the gain because, among other things, injury is inflicted upon consumers who
are unable or for other reasons do not buy the product at the higher prices. Because the
loss from price-fixing exceeds the gain, subsection (d)(1) provides that 20% of the volume
of affected commerce is to be used in lieu of the pecuniary loss under §8C2.4(a)(3). The
purpose for specifying a percent of the volume of commerce is to avoid the time and
expense that would be required for the court to determine the actual gain or loss. In
cases in which the actual monopoly overcharge appears to be either substantially more
or substantially less than 10%, this factor should be considered in setting the fine within
the guideline fine range.”
Finally, the base fine is determined according to the expression
f b = max{level fine, 0.2ti},
where ti denotes the volume of affected commerce.
This structure of the penalty can be linked to section 2.2, where we discussed the
economic approach to fine imposition. Now we can conclude that the US system is much
closer to what economic theory would suggest, since it not only takes into account the fact
that the fine should be related to the illegal gains from price-fixing, which correspond
to the area PS in Figure 2.1, but also suggests that the fine should compensate the
total loss to consumers caused by price-fixing. In other words, consumers should be
compensated for the decline in Consumer Surplus that is represented in Figure 2.1 by
adding up areas PS and Net loss in SW, which is approximately twice as high as the
illegal gains. Hence, although the US approach does not solve all problems, it seems to
be at least conceptually better than the European penalty system.
Further, the level of offence is determined by the court according to Chapter Two
(offense conduct) of the US Sentencing Guidelines and Chapter Three, Part D (Multiple
counts). The court approximates the loss in order to calculate the offense level according
to §2R1.1 (note 3) on the basis of the volume of commerce done by the defendant or his
principal in goods or services that were affected by the violation.
They start with offense level equal to 10 points.
(1) If the conduct involved participation in an agreement to submit non-competitive
bids, increase the offence level by 1 point.
(2) If the volume of commerce attributable to the defendant was more than
$400,000, adjust the offense level as follows:
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(A) More than $400,000; add 1
(B) More than $1,000,000; add 2
(C) More than $2,500,000; add 3
(D) More than $6,250,000; add 4
(E) More than $15,000,000; add 5
(F) More than $37,500,000; add 6
(G) More than $100,000,000; add 7.
The base fine is increased if the organization has prior history (was recorded in
the past). In particular, if the organization committed an offense less than 10 years
previously, add 1 point, or if the organization committed an offense less than 5 years
previously, add 2 points. The base fine is also increased if the organization conducted a
violation of an order. If the organization violated a condition of probation by engaging in
similar misconduct, i.e., misconduct similar to that for which it was placed on probation,
add 2 points. Finally, the base fine is increased by 3 points if the organization conducted
an obstruction of justice.
The base fine is decreased if the firm self-reported, cooperated during the inves-
tigation, and accepted responsibility. If the organization, either prior to an imminent
threat of disclosure or government investigation or within a reasonably prompt time after
becoming aware of the offense, reported the offense to appropriate governmental author-
ities, fully cooperated in the investigation, and clearly demonstrated recognition and
affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its criminal conduct, 5 points are subtracted.
If the organization fully cooperated in the investigation and clearly demonstrated recog-
nition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its criminal conduct, 2 points are
subtracted. Finally, if the organization clearly demonstrated recognition and affirmative
acceptance of responsibility for its criminal conduct, 1 point is subtracted.
An Example of a Fining Decision9
To provide an overview of the fining method behind the guidelines, the application of
the guidelines in the determination of the fine for the US part of the graphite electrode
cartel, UCAR International, is described in Figure 2.4. UCAR was accused of price-
fixing in the US from 1992 to 1997. The memorandum was filed in April 1998 by the
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and follows the US guidelines in
the calculation of the fine.
9This example is adopted from Wehmhoerner (2005).
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142.6  20% of the volume of commerce of US $713 million 
of UCAR's US sales between July 1992 - June 1997 
  Aggravating and attenuating factors 
 +5 Starting point as fixed in the guidelines 
 +4 1000 employees and high-level personnel involved. 
 -2 Acceptance of responsibility and full cooperation. 
199.64 to  
399.28 
=7 Culpability score of 7 implies a min multiplier of 1.40 (40% 
increase in the base fine) and a maximum multiplier of 2.80 
(180% increase in the base fine), yielding a fining range of 
US $199.64 to US $399.28 million. 
110  Alternative fine because of UCAR's inability to pay 
(15.4% of US volume of commerce) 
 
Figure 2.4: Determination of the fine for UCAR according to the US guidelines.
The fining range is determined by calculating 20% of the volume of affected commerce
over the entire duration as a starting fine. Subsequently, for each factor, such as the
size of the undertaking in terms of the number of employees, the corresponding points
with which to increase or decrease the culpability score can be read from the guidelines.
There is a direct quantitative link between these factors and the fining range through
the use of the culpability score, which determines the fining range. However, neither
the guidelines nor the decision explain how the alternative fine should be determined in
case of inability to pay.
2.3.3 Comparison
To summarize the above analysis, we can conclude that the US system is more advanced,
since there is no upper bound on the fine as in Europe, where the fine is limited from
above by the amount of 10% of the total annual turnover of the firm. However, this
upper bound is determined without taking into account dynamic aspects. We believe
that the existence of this upper bound and the fact that this boundary is not high enough
appears to be one of the main sources of inefficiencies. Other advantages of the US
system are that the base fine is a convex and increasing function of the level of offence
and depends not only on the illegal gains from the cartel, but also on the estimated
loss to consumers from price-fixing, by employing the 20% rule. Moreover, exclusive
reliance on corporate sanctions in Europe is unlikely to result in effective deterrence of
price cartels due to the existence of the ”too-low” upper bound on the fine and also
because corporate sanctions do not always guarantee adequate incentives for responsible
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individuals within the firm. Hence, the introduction of sanctions for individuals and
imprisonment in European competition law could also be a part of the solution.
The following table summarizes the main results of the analysis.
Table 2.1: Comparison of the US and EC penalty systems for antitrust violations.
US
upper bound no
base fine is determined as f b = max{”level fine”, 0.2ti}
basis for fine volume of commerce involved in crime
functional form of fine convex in the level of offense
damage to consumers taken into account
imprisonment yes
Europe
upper bound F ≤ 0.1T
base fine is determined by seriousness and duration, f b = f g + fd
basis for fine decision of the European Commission
functional form of fine linear in the level of offense
damage to consumers generally, it is not taken into account
imprisonment no
2.4 Recent Historical Developments in Antitrust Law
and Statistical Overview
2.4.1 Antitrust Law Enforcement in Europe
The Commission used its fining power under the EC Treaty for the first time in July
1969 in the Quinine and the Dyestuffs cases, in which it imposed fines ranging from
10,000 to 210,000 units of account on 6 and 10 companies, respectively. After 25 years,
by the end of July 1994, the Commission had taken 81 decisions imposing a total of 346
individual fines for infringements of Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty.
The number of fining decisions increased over the 1970s and the 1980s, reached its
highest level in the second half of the 80s, and declined till the end of the 90s. During the
period 1999-2003, the number of fining decisions again increased dramatically.10 Over
10See Figure 2.3.
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Period Number of Average fine per decision Total fine in
decisions in millions of Euro millions of Euro
1969-1973 7 5,2 36,4
1974-1978 11 0,53 5,83
1979-1983 16 1,5 24
1984-1988 28 8,3 232,4
1989-1993 17 12,1 205,7
1994-1998 17 35,46 602,82
1999-2003 46 84,76 3899,21














































Figure 2.5: Fines imposed by EC in 1969-2003, including all antitrust cases.
the period 1969-1993, 61 decisions were based on Article 81, of which 30 concerned hor-
izontal infringements (including cartels), 29 vertical infringements, and 2 infringements
involving intellectual property rights. The highest single fine imposed in the period
1969-1994 was a fine of 75 million ECUs imposed on Tetra Pak for abuse of its dom-
inant position. The highest sum of fines imposed in one single decision amounted to
approximately 248 million ECUs, being the sum of the 42 fines imposed in 1994 on the
undertakings and associations involved in the Cement cartel.11 See also Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.6 represents the amounts of the fines imposed on ”cartels only” according
to decisions of the European Commission in 1969-2004.12
From Figure 2.5 we obtain that the level of the fines in real terms declined dramati-
cally during the 1970s. The ”new, tougher policy” announced in 1979 was really nothing
more than a return to the fine levels of the first years of the Commission’s fining practice.
Only from the mid-1980s on did the ”new, tougher policy” become visible.
Until 1998, fines were calculated based on the original rules dating from 1969. These
rules use a base fine of 2 to 4% of the turnover in the product concerned by infringement,
with a few percentage points added in case of infringements of a relatively long duration
and serious nature. Starting from 1998, a new system (fine=10% of turnover) was
implemented. This system was extensively discussed in section 3.1 above. However, one
does not need a sophisticated econometric study to see that such fines are inadequate
11Decision of 30 November 1994, Cement,[1994] OJ L343/1.
12Data are taken from Jones, Van Der Woude, Lewis (1999) and Geradin and Henry (2005).
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Figure 2.6: Cartel fines in EU (1969-2004).
to deter large categories of the more serious infringements.13 Hence, the new system
introduced in 1998 still requires some changes.
The next considerable step in the historical development of antitrust law was made
in 1996, when the European Commission introduced Leniency Programs. Leniency
programs give reduced fines to firms which reveal information about the cartel to the
antitrust authority. Moreover, the reduction of fines should take place even if firms
reveal information after an investigation has started. Leniency programs improve welfare
by sharply increasing the probability of collusive practices being interrupted and by
shortening the investigation.
However, leniency programs introduced in 1996 were heavily criticized for their lack of
transparency and certainty. The vagueness and legal uncertainty embedded in the 1996
notice explained why the notice was not as effective as, for example, the US corporate
amnesty program14, which receives on average two applications per month. For this
13Recall the economic approach to fine imposition discussed in section 2.2.2 and the numerical ex-
ample provided in section 2.3.1. It follows from the above discussion that the gain obtained from the
infringement by the violator, divided by the probability of being fined, constitutes a floor below which
fines can certainly not deter. Assuming that the probability of being fined is 16%, 10% price markup,
and cartel duration of 5 years, it would still mean that deterrence cannot be achieved with fines below
150% of annual turnover in the product concerned.
14See D.O.J. (1993).
32 OPTIMAL PENALTIES AND EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS USED IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
reason, in 2002, the new EC leniency notice was introduced. With this notice, the
Commission intended to increase the effectiveness of the leniency programs by aligning
more closely the level of the reduction of fines and the value of a firm’s contribution to
establishing the infringement. More importantly, the Commission committed itself to
guaranteeing immunity from fines if the requisite conditions were fulfilled. Indeed, it
would seem that with the entry into force of the new leniency program there has been a
substantial increase in leniency applications.15 One of the greatest improvements in the
new rules was the fact that the new notice provides for the opportunity to receive partial
immunity even after the Commission has commenced an investigation. According to US
Department of Justice officials, approximately one half of all immunity applications are
made after the beginning of an investigation in the US.
The currently used system of regulations, which has been discussed extensively in
section 2.3, was brought into life in 1998.16 Fines imposed by the European Commission
now appear to be the main method of Competition Law enforcement in Europe, as
opposed to the US, where non-monetary punishment schemes are also used.17
2.4.2 US Antitrust Law Enforcement
The roots of US Competition Law enforcement go back to 1890, when the Sherman
Antitrust Act was introduced. In 1997, certain changes in the approach to the US
enforcement of international cartels and clarifications to the Sherman Antitrust Act were
developed18. These changes influenced dramatically the amounts of the fines obtained.
In the 10 years prior to 1997, the Division obtained, on average, $29 million in criminal
fines annually. The amounts obtained in the following years were considerably higher,
as can be seen in Figure 2.7 below19.
In Figure 2.7 it can be seen that two points in time, 1993 and 1997, were characterized
by a considerable increase in the amounts of fines collected. The increase of the fines
15The XXXIIIrd Report on Commission Policy, European Commission, 2003, stated that the Com-
mission has received 34 applications for immunity dealing with at least 30 separate alleged infringements,
see para. 30.
16Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed, PbEG 1998.
17Connor and Bolotova (2005) also provide an empirical study of the impact of legal environmental
on cartel overcharges.
18See D.O.J. (1999).
19Data collected by the US Department of Justice: Antitrust Division Workload Statistics FY 1994-
2003 (http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/12848.htm). See also G.R.Spratling ”Are the recent titanic
fines in Antitrust cases just the tip of the iceberg?”, March 6, 1998.
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Figure 2.7: Cartel fines in the US obtained in 1987-2003.
collected in 1993 almost doubled those collected in 1992. This can be connected with the
major modification of US leniency programs. The dramatic (almost 10 times) increase in
the fines obtained in 1997 and later can be connected with the fact that the US started
to pay more attention to the prosecution of international cartel activity.
After 1997 the Division has obtained fines of $10 million or more against U.S., Dutch,
German, Japanese, Belgian, Swiss, British, and Norwegian-based companies20. It is
remarkable that during the period before 1997 there were only 5 cases in which the fine
imposed was greater than or equal to $10 million. After 1997, there were 28 cases in
which a fine greater than $10 million was imposed.
In sum, we conclude that there are three important directions for development of
US Department of Justice competition policy: leniency programs, international cartel
enforcement, and refinement of the current penalty system. As has already been men-
tioned, the revised Corporate Amnesty Program21 has resulted in a surge of amnesty
applications. Under the old amnesty policy, the Division obtained roughly one amnesty
application per year. Under the new policy, the application rate has been more than
one per month. In recent years, cooperation from amnesty applications has resulted in
higher scores of convictions and over $1 billion in fines.
The second important direction of the US Department of Justice competition policy
20See Table 3 on Sherman Act Violations Yielding a Fine of $10 Million or More,
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1583.htm.
21Three major revisions were made to the program: amnesty is automatic if there is no pre-existing
investigation; amnesty may still be available even if cooperation begins after the investigation is under-
way; and all officers, directors, and employees who cooperate are protected from criminal prosecution.
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is the international cartel enforcement. This enforcement emphasis was quite successful
in cracking international cartels, securing the convictions of major conspirators, and
obtaining high fines. During the year 2000, the Division conducted approximately inves-
tigations of suspected international cartel activity. Currently, approximately one-third
of the Division’s criminal investigations involve suspected international cartel activity.
The third and most straightforward direction is a refinement of the current penalty
system. Namely, increasing the level fines and multiplier on the volume of affected
commerce22.
Currently, the main differences between European and US antitrust law enforcement
are the successfulness of leniency programs and the types of sanctions used. Firstly,
the successfulness of leniency programs, which is highly correlated with the clarity and
transparency of those programs, is definitely more obvious in the US. Secondly, criminal
prosecution of individuals and imprisonment are prominent components of US antitrust
law, whereas these are absent in European legislation. Accordingly, the US leniency
program has substantially more to offer to individual cartel members.
2.5 Conclusions
We conclude this chapter by summarizing the analysis of data on penalties imposed, the
number of antitrust cases uncovered, and the policy implications. We will also review
recent laws and new enforcement measures for cartel deterrence suggested by OECD
and discuss their relevance.
Following our comparative analysis of the US and EC antitrust laws and empirical
analysis of the performances of current antitrust law enforcement schemes (fines collected
and cases discovered), we conclude that the obvious result is that the current sanctions
(penalties, sanctions against private persons) are not high enough to completely block
cartel formation. A possible remedy is to set the base fine closer to the level of the harm
as implied by economic theory. It may be worth investigating whether the increase in
resources needed to better estimate the turnover of the affected commerce as well as the
overcharge would not be offset by the improved deterrence by attempting to set the base
fine closer to the harm. Additionally, the maximum limit should be set to the worst
possible harm that could result from an infringement. For the EC guidelines, this would
imply reconsidering the limit of 10% of worldwide turnover. Similarly, the alternative
22See section 2.3.2.
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maximum of doubling the loss or gain in the US23 may be too low for infringements that
are difficult to detect. Given that fining decisions currently do not account for factors
such as the probability of detection or the deadweight loss, the trend towards increasing
fines appears to be a good development.
At the same time, we found certain trends in the behavior of the amounts of the fines
collected and cases discovered connected with the recent changes in regulations. Distinct
examples are the two-times increase in the total amounts of fines collected in the US in
1993 after the introduction of leniency programs and the tenfold increase in the total
amounts of fines collected in the US in 1997 after the introduction of the strategy of
fighting international cartels.
We also should not forget about the other dimension of this problem. This refers
to the fact that a cartel is itself a group, and consequently the antitrust authority can
influence the internal stability of this group. Leniency programs do this job. They
not only increase the number of discovered cartels, but also help to reduce the amount
of money spent during investigations. These programs have been introduced in many
countries already, but antitrust authorities still need to work on the issues of making
those programs clearer and more transparent.
The third perspective direction is international cooperation and sharing of informa-
tion about cartels. This policy will substantially increase the effectiveness of sanctions
against international cartels. Theoretical grounds for such policy implications were given
by Levenstein and Suslow (2001), Evenett, Levenstein, and Suslow (2001), and Suslow
(2002). They state that the exchange of information about cartels and international co-
operation between countries would also increase the effectiveness of leniency programs.
23Recall the 20% rule in section 2.3.2.

CHAPTER 3
Determination of Optimal Penalties for Antitrust Violations in a
Dynamic Setting
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we incorporate specific features of antitrust law enforcement, which are
in practice now in the US and the European Union, into a dynamic framework of utility
maximization with two players having conflicting objectives. In the particular case of
violations of antitrust law, those two players are the firm of regulated monopoly type,
which rises prices above marginal costs level, or the firm, which participates in cartel
agreements, and the Antitrust Authority, whose aim is to prevent price-fixing or cartel
formation in the industry.
According to the US Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations and the Guidelines
on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed for Violations of Competition Law in Europe,
the penalty schemes for antitrust violations are based mainly on the gravity of the
violations, which is determined on the basis of the turnover involved in the infringement.
To be more precise, in the European regulation the penalty imposed depends on the
gravity and duration of the infringement in a linear manner. The level of offence is
measured by the turnover involved in the infringement, which is defined as the total
sales of the product involved over the whole period of existence of the cartel. In the
US sentencing guidelines for organizations the system of fine imposition for antitrust
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violations is different. There we observe that the penalty schedule for the base fine is
represented by a convex increasing function of the level of offence.
In order to investigate the efficiency of the current penalty schemes we incorporate
these two features of penalty systems for antitrust law violations into a dynamic model
of intertemporal utility maximization by modelling penalty schedule in the stylized form
as a linear or quadratic functions of the degree of price-fixing and time. Similar to
Feichtinger (1983) the set up of the problem leads to a differential game. The authorities
attempt to minimize the social loss caused by price-fixing, whereas the firm wants to
maximize the profit gained from price-fixing.
It is found that the stylized form of the existing penalty schemes would not succeed,
in the sense that it cannot provide complete deterrence. Therefore, we try to find a
more efficient functional form of penalty schedule for violations of antitrust law. Finally,
we suggest a new penalty system which is the most efficient from the point of view of
complete deterrence of price-fixing in dynamic settings.
We relate our analysis to the general literature on crime and punishment, starting
with Becker (1968). In his seminal paper, Becker (1968) studied the problem of how
many resources and how much punishment should be used to enforce different kinds of
legislation. The decision instruments are the expenditures on police and courts influenc-
ing the probability that the offender is convicted, and the type and size of punishment
for those convicted. The goal was to find those expenditures and punishments that
minimize the total social loss. This loss is the sum of damages from offences, costs of
apprehension and conviction, and costs of carrying out the punishment imposed.
The main contribution of Becker’s work was to demonstrate that the best policies to
combat illegal behavior were part of an optimal allocation of resources. Becker (1968)
investigates this problem using a static economic approach to crime and punishment.
He derives that in a static environment the optimal fine should be a multiple of the
offender’s benefits from crime and inversely related to the probability of detection. So,
since an increase in the probability of control causes an increase in the costs of detection,
the least costly policy for the antitrust authority would be to decrease the probability
of control and increase the fine itself. But in this case existence of legal limitations
concerning the upper bound of fine would bind fine from above and, hence, least costly
policy would not be implementable. Later, in the paper by Souam (2001) optimal crime
deterring policies under different regimes of fines were discussed in the static setting
with asymmetric information. In Leung (1991), Feichtinger (1983), and Fent et al.
(1999, 2002) dynamic (intertemporal) trade-offs between the damages generated from
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the offences and the costs of the control instruments were studied. More precisely, their
papers try to determine a mix of policy variables, like prevention, treatment and law
enforcement, which minimize the discounted stream of total social loss.
Now we give a more detailed review of the papers related to the problem, addressed in
the current chapter. Leung (1991) introduces a dynamic model of optimal punishment,
where the optimal fine is calculated as a solution to an optimal control problem. The
results of this model differ a lot from the implications of the static model of Becker (1968).
Leung demonstrates that the optimal fine derived from a dynamic model is drastically
different from the one obtained from a static model. He finds that the fine which
would block the crime can actually be less than the harm induced by the infringement,
which contradicts the result of Becker. Leung argues that Becker’s approach will not
generate the optimal outcome, i.e. the outcome which maximizes welfare, in a dynamic
environment. In fact, according to Leung (1991) it would cause overcomplience because
the multiple fine imposes too heavy a penalty on the offender.
A considerably different approach was suggested in Fent et al. (1999, 2002). They
investigate optimal law enforcement strategies in case punishment is modelled as a func-
tion depending not only on the intensity of crime (offence rate) but also on the offender’s
prior criminal record. This idea was adopted in Fent et al. (1999) in an optimal control
model with the aim to discover the optimal intertemporal strategy of a profit maximiz-
ing offender under a given, static punishment policy in the model with only one agent.
In Fent et al. (2002) the framework described above was extended to an intertemporal
approach of utility maximization, considering two players with conflicting objectives.
The authorities attempt to minimize the social loss caused by criminal offences, whereas
the offending individual wants to maximize the profit gained from offending. This leads
to a differential game, which makes it possible to study competitive interactions in a
dynamic framework. The criminal record takes the role of a state variable. A high record
increases the punishment an offender expects in case of being convicted.
Modeling intertemporal trade-offs requires application of tools like dynamic pro-
gramming, optimal control theory and, if there is strategic interaction between players,
differential games. All the papers mentioned above investigate the problem of optimal
dynamic law enforcement and minimization of social loss from crime by modeling the
interactions between the offender, who commits the crime, and the authority, whose aim
is to prevent the crime. In this chapter we suggest a similar approach. We analyze a
differential game between the offender and the authority, whose aim is to prevent the
crime, to study the situation of violation of antitrust law by the firm, which fixes the
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prices above competitive level or participates in a cartel.
Technically our analysis will be close to the paper by Feichtinger (1983), in which he
studies violations of criminal law by means of a differential game solution to a model of
competition between the thief and the police. We extend his framework by allowing for
the penalty for violation to vary over time. Moreover, we introduce the fine as a function
of the current degree of offence and probability of law enforcement at each instant of
time.
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2 we set up the model describing
the intertemporal game played between a firm engaged in price-fixing and the antitrust
authority, and recall the modified static microeconomic model of price-fixing. In section
3.3 the differential game will be solved and we show that it is impossible to have complete
deterrence under current European and US systems of penalties for antitrust violations.
In section 3.4 a new penalty scheme, which gives the desired outcome with no collusion,
will be suggested. Section 3.5 provides a summary of our results and outlines possible
extensions and generalizations of the model. Finally, in appendixes we provide proofs of
the main results of the chapter.
3.2 Description of the Problem
A model is designed to determine optimal penalty schemes for antitrust violations and
cartel deterrence in the framework of differential games. There are two types of agents.
First, there are the firms, which can perform illegal activities, such as price-fixing and
cartel formation or violations of the price limits imposed by the authority on the regu-
lated monopoly. They obtain strictly positive gains from price-fixing in each period that
the cartel was present in the market. Second, we have the antitrust authority, which
can inspect those firms, and, in case violation is detected, punish them by imposing a
fine s(t), where t reflects the time index. The interactions of the agents are modeled as
a continuous time problem with finite planning horizon T .
The aim of the firm is to maximize its total expected gain from setting its price
above the competitive level by choosing q(t). This variable represents the degree of
illegal activities with respect to price-fixing (analogous to the ”pilfering rate” in the
model of competition between thief and police in Feichtinger (1983)). This variable will
be described in more detail in the next subsection, which presents the microeconomic
model underlying the problem of fighting price-fixing agreements.
The antitrust authority is modeled as a second decision maker. It also has one
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instrument, which is the ”rate of law enforcement” (or probability of control by the
antitrust authority) denoted by p(t). The aim of the antitrust authority is to maximize
welfare. This implies that the rents from collusion for the firm need to be reduced. So,
the aim of the antitrust authority is to prevent cartel formation at the lowest possible
costs.
The profit of the firm in each period or the rent from collusion per period above the
competitive profit is π(t) > 0.1
In order to be able to set up the dynamic model and determine the objective func-
tionals of both players, we first describe a static microeconomic model of price-fixing.
3.2.1 Static Microeconomic Model of Price-fixing
Let us consider an industry with M symmetric firms engaged in a price fixing agreement.
Assume that they can agree and both increase prices from the competitive level P c = c
to P > c , where c is the fixed marginal cost in the industry. Since firms are symmetric,
each of them has equal weight in the coalition and consequently total cartel profits
will be divided equally among them.2 Hence, the whole market for the product (in
which the price-fixing agreement has been achieved) will be divided equally among M
firms, so each firm operates in a specific market in which the inverse demand function
equals P (Q) = 1 − Q. Demand functions are identical in the submarkets. Under these
assumptions we can simplify the setting by considering not the whole cartel (group
of violators) but only one representative firm, and apply similar sanctions to all the
members of cartel.3
Let Pm be the monopoly price in the industry under consideration, and let P = 1−Q
be the inverse demand for a particular firm. In order to be able to represent the consumer
surplus and extra profits from price fixing for the firm in terms of the degree of collusion,
we define the variable q, which denotes the degree of price-fixing, by q = P−c
P m−c , where
P is the price level agreed by the firms. In words, q can be interpreted as a ratio of the
realized price increase above the competitive level to the maximal price increase that is
possible in case of a monopoly. Then it holds that q ∈ [0, 1] and extra profits from price
1Competitive profit (πc) is assumed to be zero.
2We also assume that there is no strategic interaction between the firms in the coalition in the sense
that we abstract from the possibility of self-reporting or any other non-cooperative behavior of the firms
towards each other.
3Of course, in these settings the incentives of the firms to betray the cartel can not be taken into
account and the possibility to influence the internal stability of the cartel is not feasible. But this is
the topic of Chapters 5 and 6.
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fixing for this particular firm will be determined according to the following formula:
π(q) = q(
(1− c)
(Pm − c) − q)(P
m − c)2.




P m−c = 2 and, consequently, it holds that A =
(1−c)2
4
= Πm (monopoly profit in
this particular market).
The instantaneous producer surplus, consumer surplus and net loss in social welfare
are presented in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Representation of producer surplus, consumer surplus, and net loss in total
social welfare in the price-quantity diagram.
Following the above analysis the Producer Surplus equals
PS(q) = π(q) = Πmq(2− q) ,












(q) < 0, NLSW
′′
(q) > 0, CS
′′
(q) > 0.
Under the assumption that Πm is equal to 1
4
(or c = 0), these three functions are
presented in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: Consumer surplus, producer surplus and net loss of social welfare as functions
of the degree of price-fixing.
The consumer surplus is lower the higher the degree of collusion. The loss in consumer
surplus is higher the higher the degree of collusion, while the rents from cartel for the
firm are higher the higher the degree of collusion.
It should be mentioned that in the literature two main objectives of the authority
are considered. First, the authority aims to maximize total welfare, i.e. the sum of
consumer and producer surpluses. Second, the authority’s aim could be to maximize
consumer surplus and at the same time minimize the rents from collusion for the firm.
The second approach can be justified by the conjecture that the rents obtained through
illegal activities are lost for society in most of the cases. So they should not be included
in the regulator’s maximization function.
Let us consider the first problem in a static setting. The antitrust authority is aiming
to maximize (CS + PS), i.e.,
maximize {1
2
Πm(2− q)2 + Πmq(2− q)} s.t. q ∈ [0, 1].
This implies that total welfare is maximized for q = 0. Note that this is equivalent
to the minimization of NLSW .
Let us consider now the second problem in a static setting. The antitrust authority
is aiming to maximize CS and at the same time minimize the rents from collusion,
i.e. keeping PS = 0 equal to competitive profit. In other words, the sum of net loss in
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social welfare and producer surplus will be minimized. This means that the problem is to
minimize {Πmq(2−q)+ 1
2
Πmq2}. This is equivalent to minimizing {(2q− 1
2
q2)Πm}, which
is equal to the minimization of the total loss from price-fixing for society. Consequently,
in the settings where antitrust authority cares only about consumer surplus, the social
welfare will be maximized when there is no collusion.
So we can conclude that in the static setting the outcomes of the two problems
described above are equivalent in the sense that the antitrust authority should not allow
for any collusion irrespective of whether it cares about total welfare of the society or
only about the consumer surplus. For this reason we will assume that the aim of the
antitrust authority will thus be to achieve zero degree of price-fixing (i.e. q = 0) in all
the periods of the planning horizon in a dynamic setting as well.
3.2.2 Description of the Dynamic Game
To investigate the interactions between the firm and the antitrust authority we develop
a differential game. We consider a firm (player 2) playing against the antitrust authority
(player 1). The probability that the firm gets caught at time t, F (t), is influenced by the
degree of collusion that is control variable of the firm, q(t), as well as the law enforcement
rate that is control variable of the antitrust authority, p(t), in the following manner:
.
F (t) = p(t)q(t)[1− F (t)]. (3.1)
Note that Φ(t) =
.
F (t)[1 − F (t)]−1 is the hazard rate of the process leading to con-
viction of the firm. Φ(t) is the conditional probability of getting caught at time t
provided that the firm has not yet been caught. Equation (3.1) says that the hazard
rate Φ increases linearly with increasing activities of the firm and antitrust authority,
and F (0) = 0 is the initial condition.
As usual two types of variables appear in the model: a state variable F (t) (the prob-
ability distribution function of the time until the detection of the violation of the firm)
and control instruments q(t) (degree of collusion of the firm) and p(t) (law enforcement
rate of antitrust authority). Note that the state constraint 0 ≤ F (t) ≤ 1 is satisfied au-
tomatically. The idea to use F (t) as a state variable is based on Kamien and Schwartz
(1971). Assume also that a once convicted firm is not able to collude any more until
time T (so punishment is that harsh that the firm needs a lot of time to recover). The
parameter r denotes the discount rate.
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e−rt[−(NLSW (q(t))+C(p(t)))[1−F (t)]+s(q(t), p(t))
.
F (t)]dt−e−rT C1(T )[1−F (T )].
(3.2)
The term C(p(t)) reflects the costs for the antitrust authority of performing the
audit activities (such as the number of inspections, salaries for auditors, etc.). The
analysis of the game will be conducted for the case when the costs of law enforcement
are quadratic, i.e. C(p) = Np2.4 As in the previous section, the term NLSW (q(t))
reflects the loss in instantaneous total social welfare due to a price increase by the firm.
NLSW (q) increases when q increases. The term s(q(t), p(t))
.
F (t) reflects the expected
revenue for the authority at time t if the cartel is discovered at this particular instant
of time. The penalty s(q, p) is a function of both the current degree of offence and the
current probability of audit by the antitrust authority. Note that the higher the degree
of collusion, q(t), the higher the probability to be caught for the firm, and, consequently,
the higher the expected punishment. Later in this chapter we will discuss three different
types of penalty functions. The two penalty schemes discussed in section 3.3, namely,
stylized EU and stylized US penalty schemes, depend only on the degree of collusion,
while the penalty schedule discussed in section 3.4 is a function of both the degree of
offence and the probability of audit. C1(T ) is the terminal value (disutility) assessed
by the antitrust authority if the firm is not yet caught at time T. 5 Note also that we
assume that no additional costs arise after the firm has been caught. This is a reasonable
assumption in the context of violations of antitrust law, since it is assumed that only a
monetary fine can be imposed and this, contrary to imprisonment, is costless for the
authority.
4However, qualitatively speaking the results obtained in the paper hold for costs of law enforcement
being any increasing convex function of p. The solution of the game for the linear case C(p) = Np is
available from the author upon request.
5From the underlying static microeconomic model of price-fixing (section 3.2.1) we derive that the






F (t)]dt−e−rtC1(T )[1−F (T )],
where the term PS(q(t)) reflects the instantaneous producer surplus, CS(q(t)) is the instantaneous
consumer surplus, and CSmaxF (t) denotes the expected instantaneous consumer surplus associated
with the time period after the conviction. This relates us back to the discussion in section 3.2.1 and
the setting where the authority aims to maximize total social welfare.
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e−rt[PS(q(t))[1−F (t)]+PScompF (t)−s(q(t), p(t))
.
F (t)]dt+e−rT C2(T )[1−F (T )].
(3.3)
Here the term PS(q(t)) reflects the instantaneous rents from collusion as defined in
section 3.2.1. Expression −s(q(t), p(t))
.
F (t) denotes the expected punishment for the
firm at time t, i.e. the fine times the probability of being caught. s(q(t), p(t)) is the
instantaneous penalty at the moment the firm is caught. As discussed above, s(q, p) is
assumed to be a function of both control variables. The term PScompF (t) reflects the
profits of the firm during the period after the conviction, when there is no price-fixing.
Consequently, the expression PScomp is equal to zero. Finally, C2(T ) is the terminal
value (utility) of the firm being not yet convicted in cartel formation at time T .
The corresponding differential game with two players, one state variable F (t), and
two control variables, q(t) and p(t), is represented by the expressions (3.1)-(3.3). The
state space is F (t) ∈ [0, 1], and the set of feasible controls is p(t) ∈ [0, 1] for player 1 and
q(t) ∈ [0, 1] for player 2.
The major difference with earlier papers on crime control (Feichtinger (1983)) is that
we introduce s(t) = s(q(t), p(t)) being the penalty imposed on the firm as a function
of both the degree of offence and the rate of law enforcement, which both can vary over
time.
An economically reasonable assumption would be to set salvage values to be nonneg-
ative, i.e. C1(T ) ≥ 0, C2(T ) ≥ 0. Moreover, further, in order to simplify the calculations,
we assume a zero discount rate6 (r = 0).
We also assume that players make their choices simultaneously and that the solutions
to their control problems correspond to either Markovian or open-loop Nash Equilibrium
strategies (see, e.g., Dockner et al. (2000)). Below we provide the formal definitions of
Markovian and open-loop Nash Equilibria of a differential game with two players in case
each player has only one control variable.
Definition 3.1 The tuple (φ, ψ) of functions φ, ψ : [0, 1] × [0, T ) 7−→ R, which belong
to the sets of feasible controls defined as U1(F (t), q(t), t) ⊆ R and U2(F (t), p(t), t) ⊆ R,
is a Markovian Nash Equilibrium if for both players optimal control paths p(t) and q(t)
of the control problem (3.1)-(3.3) exist and are given by the Markovian Strategies p(t) =
φ(F (t), t) and q(t) = ψ(F (t), t) for all 0 < t < T .
6However, most of the results of the chapter would not change if we would relax this assumption.
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Definition 3.2 The tuple (φ, ψ) of functions φ, ψ : [0, T ) 7−→ R, which belong to the
sets of feasible controls defined as U1(F (t), q(t), t) ⊆ R and U2(F (t), p(t), t) ⊆ R, is an
open-loop Nash Equilibrium if for both players optimal control paths p(t) and q(t) of the
control problem (3.1)-(3.3) exist and are given by the open-loop Strategies p(t) = φ(t)
and q(t) = ψ(t) for all 0 < t < T .
It can be shown that for this particular game the set of Markovian Nash Equilibria
will coincide with the set of open-loop Nash Equilibria. The proof will be provided in
Appendix 2. For this reason it is sufficient to focus on obtaining an open-loop Nash
Equilibrium.
3.3 Analysis of the Current EU and US Penalty
Schemes
3.3.1 Stylized EU Penalty Scheme
In this section we consider a penalty scheme, which resembles the current European or
Dutch systems7. We model the main feature of these systems, namely that the base
penalty is proportional to the gravity of the infringement or to the turnover involved
in the undertaking and does not depend on the rate of law enforcement. It should
be mentioned, however, that the functional form described in equation (3.4) does not
capture all the properties of the penalty schemes, which are determined in the current
”Guidelines for the Setting of the Fines” (such as longer duration of the offence or leading
role in the infringement would increase the penalty). That is why we call this scheme a
”Stylized EU penalty scheme”. Consequently, the penalty in this case is modeled as a
linear increasing function of the degree of offence, q:
s(q) = KΠmq, (3.4)
where K is a positive constant, which determines the steepness of the penalty scheme,
and Πm is the instantaneous monopoly profit to the firm8.
7Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed for violations of competition law in Europe can
be found in PbEG 1998, while guidelines for the setting of fines in the Netherlands are described in
Section 57(1) of Competition Act.
8The multiplier KΠm is derived from the static optimization problem for the firm. The firm decides
on the level of offence given the rate of law enforcement, p, and the functional form of the penalty
scheme, which is linear. And the aim of the antitrust authority is to achieve zero price-fixing outcome.
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Since our aim is to determine Nash Equilibria in open-loop strategies, we first find a
tuple (φ, ψ) where φ : [0, T ] 7−→ [0, 1] and ψ : [0, T ] 7−→ [0, 1] are the fixed strategies for
the antitrust authority and the firm, respectively. Hence, φ corresponds to the control
variable p(t), and ψ corresponds to the control variable q(t).
As the static analysis in the previous section suggests, it is reasonable to assume
concavity of the terms −NLSW (q(t))−C(p(t)) and PS(q(t)). This allows to obtain the
expressions for an interior solution of the differential game (3.1)-(3.3).
The solution of the problem of the firm gives the following expression being the





0 if B ≤ 0
B if 0 < B ≤ 1







In (3.6) µ(t) is the shadow price (costate variable) of the state variable F (t) for the
firm.
According to (3.6) the optimal degree of price-fixing for the firm decreases with
decreasing shadow price µ(t). Moreover, the higher the penalty at the instant the firm is
caught, the lower will be the optimal rate of price-fixing. The influence of the maximal
gains from price-fixing on the optimal degree of price-fixing is determined by taking the
derivative of expression (3.6) with respect to Πm. We get that ∂B
∂Πm
≥ 0. So the optimal
degree of price-fixing by the firm will increase when the maximal gains from collusion
increase. This behavior makes economic sense.
The solution of the problem of the antitrust authority gives us the following expres-





0 if D ≤ 0
D if 0 < D ≤ 1







In (3.8) λ(t) is the shadow price of the state variable F (t) for the antitrust authority.
9For a complete derivation of this result see Appendix 1.
10For a complete derivation of this result see Appendix 1.
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The intuition behind the formula (3.8) is as follows. Since the antitrust authority
aims to minimize the total loss, the adjoint variable λ(t) measures the shadow costs of
one additional unit of probability F (t) imputed by the authority. Thus, −λ(t) is the
shadow price by which the state variable F is assessed by the authority. From (3.8) we
see that a decrease in λ(t) results in an increase of the equilibrium rate of law enforcement
p. The increase in the absolute value of the penalty KΠm also will cause an increase in
the rate of law enforcement, since it becomes more profitable for the antitrust authority
to discover more violations. At the same time it holds that the higher the marginal costs
of law enforcement N, the lower p.
3.3.2 Determination of the Nash Equilibrium
Based on the expressions (3.8) and (3.6) we can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3 If the penalty schedule has the form s(q) = KΠmq and the costs of
law enforcement are a quadratic function of p, then the outcome with no collusion, i.e.
q(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ], cannot arise as equilibrium strategy of the firm.
Proof : See Appendix 1.
The unique steady state of this problem is given by q∗ = 0 and p∗ = 0.11 By
considering the phase diagram of this problem in the (p, q)- plane we conclude that this
solution is not stable12. This fact provides an additional argument in favor of rejection
of the penalty scheme being linear in the degree of price-fixing.
The general result of the analysis of the differential game conducted in this subsection
points out the weaknesses of the penalty scheme, which corresponds to the European
Sentencing Guidelines for violations of antitrust law.
3.3.3 Stylized US Penalty Scheme
In this section we consider a differential game where the penalty schedule is a convex
increasing function of the degree of the offence. This schedule is given by the following
expression:
s(q) = KΠmq2. (3.9)
11For the sake of completeness we also give here the definition of the steady state. In the steady
state, state and control variables are constant over time.
12See the part on the investigation of stability in Appendix 1.
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This resembles the current US system of penalties for violations of antitrust law,
where the base penalty imposed by court for the firm convicted in price-fixing will be
determined as a convex increasing function of the degree of offence13. Again, this system
does not exactly capture all the features of the penalties determined in the US guidelines
manual (such as dependence on the duration of offence or the role in the infringement).
That is why, as in the previous subsection, we call this scheme a ”Stylized US penalty
scheme”. For the convex penalty scheme Proposition 3.4 can be obtained. We refrain
from presenting its proof, since it is similar to the linear case14.
Proposition 3.4 If the penalty schedule has the form s(q) = KΠmq2 and the costs of
law enforcement are a quadratic function of p, then the outcome with no collusion, i.e.
q(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ], cannot arise as equilibrium strategy of the firm.
There is some evidence that the deterrence with convex penalty system works slightly
better than the deterrence with a linear penalty scheme for more grave offences. When
q is sufficiently high, it can be shown that for any given probability of law enforcement
the stylized US scheme gives a lower equilibrium degree of price-fixing by the firm than
the stylized EU scheme and, consequently, a lower damage for society15. Moreover, this
result once again gives support to the argument in favor of deterrence focused not only
on cartel benefits but also on the harm to the consumers caused by price-fixing. Recall
that the net losses in social welfare were proportional to the squared degree of offence16.
The main implication of the model discussed in this section is that the penalty
schemes, which are used now in the EU and US legislation, appear not to be as efficient
as desired from the point of view of minimization of consumer loss from price-fixing
activities of the firm. The result is that zero collusion (full compliance) behavior is
not sustainable as a Nash Equilibrium in Markovian strategies for the whole planning
period, and, moreover, there is no stable steady state corresponding to zero collusion.
The reason for this is that fines for antitrust violations do not depend in any way on
the probability of law enforcement, which should be an important determinant of the
13According to the US Guidelines Manual, the base penalty imposed by court for the firm convicted
in price-fixing is determined based on the ”level fine” that exhibits convex mapping from offence levels
into fine levels.
14The proof of Proposition 3.4 and investigation of the stability of the system in the long run are
available from the author upon request. Also here it holds that the unique steady state given by
p = q = 0 is not stable.
15The detailed proof of this result is available from the author upon request.
16Recall from Section 3.2 that Net Loss in SW = 12Π
mq2.
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efficiency of penalty schemes as has been mentioned in Becker (1968) and Leung (1991).
In the next section we pursue this road.
3.4 A Penalty Schedule that Does Prevent Collusion
3.4.1 Solution of the Game
Here the aim is to find an open-loop Nash equilibrium, which is also a Markovian Nash
Equilibrium of the game described above17, when the penalty schedule is determined as
follows:
s(q, p) = KΠmq +
G
p
with s(0, 0) = 0, (3.10)
where G is a positive constant.
The foundation for the penalty schedule determined by expression (3.10) is based
on the following considerations. Departing from (3.6), which is the FOC for the firm
in case the penalty is linear in q and making use of the fact that µ(t) ≤ 0 for all t, we
ensure that q(t) = 0 for all t by means of adding a strictly negative term, which is in
absolute value greater or equal than twice the monopoly profits, to the numerator of
expression (3.6). The term G
p
in the penalty function (3.10) assures the appearance of
this additional term in the expression for the reaction function of the firm. Note that
this result has a lot in common with the well known result of Becker (1968).
Searching for the open-loop Nash Equilibria of the game we start by solving the
optimal control problem of the firm. If the antitrust authority chooses to play p(t) = φ(t)






)φ(t)q(t))[1−F (t)]]dt+e−rT C2(T )[1−F (T )]
s.t.
.
F (t) = φ(t)q(t)[1− F (t)].
The Hamiltonian of this problem equals
H(q, F, µ, t) = [Πmq(t)(2− q(t))− (KΠmq(t) + G
φ(t)
)φ(t)q(t) + µ(t)φ(t)q(t)][1− F (t)],
where µ(t) is the costate variable of the problem of the firm.
Solving for q(t) and µ(t) we get:
.
µ(t) = Πmq(t)(2− q(t))− s(t)φ(t)q(t) + µ(t)φ(t)q(t),
17For verification see Appendix 2.
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The intuition behind this result is exactly the same as in the previous section. The
only difference is that the size of the fixed fine G negatively influences the degree of
price fixing.
Now we move to the solution of the optimal control problem of the antitrust authority.








F (t)]dt+e−rT C1(T )[1−F (T )]
s.t.
.
F (t) = p(t)ψ(t)[1− F (t)].
The Hamiltonian of this problem equals






where λ(t) is a costate variable of the problem of player 1.
Solving for the optimal p(t) and λ(t), and taking into account that the control region
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The intuition behind this result is exactly the same as in the previous section.
Taking into account the assumptions on the terminal values C1(T ) ≥ 0, C2(T ) ≥ 0
we conclude that the transversality conditions will be as follows:
λ(T ) = −C1(T ) ≤ 0 and µ(T ) = −C2(T ) ≤ 0. (3.15)
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3.4.2 Determination of Nash Equilibrium
Unfortunately, a conventional open-loop Nash Equilibrium of this game does not exist
in case the penalty is defined as in (3.10). However, we are able to establish that, under
certain conditions on the parameters of the model, an equilibrium with zero degree of
collusion in all periods can be sustained as an ε−equilibrium in open-loop or Markovian
strategies.
The notion of ε−equilibrium is defined as follows (See Myerson (1991)).
Definition 3.5 An ε−equilibrium of a strategic-form game is a combination of strate-
gies such that no player could expect to gain more than ε by switching to any of his
feasible strategies, instead of following the strategy specified for him.
Let us investigate the stability of the system and the properties of the last period
solution in the case of interior controls. From (3.11)-(3.14) it can be concluded that the
system of equations describing the solution of the differential game in terms of reaction
functions at the final time of the game has the following form:
p∗(T ) =




2Πm + µ(T )p(T )−G
2Πm + 2ΠmKp(T )
. (3.17)
Studying the reaction functions of both players at each instant of time, we can
conclude that the following proposition holds
Proposition 3.6 If the penalty schedule has the form (3.10) where G ≥ 2Πm, then
the unique ε−equilibrium is given by q(t) = 0 and p(t) = σ for all t ∈ [0, T ] with
σ > 0, σ(ε) → 0 if ε → 0.
Proof.
From expression (3.16) it is obtained that p∗(T ) = 0 if and only if q(T ) = 0 , since
KΠmq(T ) − λ(T ) cannot be equal to zero due to the transversality condition (3.15).
This will be situated on an optimal path for the strategy of player 2, given by expression
(3.17), when G ≥ 2Πm and µ(T ) ≤ 0. In this case, the best response function q(p) for
player 2 is the constant function passing through the point (0, 0), so q∗(p) = 0 for any
p ∈ [0, 1].
In Figure 3.3 we sketch time T reaction functions of the firm and antitrust authority
in case µ(T ) < 0 and λ(T ) < 0. Here solid line, p(q), represents the best response curve
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of the authority and dashed line, q(p), represents the best response curve of the firm.
It is clear from the graph that with G ≥ 2Πm there is unique Nash equilibrium with
q∗(T ) = p∗(T ) = 0.





 Unique equilibrium 
 1    p 
   1     
Figure 3.3: Determination of the Nash Equilibrium in the model when the penalty
schedule is given by the function s(q, p) = KΠmq + G
p
for parameter values K =
2, Πm = 1, G = 2, N = 1 and taking λ = −1.
We can conclude that q∗(T ) = 0 and p∗(T ) = 0 will be sustained as an open-loop
or Markovian18 Nash equilibrium at the end of the planning horizon when G ≥ 2Πm,
i.e. the fixed penalty is high enough to make the reaction curve of the firm a horizontal
line, passing through the point q = 0. Similar arguments hold for p∗(t) and q∗(t) at each
instant of time, t ∈ [0, T ).
The problem here is that, according to expression (3.10), the penalty and, conse-
quently, the objective functions become indeterminate when p(t) = 0. To overcome this
problem we employ the notion of ε − equilibrium (or almost equilibrium) as given in
Definition 3.5. As a candidate for an ε − equilibrium we consider q∗(t) = 0 and
p∗(t) = σ for all t ∈ [0, T ] , where σ > 0 and σ(ε) → 0 if ε → 0.
In order to show that p∗(t) = σ and q∗(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ) can be sustained as
an open-loop or Markovian Nash equilibrium of this game, we need to verify that this
solution satisfies the necessary conditions for optimality. Obviously, they are satisfied.
18Analogous to the models in section 3, also for this game it holds that the sets of open-loop and
Markovian equilibria coincide.
3.4: A Penalty Schedule that Does Prevent Collusion 55
For F (t) 6= 1 we can rewrite the differentiated Hamiltonians as follows19:
lim
σ→0+




[2Np(t)−KΠq2(t) + λ(t)q(t)](p=σ,q=0) = 0,
lim
σ→0+




[2Πm− 2Πmq(t) + µ(t)p(t)− 2ΠmKq(t)p(t)−G](p=σ,q=0) = 0.
Note that the second equality is satisfied when G = 2Πm. However, when G >
2Πm, the point with p = σ, q = 0 is a boundary optimum and, hence, also solves the
optimization problem described in section 3.4.1.
Next, we prove that q(t) = 0, p(t) = σ for all t ∈ [0, T ] is a unique equilibrium.
Analysis of the shape of the reaction functions implies that the fact that µ(t) ≤ 0 for
all t ∈ [0, T ] ensures that q(t) = 0, p(t) = σ for all t ∈ [0, T ] is a unique solution.
Firstly, µ(T ) > 0 can not hold, since according to the transversality condition we
have µ(T ) ≤ 0. Hence, the equilibrium with q(T ) = 0, p(T ) = σ is a unique equilibrium
in period T given G ≥ 2Πm.
We can show that the equilibrium with q(t) = 0, p(t) = σ will be also unique for all
t ∈ [0, T ). In the problem under consideration the necessary condition for uniqueness of
the equilibrium q(t) = 0, p(t) = σ for all t is the condition µ(t) ≤ 0 for any t ∈ [0, T ].
Taking into account the transversality condition µ(T ) ≤ 0 above we now show that
µ(t) ≤ 0 for t ∈ [0, T ). Assume that there is an arbitrary t′ ∈ [0, T ) such that µ(t′) > 0.




From the costate equation for µ(t) we obtain that
.




−2Πm + 2Πmq(t′) + 2KΠmq(t′)p(t′) + G
p(t′)
)p(t′)q(t′) = q2(t′)Πm (1 + Kp(t′)) ≥ 0.
Hence, a non-positive terminal value given by µ(T ) = −C2(T ) could never be reached.
Thus,
µ(t) ≤ 0 for t ∈ [0, T )
Hence we can conclude that with G = 2Πm the outcome with no collusion q(t) = 0
for all t ∈ [0, T ] can arise as an open-loop or Markovian Nash Equilibrium solution of
the game and this equilibrium is unique21.
19Note that in case F (t) = 1 equalities ∂H(p,F,λ)∂p = 0 and
∂H(q,F,µ)
∂q = 0 are satisfied for any values
of p and q.
20For a complete derivation see Appendix 3.6.3.
21Note that this result also goes through with r > 0. The only difference is that
.
µ(t′) = rµ(t′) +
q2(t′)Πm (1 + Kp(t′)) , which is also greater or equal than zero given that µ(t′) > 0.
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To summarize the analysis, we stress that this proposition considers the settings,
where we model the interactions between the firm and antitrust authority as a differential




at the moment the cartel is discovered and zero penalty if it conducts the
audit and does not discover any violation. One important feature of this schedule is that
when the cartel is discovered the penalty imposed on the firm must be at least greater
than twice the instantaneous monopoly profits from price-fixing in the industry under
consideration. It turns out that this penalty scheme is more efficient than the current
EU or US penalty schemes, in the sense that this policy leads to the complete deterrence
outcome. In particular, the regulator can achieve the outcome with no price-fixing in all
periods of the planning horizon at the lowest possible costs.
Finally, consider the infinite horizon problem and let us investigate the stability of
the Nash Equilibrium solution in the long run. In the Appendix 3.6.3 we derive the
system of differential equations for the Nash-optimal controls and obtain the qualitative
behavior of the optimal solution from a phase diagram analysis in the (p, q)- plane for a
specific set of parameter values22. Studying the phase diagram23 we can conclude that
the following proposition holds.
Proposition 3.7 The outcome with q∗ = 0 and p∗ → 0 is the unique long run steady
state equilibrium of the infinite horizon model, where the penalty is given by the expres-
sion s(q, p) = KΠmq + 2Π
m
p
and the costs of law enforcement for the antitrust authority
are convex.
Proof: See Appendix 3.
Next, we give a phase portrait in the (p, q)− plane of the system of differential
equations which describes the long run dynamics of the system in terms of control
variables. In Figure 3.4 the domain of the controls is determined by the square [0, 1]×
[0, 1] . This figure also shows graphically that the solution (p∗ → 0, q∗ = 0) is the unique
stable steady state equilibrium of the game.
Considering the dynamics of the system in this domain, we can distinguish two
possible situations. In the first situation we start with initial values of control variables
22Numerical examples suggest that these results are robust in the setting with different parameter
values. However, a general closed-form solution of the system of the differential equations for the steady










Figure 3.4: Phase portrait in (p,q)-space for the model where penalty schedule is given
by s(q, p) = KΠmq + G
p
for the set of parameters K = 2, N = 1, G = 2, Πm = 1.
above the line OA in the Figure 3.4, which denotes the locus where both
.
p = 0 and
.
q = 0. In this case, the system will always converge to the point (0, 0). In the second





q = 0), the system arrives at the point (1, 1), which is clearly suboptimal
compared to the solution (0, 0) for the chosen parameter values24. So, we can conclude
that q∗ = 0, p∗ → 0 is the unique stable steady state solution of the system of differential
equations (3.30), (3.31).
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we analyze dynamic interactions between the antitrust authority and
a firm involved in a cartel. We develop a model which can be used to study dynamic
optimal enforcement of competition law. We can summarize the results of the chapter
as follows.
One main result is that the penalty schemes, which are used now in the EU and US
legislation, appear not to be as efficient as desired from the point of view of minimization
24Note that strictly speaking also the path towards the steady state should be taken into account
when comparing objective values.
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of consumer loss from price-fixing activities of the firm. In particular, we prove the result
that zero collusion (full compliance) behavior is not sustainable as a Nash Equilibrium
in Markovian strategies. The reason is that the current penalty schemes do not allow the
fine to be high enough to outweigh the accumulated expected gains from price-fixing for
colluding firms. An additional reason could be that fines for antitrust violations do not
depend in any way on the probability of law enforcement, which should be an important
determinant of the efficiency of penalty schemes. The latter result was obtained by
Becker (1968) and also by Leung (1991).
Furthermore, we determine a penalty system, that is efficient from the point of view
of the possibility of complete deterrence of cartel formation in a dynamic setting. We
find that there is a possibility to achieve the socially desirable outcome, i.e. the outcome
with no price-fixing in all the periods of planning horizon, and give an example of the
penalty scheme with which this outcome can be achieved. The amount of fine should be
an increasing function of the degree of offence and it should be negatively related to the
probability of law enforcement, which is related to Becker’s (1968) result. An interesting
implication is that in any case, whatever the degree of offence is, the penalty should be
greater than twice the per period maximal gains from price-fixing for the firm. This in
some sense confirms the suggestion which has been made in the beginning of the chapter
that, indeed, the penalty should be related not only to the gains from price-fixing for the
firm but also to the loss in consumer surplus due to price-fixing, which is approximately
twice the monopoly profits in case of full collusion.
There is a number of possible extensions of the model described in this chapter. It
seems reasonable to assume that the duration of the game is large. Thus it might be
interesting to consider also the case of an infinite time horizon in more detail and try to
find a more general solution for this setting. In this case the salvage values must be equal
to zero and the discount rate must be strictly positive for reasons of convergence of the
objective functionals. New insights may be gained by looking at heterogeneity among
the violating firms and, consequently, different penalty schedules for offences of different
gravity and differentiation between industries can also help to improve the deterrence
power of the current penalty schemes for violations of competition law. The introduction
of new state variables such as the offender’s criminal record or the accumulated gain from
cartel formation could give new insights for the determination of optimal penalty schemes
for antitrust law violations. This task will be accomplished in the next chapter of the
thesis, where we discuss properties of the penalty schemes that take into account history
of the violation through the accumulated illegal gains from price-fixing activities.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Appendix 1. Complete Solution of Differential Game
with Linear Penalty Schedule
Solution of the Problem of Player 2 (firm)25
Let us start by solving the optimal control problem of player 2 defined by (3.18) and
(3.19), where we take into account that, according to (3.4), s(q(t)) is given by the





e−rt[(Πmq(t)(2− q(t))−KΠmφ(t)q2(t))(1− F (t))]dt + C2(T )[1− F (T )] (3.18)
s.t.
.
F (t) = φ(t)q(t)[1− F (t)], F (0) = 0, F (t) ∈ [0, 1] and q(t) ∈ [0, 1]. (3.19)
Now φ(t) is assumed to be a fixed function.
The Hamiltonian of this problem equals
H(q, F, µ, t) = [Πmq(t)(2− q(t))−KΠmφ(t)q2(t) + µ(t)φ(t)q(t)] ∗ [1− F (t)].
Solving for q(t) and µ(t) we get:
(i)
.
µ(t) − rµ(t) = −∂H(q,F,µ,t)
∂F
. This implies that
.
µ(t) − rµ(t) = Πmq(t)(2 − q(t)) −
KΠmφ(t)q2(t) + µ(t)φ(t)q(t).
(ii) q∗(t) is such that it maximizes H(q, F, µ, t) on q ∈ [0, 1].
(iii) F (T ) is free, which implies a transversality condition of the following form:
µ(T ) = −C2(T ).
(ii) implies that
∂H(q, F, µ, t)
∂q
= 2Πm − 2Πmq(t) + µ(t)φ(t)− 2ΠmKq(t)φ(t).
The interior solution 2Πm − 2Πmq + µφ− 2ΠmKqφ = 0 gives us
µ = 2Πm
q − 1 + Kqφ
φ
.
Substituting this expression into the costate equation we obtain that
25For the sake of completeness we solve this game under the assumption that r ≥ 0. Therefore, the
results stated in section 3.3.1 (under assumption r = 0) will hold automatically.
60 DETERMINATION OF OPTIMAL PENALTIES FOR ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS IN A DYNAMIC SETTING
.
µ = rµ + Πmq(2− q)− ΠmKqφq + 2Πm(−1+q+Kqφ
φ
)φq = rµ + Πmq2 + ΠmKq2φ.
Furthermore, ∂H(q,F,µ,t)
∂q










0 if B ≤ 0
B if 0 < B ≤ 1
1 if B > 1.
Proof of µ(t) ≤ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. The transversality conditions are λ(T ) = −C1(T ) for player 1 (antitrust-
authority) and µ(T ) = −C2(T ) for player 2 (firm). Given C1(T ) ≥ 0 and C2(T ) ≥ 0
we have that λ(T ) ≤ 0 and µ(T ) ≤ 0, where λ(T ) and µ(T ) are values of the costate
variables of the game in the last period.
Taking into account the conditions above we can show that µ(t) ≤ 0 for t ∈ [0, T ).
Assume that there is t′ ∈ [0, T ) such that µ(t′) > 0. Then, according to the concavity
of PS(q) we obtain from the costate equation for µ(t) that
.
µ(t′) = µ(t′)r + Πmq(t′)2 +
ΠmKq(t′)2p(t′) ≥ 0. Hence, a non-positive terminal value given by µ(T ) = −C2(T ) could
never be reached. Therefore it holds that
µ(t) ≤ 0 for t ∈ [0, T ).
Solution of the Problem of Player 1 (antitrust authority)
Now we move to the solution of optimal control problem of player 1 defined by (3.20)





e−rt(NLSW (ψ(t)) + Np2(t))[1− F (t)]−KΠmψ(t)
.




F (t) = p(t)ψ(t)[1− F (t)], F (0) = 0, F (t) ∈ [0, 1] and p(t) ∈ [0, 1]. (3.21)
Now ψ(t) is assumed to be a fixed function.
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The Hamiltonian of this problem equals
H(p, F, λ, t) = [(Πm
1
2
ψ2(t) + Np2(t))− s(t)p(t)ψ(t) + λ(t)ψ(t)p(t)] ∗ [1− F (t)].











(ii) p∗(t) is such that it maximizes H(p, F, λ, t) on p ∈ [0, 1].
(iii) F (T ) is free, which implies a transversality condition of the following form:
λ(T ) = −C1(T ).
(ii) implies that
∂H(p, F, λ, t)
∂p











0 if D ≤ 0
D if 0 < D ≤ 1
1 if D > 1.
The equation 2Np−KΠmψψ + λψ = 0 gives λ = −2Np+KΠmψ2
ψ
.
Substituting this expression into the costate equation we obtain that
.
λ(t)− rλ(t) = Πm 1
2





Note that, since the sign of the expression for costate variable of player 1 given by
.
λ(t) − rλ(t) = 1
2
Πmq2 − Np2 is ambiguous, it holds that in general λ(t) has no unique
sign.
Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof. Consider the value of the control variable of the antitrust authority in the last
period of the game given by expression (3.8). It is clear that p∗(T ) = 0 if and only if
q(T ) = 0. But this contradicts the optimal path for the last period strategy of player 2
given by expression (3.6), which implies that, when p(T ) = 0, q∗(T ) must be equal to 1.
We conclude that p∗(T ) = 0 and q∗(T ) = 0 do not constitute a Nash equilibrium of the
game in the last period for arbitrary salvage value C2(T ). Consequently, the strategy
q(t) = 0 for all t cannot be sustained as a Nash equilibrium in open-loop or Markovian
strategies.
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Investigation of Stability of the System when the Penalty is Given by the
Expression s(q) = KΠmq.
From the solution of the problem of the firm (setting r = 0) we obtain that
µ =





µ(t) = 2Πmq − Πmq2 − (KΠmq)pq + (−2Πm+2Πmq+2KΠmqp
p
)pq = q2Πm (1 + Kp) .

























pΠm − 2 .pΠmq
p2
= q2Πm (1 + Kp) (3.24)




















p into (3.24) and solving for
.






Πmq2 − Πmq3 − 2Np2 + 4qNp2 + 2Np3qK
2Kp2qN + KΠmq2 −KΠmq3 + 2Np .





−2 .p + 2 .pq + q2p2 + q2p3K




q into (3.25) and solving for
.






K2Πmq2p2 + 4Np2 + 4Np3K − Πmq2
2Kp2qN + KΠmq2 −KΠmq3 + 2Np .
Solving the system of equations above for
.
p = 0 and
.
q = 0 we obtain that the solution
p = 0, q = 0 is also a steady state equilibrium of the game described in section 3 of this
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chapter. But after careful analysis of the phase diagram of this system we can conclude
that the equilibrium p = 0, q = 0 is not stable for some policy relevant values of the
parameters of the system.
Given the parameters Πm = 1, N = 2, K = 0.5 and given the domain of the control








Figure 3.5: Phase portrait in (p,q)-space for the model with linear penalty schedule and
convex costs of law enforcement for the set of parameters K = 0.5, N = 2, Πm = 1.
OA is the locus where the variable p changes its dynamics and OB is the locus where
the variable q changes its dynamics.
By studying the phase diagram we can conclude that solution p∗ = 0, q∗ = 0 cannot
be a stable equilibrium, i.e. an equilibrium to which the system converges in the long
run.
3.6.2 Appendix 2
In this appendix we show that for the games described in sections 3, 4 and 5 of this
chapter the candidates for an open-loop Nash optimality are also candidates for Marko-
vian Nash optimality and hence the open-loop strategies are also optimal in the set of
Markovian strategies.
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We have already mentioned that, referring to Feichtinger (1983) we can define the
game under consideration as a state-separable game, i.e. the game which has the prop-
erty that the state variable does not occur in the maximum conditions as well as in the
adjoint equations. For such a game the system of differential equations for the Nash-
optimal controls can be derived and also the qualitative behavior of the optimal solution
can be obtained from a phase diagram analysis in the (p, q)- plane.
According to Feichtinger (1983), in state-separable differential games the candi-
dates for open-loop Nash optimality are also candidates for Markovian Nash optimality.
The strategies are independent of the state variable because neither the Hamiltonian-
maximizing conditions nor the adjoint equations depend on state variable F . Thus, the
open-loop strategies are also optimal in the set of Markovian strategies. Usually it is
shown by verifying the sufficient conditions for Markovian Nash equilibrium controls as
in Leitmann and Stalford (1974).
For the particular game described in section 3.3 of the chapter the procedure of
verifying the sufficient conditions will be as follows.
Recall the definition of Markovian Nash Equilibria given in section 3.2.1. So searching
for Markovian equilibria we impose that the choice of the control variable by each player
will depend on the realization of state variable and also that both players can observe
this realization. In that case the optimal strategies of player 1 (antitrust authority) and
player 2 (firm) must be p(t) = φ(F (t), t) and q(t) = ψ(F (t), t), respectively.
Solving for the open-loop Nash equilibria of the game of section 3 we get q∗(t) =
2Πm+µ(t)p(t)
2Πm+2ΠmKp(t)




Now we substitute q∗(t) and p∗(t) into H2(q, F, µ, t) and H1(p, F, λ, t). Then the
Maximized Hamiltonians will have the following form:
H2∗(q, F, µ, t) = [Πmq∗(t)(2− q∗(t)− s(q(t), p(t))φ(t)q∗(t) + µ(t)φ(t)q∗(t)][1− F (t)]
H1∗(p, F, λ, t) = [(Πm
1
2
ψ2(t) + Np∗2(t)− s(q(t), p(t))p∗(t)ψ(t) + λ(t)ψ(t)p∗(t)][1−F (t)].
Recall also that in the state-separable game described above the adjoint equations
do not depend on the state variable and, consequently, costate variables will not depend
on the state variable as well.
Taking the above considerations into account we can notice that the Maximized
Hamiltonian functions of both players are linear ( and hence concave ) with respect to the






are indeed nondegenerate Markovian Nash Equilibria of the game in section
3.2.2. Since q∗(t) and p∗(t) do not depend on F (t) this open-loop Nash equilibrium of
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this game could be also regarded as a Nash Equilibrium of a differential game in which
both players have full Markovian information.
The same reasoning holds for the model in section 4 of this chapter.
3.6.3 Appendix 3. Calculation of steady states in the model of
section 3.4
In this appendix we verify that the equilibrium (q∗ = 0, p∗ = 0) is also a stable unique




. Firstly, we derive the system of differential equations for the Nash-
optimal controls in general. They are given in expressions (3.30) and (3.31). However,
since objective functions of this game are quite complicated expressions in terms of
control variables, the stability of the system cannot be investigated analytically with
the help of general techniques such as an evaluation of the trace and the determinant of
the Jacobian matrix. Therefore, in order to investigate the qualitative behavior of the
optimal solution we employ a phase diagram analysis in the (p, q)- plane for a specific
set of parameter values. Finally, we summarize the results of this analysis in Figure 3.6.
To simplify the calculations we assume that there is no discounting. Unfortunately,
we were not able to obtain closed form expressions even for the dynamics of control values
in case r > 0. However, we can presume that under r > 0 the effect of the penalty should
be even stronger, since the accumulated expected future gain from price-fixing for the
firm would be less.
The solution of the problem of player 2 gives
µ =





µ(t) = q2Πm (1 + Kp) .










Πmq2 −Np2 − qG.











pΠm − 2 .pΠmq − .pG
p2
= q2Πm (1 + Kp) , (3.28)
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Πmq2 −Np2 − qG. (3.29)






2 (Πm)2 q2(1− q) + 4ΠmNp2(2q − 1) + ΠmqG(3q − 4) + 2q(Np2 − qG) + 4ΠmqNp3K
4KΠmp2qN + 2K (Πm)2 q2 + 4ΠmNp− 2 (Πm)2 q3K −GKΠmq2 − 2GNp .
(3.30)
From (3.28) it follows that
.
p = Πmq2p
K2Πmq2p2 + 4Np2 + 4Np3K − Πmq2 + 2qG + 2qGpK
4KΠmp2qN + 2K (Πm)2 q2 + 4ΠmNp− 2 (Πm)2 q3K −GKΠmq2 − 2GNp.
(3.31)
In order to be able to conduct a more transparent analysis we make assumptions
about the parameters of the model. First, we normalize monopoly profits to 1, i.e.
Πm = 1, while the parameter of the penalty scheme is G = 2Πm = 2. Moreover, the
costs of law enforcement should be proportional to the amounts of extra gains from
price-fixing in every particular industry, since the more the firm has resources, the more
efficient it will be in hiding the violation and if violation is found the more fears will be
the battle in the court. Consequently the antitrust authority has to spend more resources
in order to catch and sew the firm. Taking the above considerations into account we
consider N ∼= Πm = 1. Parameter K can be equal to 2 as in static settings or less,
this influences neither the location of the steady state, nor the dynamics of the system
around steady state.26






4q − q2 + 4p2 + 4p3






4q2p2 + 4p2 + 8p3 − q2 + 4q + 8qp
2p2 − q2 .
Given the complexity of the problem, we cannot derive any stability results from
studying the Jacobian matrix. Therefore, we rely on phase plane analysis.
The phase diagram of the above system in the (p, q)-plane is presented in Figure 3.6.
In this diagram the locuses where the variable q changes its sign are
q = 0, q = 2 + 2
√
(1 + p2 + p3), q = 2− 2
√
(1 + p2 + p3), q =
√
2p, q = −√2p.
And the locuses where the variable p changes its sign are q = 0, p = 0, p = −0.5,
26Note that there is one location of steady state which is not influenced by the values of parameters
of the system at all, which is in the point p = 0, q = 0. This can be seen immediately from the system
(3.28), (3.29).
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p',q' change sign 
p',q' change sign 
Figure 3.6: Complete phase portrait in (p,q)-space for the model where penalty schedule
is given by s(q, p) = KΠmq+ G
p






(1− 2p3 + p2)
)











Recall that the domain of the controls is determined as (p, q) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1]. Con-
sidering the dynamics of the system in this domain, we conclude that for certain initial
values of control variables, in particular q >
√
2p , the system will always converge to the
point (0, 0). Moreover starting in any point with characteristics q ≤ √2p will bring the
system into the point (1, 1), which, as we will prove below, is clearly suboptimal com-
pared to the solution (0, 0) given the above parameter values. So we can conclude that
q∗ = 0, p∗ = 0 is the stable steady state solution of the system of differential equations
(3.30), (3.31).
In order to verify the above statement we consider the values of objective functionals
for both players in points (0, 0) and (1, 1).
In case p(t) = 0, q(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ] we obtain
.
F (t) = p(t)q(t)[1− F (t)]|p=0,q=0 = 0.
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Then, given that F (0) = 0, it follows that F (t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
In case p(t) = 1, q(t) = 1 for all t ∈ [0, T ] we obtain
.
F (t) = p(t)q(t)[1− F (t)]|p=1,q=1 = 1− F.
Then, given that F (0) = 0 it follows that F (t) = 1− e−t for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Thus, the utility of the firm in both situations can be written as follows J2|(0,0) =
C2(T ) and J2|(1,1) = (K + 1)Πm(e−T − 1) + C2(T )[e−T ].
Note also that (K + Πm)(e−T − 1) + C2(T )[e−T ] < C2(T ), so that the firm is always
better off in point (0, 0).





J1|(1,1) = 2ΠmT − ((
3
2
+ K)Πm −N)(e−T − 1).
Note that 2ΠmT − ((3
2
+ K)Πm − N)(e−T − 1) < 2ΠmT , when N < (3
2
+ K)Πm.
Clearly, this inequality is satisfied given parameters values K = 2, N = 1, G = 2, Πm = 1.
CHAPTER 4
Analysis of the Properties of Current Penalty Schemes for
Violations of Antitrust Law
4.1 Introduction
This chapter analyzes the optimal policies for the deterrence of violations of antitrust
law. We study the effects of penalty schemes, determined according to current US and
EU antitrust laws, on the behavior of the firm. We investigate intertemporal aspects of
this problem using a dynamic optimal control model of utility maximization by the firm
under antitrust enforcement.
This chapter addresses the problem of whether the fine, determined on the basis
of accumulated turnover of the firm participating in a cartel, can provide a complete
deterrence outcome. We assume that the imposed fine takes into account the history
of the violation. This means that when the violation of antitrust law is discovered, the
regulator is able to observe all accumulated rents from cartel formation. Consequently,
it will impose the fine that takes into account this information. We also compare the
deterrence power of this system with the fixed penalty scheme.
The OECD report provides a description of the available sanctions for cartels accord-
ing to the laws of member countries1. Those laws allow for considerable fines against
enterprizes found to have participated in price-fixing agreements. In some cases, how-
1See O.E.C.D. (2002a) or Wils (2002).
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ever, the maximal fines determined by these laws may not be sufficiently large to ac-
commodate multiples of the gain to the cartel, as suggested by expected utility theory.
In most of the countries the maximal fines are expressed either in absolute terms or as
a percentage (10%) of the overall annual turnover of the firm2. However, according to
experts’ estimations, the best policy is to impose the penalties, which are a multiple of
the illegal gains from price-fixing agreements to the firms. This, of course, would be
difficult to estimate in real life, so it is still common practice to use the percentage of
turnover as a proxy of the gains from price-fixing activities.
Several countries, namely the US, Germany, and New Zealand, have already accom-
modated this more advanced system. Instead of total turnover, in the US and Germany
the maximal fine is stated in terms of unlawful gains. In Germany the maximal fine
equals the maximum of the administrative fine of EUR 511518 or three times the ad-
ditional profit from the cartel. In the US the maximal fine is the maximum of USD 10
million or twice the gain to the cartel3. New Zealand has the most advanced system.
It provides for three alternatives: the maximum of NZD 10 million, three times the
illegal gain, or if the illegal gain is not known, 10% of the total annual turnover of the
enterprise. In general, the determination of the final amount of the fine, to be paid by
the firm in each particular case, is based on the degree of offence, which is proportional
either to the amount of accumulated illegal gains from the cartel or to its proxy, turnover
involved throughout entire duration of infringement.
So, we can conclude that the current penalty schemes for antitrust law violations
are mainly based on the turnover involved in the infringement throughout the entire
duration of the infringement, which serves as a proxy of the accumulated gains from
cartel or price-fixing activities for the firm. At the same time there exists an upper
bound for the penalties for violations of antitrust law. The fine is constrained from
above by the maximum of a certain monetary amount, a multiple of the illegal gains
from the cartel, or if the illegal gain is not known, 10% of the total annual turnover of
the enterprise. The idea of the current chapter is to incorporate these features of the
current penalty systems into a dynamic model of intertemporal utility maximization by
a firm, which is subject to antitrust enforcement.
Similar to Fent et al. (1999), the set up of the problem leads to an optimal control
model. The main difference compared to Fent et al. (1999) or Feichtinger (1983) is




takes the role of a state variable, whereas the idea of Fent et al. (1999) was to take
the offender’s criminal record as a state variable of the dynamic game. An increase in
the state variable is thus positively related to the degree of price fixing by the firm,
and increases the fine the firm can expect in case of being convicted. By solving the
optimal control problem of the firm under antitrust enforcement, we will investigate the
implications of the different penalty schedules. It should also be mentioned that the
model of Chapter 4 is an extension of the model used in the study described in Chapter
3 in the sense that, in the former, we relate the penalty not only to the current degree
of offence, but also to the accumulated illegal gains from cartel formation. We assume
that the fine imposed takes into account the history of the violation. This means that
when the violation of antitrust law is discovered, the regulator is able to observe all
accumulated rents from cartel formation. Consequently, he will impose the fine that
takes into account this information.
Furthermore, this framework allows us to analyze the consequences of two major
modifications of the penalty systems for violations of competition law, which have been
recently discussed by the OECD and the US Department of Justice (DOJ)4. These
modifications were concerned with increasing the multiplier for the base fine and raising
the legal upper bound for the imposed fines.
The main results are that, for the benchmark case, i.e., when the penalty is fixed,
the outcome with complete deterrence of cartel formation is possible but only at the
cost of shutting down the firm. In other words, the fixed penalty, which can ensure
complete deterrence, is too high, because it leads to immediate bankruptcy. However,
the result can be improved by relating the penalty to the illegal gains from price-fixing.
The proportional scheme appears to be more appropriate than the fixed penalty, since it
can ensure no price-fixing outcome in the long run even in case penalties are moderate5.
Similar to the Garoupa (1997, 2001) approach, we also study the impact of the
main parameters of the penalty scheme (probability and severity of punishment) on
the efficiency of deterrence and analyze the optimal trade-off between changes in the
scale parameter of the proportional penalty scheme and probability of law enforcement.
It turns out that, the higher the probability and severity of punishment, the earlier
the cartel formation is blocked. The sensitivity analysis shows that when the penalties
are already high, the antitrust policy aiming at a further increase in the severity of
4See D.O.J. (1998).
5Unfortunately, complete deterrence outcome, i.e. full compliance behavior in all the periods of the
planning horizon, is not sustainable even with proportional penalties.
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punishment is less efficient than the policy that increases the probability of punishment.
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2 we describe the general setup of an
optimal control model of the firm under antitrust enforcement. In section 4.3 we consider
the case where the upper bound for the penalty is an exogenously given fixed monetary
amount. Moreover, we will derive an analytical expression for this upper bound, which
allows to achieve the result of complete deterrence of price-fixing. In section 4.4 we
investigate the implications of the penalty being proportional to the accumulated gains
from price-fixing. We also conduct sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium values of the
variables of the model with respect to the parameters of the penalty scheme. Section
4.5 summarizes the results of the analysis and suggests directions for future work.
4.2 Optimal Control Model. The General Setup.
We introduce the basic ingredients of the intertemporal optimization problem of a profit
maximizing firm, which participates in an illegal cartel. The key variable is the accumu-
lated gains from prior criminal offences (in case of a cartel, these offences are price-fixing
activities).
Dynamics of the accumulated rents from price-fixing
The accumulated rents from price-fixing, w(t), is the state variable of the model,
which increases depending on the degree of offence (price-fixing). Using a continuous
time scale the dynamics of the accumulated rents from price-fixing equals6
.
w(t) = πmq(t)(2− q(t)), (4.1)
w(0) = w0 ≥ 0.
Here
.
w(t) stands for the change in the value of the state variable at time t, πm denotes
the instantaneous illegal gains from cartel, q(t) denotes the degree of price-fixing by the
firm at instant t, and w0 is the initial wealth of the firm before the start of the planning
horizon. Expression (4.1) rests on the assumption of the demand function being linear.
A complete derivation of expression (4.1) is given in section 3.2.1 of the previous chapter,
where
.
w(t) is associated with instantaneous producer surplus for the firm caused by
fixing price levels above the competitive level. The main idea behind this formulation
is that cartel formation leads to higher prices. The ”normal” price is c (competitive
6To simplify the analysis for the rest of this chapter we assume w0 = 0. However, relaxing this
assumption does not change the results stated in propositions of this chapter.
4.2: Optimal Control Model. The General Setup. 73
equilibrium) leading to zero profits. Then q denotes the degree of violation, i.e. when
the cartel fixes a higher price than ”normal”. From the definition of q in section 3.2.1
of Chapter 3 it is clear that in case of such a violation, i.e. when price is higher than
competitive level, q is positive. Based on the simple linear demand function7 , profit, or
producer surplus, can be expressed as a concave function of q. Now the state variable
w(t) adds up the profits over time, and as such w(t) is the total gain from crime (too
high prices) from time 0 up to t.
There are strong legal and economic reasons for introduction of the state variable
in the form of accumulated gains from price-fixing. It is related to the fact, that in US
and EU guidelines for imposition of fines for antitrust violations, the penalty imposed
in many cases is based mainly on the turnover involved in the infringement throughout
the entire duration of the infringement. Clearly, the accumulated turnover serves as a
proxy for accumulated gains from cartel or price-fixing activities for the firm.
In addition, according to the OECD survey, the fines imposed recently, expressed as
a percentage of the gain, varied widely, from 3% to 189%. In only four cases the fines
were more than 100% of the estimated gain, and in no case the fine was as high as two
or three times the gain, as recommended by some experts. So, we can conclude that
sanctions actually imposed have not reached the optimal level for deterrence, which,
according to a well known Becker’s (1968) result, suggests that the fine should be a
multiple of illegal gains.
Profit function
The instantaneous illegal gains from price-fixing for the firm equal πmq(t)(2− q(t)).
This function has been derived from the microeconomic model underlying the problem
of price-fixing8. Obviously, this function implies that the marginal profit for the firm
is always positive and strictly declining in the interval q(t) ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, for each
positive level of offence the profit is also positive.
The instantaneous profit at time t will also be influenced by accumulated rents from
price-fixing. This variable also measures the experience the firm has in cartel formation.
The more it has experience, the more efficiently the firm colludes and, consequently,
the higher the instantaneous profits from price-fixing9. This influence is reflected in the
7See section 3.2.1 of Chapter 3.
8For complete derivation of this expression see section 3.2.1.
9It is reasonable to assume that it is easier to reach an agreement with other members of the cartel
when the cartel has already been in place for some time, rather than to reach an agreement while
forming a new cartel.
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term γw(t) which enters additively the objective function of the firm (see expression
(4.4) below)10.
Law enforcement policy
The goal of the current section is to incorporate the features of the penalty system for
antitrust law violations, described above, into the optimal control model of intertemporal
utility maximization by the firm in the presence of a benevolent antitrust authority,
whose aim is to block any degree of price-fixing which is equivalent to minimization of
loss in social welfare due to an increase in price above the competitive level11. So, in
order to capture the specifics of the sentencing guidelines and current antitrust practice,
we model the penalty for violations of antitrust law as a linear increasing function of the
accumulated rents from price-fixing for the firm. Therefore, it can be written as
s(w) = αw. (4.2)
This setup will also allow to study the effects of the changes of the multiplier for
the base fine (refinement suggested by OECD) on the deterrence power of the penalty
scheme.
According to Becker (1968) the cost of different punishments to an offender can be
made comparable by converting them into their monetary equivalent or worth. And this
is satisfied in our model, since we measure the accumulated rents from price-fixing for
the firm in monetary units.
Moreover, our specification of the penalty function satisfies three main conditions
specified in Fent et al. (1999), namely:
1. It is strictly increasing in the level of offence (since w(t) is strictly increasing in
q(t)).
2. Firms which do not collude at all should not be punished: s(w0) = 0.
3. Any detected positive level of offence should lead to a positive amount of punish-
ment: s(w(t)) > 0, for any w(t) > w0, which is equivalent to q(t) > 0 for some t ∈ [0, T ].
10It may be more realistic to express this term as a nonlinear function of w. In particular, a concave
formulation may be very tractable since there might be decreasing marginal returns from experience.
However, it will not change the results of the paper in a qualitative sense. The solution of the model
in case experience gain is modeled as γ
√
w gives the outcome with complete deterrence similar to
Proposition 2 and results of sensitivity analysis for the model with proportional penalty still hold. The
analysis of the model, where penalty is fixed, with γ
√
w term gives the same qualitative result but the
model can only be solved numerically. A complete proof of this statement is available from author upon
request.
11For verification of this statement see also section 3.2.1.
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This implies that, if the firm has been checked, violated the law in the current period
and participated in the cartel in some of the previous periods, the fine will be imposed
on the basis of the whole accumulated gains from price-fixing, w(t), and thus not only
on the basis of the current degree of offence, q(t).
Further, we will compare the efficiency and deterrence power of the penalty systems
for a model in which the penalty is given by expression (4.2) and a model in which the
penalty is fixed (s(w) = Smax), where Smax is the fixed upper bound for the penalty
introduced in the sentencing guidelines, which is not related to the level of offence.
Costs of being punished
The cost of being punished at time t equals the expected value of the fine that has to
be paid. This will be defined as the probability of being audited by antitrust authority,
p (level of law enforcement), p ∈ [0, 1], times the degree of offence at time t, q(t), times
the level of punishment, s(t), which depends on time as well:
expected penalty at time t = s(t)pq(t). (4.3)
So, the expected penalty is determined by expression (4.3), where pq(t) is the prob-
ability of being punished at time t and s(t) is the fine, which may either be fixed or can
be expressed as a function of accumulated gains from price-fixing.
We should stress here that the firm can only be caught at time t if q(t) > 0, i.e.
the offence is committed exactly at this time. Of course this need not be the case for
criminal acts in general: you can convict a thief, if the police has found the stolen things
without having caught the burglar in action.12 However, it does apply to antitrust law
practices. According to the US sentencing guidelines (2001) and OECD report (2002),
investigation concerning past behavior only starts at the moment it is observed that
the current price exceeds the competitive price, thus when q(t) > 0. After this has
been proved (usually on the basis of empirical analysis of price mark-ups), the antitrust
authority will start a more detailed investigation and get access to accounting books and
documents that can prove the existence of a cartel agreement. Only after that the gains
from price-fixing (w(t)) become “perfectly observable”, so that the court (or competition
authority) can take them into account while determining the amount of fine to be paid.
Here it is also important to realize that the probability of being caught at instant t
is pq(t). The firm can only be caught at time t1 if it does price-fixing on that date, so if
q(t1) > 0. Later in time, say at time t2 > t1, the firm cannot be punished because of the
12We thank an anonymous referee who pointed out this difference.
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offence at time t1. At t2 it can only be caught and punished if q(t2) > 0. At the moment
the firm is caught it has to pay a fine, s(t). In one scenario this fine is an increasing
function of w(t). So this means that if the firm did a lot of price-fixing in the past,
implying that w(t) is large, the fine will be larger. In this sense repeated offenders are
more heavily punished, and this is what quite frequently happens in modern democratic
societies. So if the firm is caught at time t2, it is convicted for the crime on t2, and
the level of the fine depends on what the firm did in the past, thus also what it did at
time t1 < t2 as well. In other words, the higher the degree of price-fixing before t2, the
larger the fine will be at t2. This is independent of how many times the firm was caught
in the past: the fine the firm paid before will not be subtracted from w. Since w is
non-decreasing over time, it is implicitly taken into account that repeated offenders will
be more heavily punished.13
Optimization problem





e−rt[πmq(t)(2− q(t)) + γw(t)− s(t)pq(t)]dt (4.4)
s.t.
.
w(t) = πmq(t)(2− q(t)) and q(t) ∈ [0, 1].
The parameter r is the discount rate. The objective functional J(q(t)) is the dis-
counted profit stream gained from engaging in price-fixing activities. The term πmq(t)(2−
q(t)) reflects the instantaneous rents from collusion and the term −s(t)pq(t) reflects the
possible punishment for the firm, if it is caught. Note that the higher the degree of
collusion, the higher the q(t), the higher the expected punishment. γw(t) reflects the
experience of the firm in cartel formation which increases future instantaneous gains
from cartel formation.
Having made the assumptions of section 2 we define the current value Hamiltonian:
Hc(q, w, µ, t) = πmq(t)(2− q(t)) + γw(t)− s(t)pq(t) + µ(t)(πmq(t)(2− q(t))) (4.5)
13In reality it works as follows. If the firm is convicted for the second time its fine is increasing in
the amount of price fixing, but compared to the fine for the first conviction, the fine to be paid for
the second conviction will be multiplied with a higher number. To model this, ideally after the first
conviction the fine is αw(t1), while for the second conviction the fine should be cα(w(t2)−w(t1)) with
c > 1. We did not see a chance to model this in a tractable optimal control framework. Therefore, we
decided to approximate this with having a fine equal to αw(t). Since w(t) is non-decreasing over time,
it is implicitly taken into account that repeated offenders will be more heavily punished.
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where µ(t) is the current value adjoint variable representing the shadow price of the
offence. The Hamiltonian is well-defined and differentiable for all nonnegative values of
the state variable w(t) and all values of the control variable q(t) in its domain [0, 1].
4.3 The Model where the Penalty is Represented by
a Fixed Monetary Amount
In this section we would like to model the situation where the penalty for violations of
antitrust law is represented by a fixed monetary amount. In this case we assume that
the fine does not depend on the accumulated gains from price-fixing and is constant
over time. This might be a good framework to study the efficiency of antitrust enforce-
ment in an environment where there exists an upper bound for penalties and offences
are so grave that punishment always reaches its upper bound, which is true for highly
cartelized markets. The analysis of this model is quite essential, since the imposition of
the upper bound for penalties for violations of antitrust law is still a current practice in
most countries.14 Only Norway and Denmark do not have this limitation. We modify
the model of section 4.2 in such a way that the fine is given by some fixed monetary
amount, Smax, which denotes the maximal penalty. In other words, the antitrust author-
ity commits to a policy of the following form: the rate of law enforcement is constant
p(t) = p ∈ (0, 1] for all t, and, when the firm is inspected, the penalty is given by
s(t) =
{
Smax if q(t) > 0
0 if q(t) = 0.
In this section we show that if the fixed penalty (or upper bound for the fine imposed
by law) is not high enough, complete deterrence is never possible. Moreover, we will
derive an analytical expression for the upper bound, which allows to achieve the result of
complete deterrence of price-fixing. For simplicity, we assume that there is no discounting
(r = 015), the planning horizon is finite (T < ∞), salvage values for both players are
equal to zero, so that the transversality conditions are λ(T ) = 0, µ(T ) = 0 for both
players.
14There are certain policy reasons that lie behind the provision of an upper bound for fines in com-
petition legislation, namely, to prevent firms from bankruptcy.
15To make the analysis more transparent and analytically solvable we assume here that r = 0.
However, imposing that r > 0 does not change the qualitative predictions of the model. Only the
dynamics of the costate variable of the firm changes. The equation for µ(t) becomes µ(t) = γr (1−e(t−T )).
A complete proof of this statement is available from the author upon request.
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c(q, w, µ, t)
∂w
. (4.7)
The expression (4.7) gives
.
µ(t) = −γ. Solving this simple differential equation in
case of finite planning horizon, we get µ(t) = γ(T − t). Consequently, µ(t) ≥ 0 for
all t ∈ [0, T ] . This allows us to conclude that the Hamiltonian (4.5) is strictly concave
with respect to q. Therefore, condition (4.6) is equivalent to Hcq = 0. It leads to
q(t) = 1− pS
max
2πm(1 + γ(T − t)) = C. (4.8)
However, the control region of the offence rate q is limited by [0, 1], by construction.






0 if C ≤ 0
C if 0 < C ≤ 1
1 if C > 1.
(4.9)
We can represent the optimal degree of price-fixing by the firm, q, as a decreasing
function of both the penalty for violation and time, which is depicted in Figure 4.1. The
first part of this statement is quite intuitive, since a higher expected penalty will, ob-
viously, increase the incentives for the profit maximizing firms to avoid participation in
price-fixing agreements and thus reduce the degree of offence, q. The negative relation-
ship between the degree of price-fixing and time is related to the fact that higher gains
from price-fixing in the beginning imply that for a longer time period the firm can take
an advantage of it, in the sense that due to increased experience profits from price-fixing
will be higher. So, incentives to commit crime decrease over time and, hence, the degree
of offence falls.
The state-control dynamics
After we substitute (4.8) into (4.1) the differential equation describing the dynamics
of the state variable will be as follows:
.
w(t) = πm(1− ( S
maxp
2πm(1 + γ(T − t)))
2). (4.10)

















Figure 4.1: Representation of optimal degree of price-fixing as a decreasing function of
penalty for violation and time for parameter values: T = 10, πm = 2, γ = 1
2
, p = 1
2
.
The solution of this differential equation in general form will have the following form:




γ (1 + γT − γt) + C1,
where C1 is a constant determined from the initial condition w(0) = w0.
To understand the exact dynamics of the state and control variables over time we
consider a numerical example. For parameter values p = 1
2
, Smax = 2, πm = 2, γ =
1
2
, T = 10, the solution of this differential equation in general form will be as follows:
w(t) = 1
2(−12+t) + 2t + C. Taking w(0) = 1, we get
w(t) =
1




The optimal degree of price-fixing will have the following form: q(t) = 1− 1
24−2t and





0 if 1− 1
24−2t ≤ 0
1− 1
24−2t if 0 < 1− 124−2t ≤ 1
1 if 1− 1
24−2t > 1.
The results for different values of Smax are summarized in the Table 4.1.
Table 4.1.
Penalty Accumulated gains from collusion Degree of price-fixing
2 w(t) = 1
2(−12+t) + 2t +
25
24
, w(T ) = 20 q∗(t) = 1− 1
24−2t ,→ q(T ) = 34
10 w(t) = 25
2(−12+t) + 2t +
49
24
, w(T ) = 15 q∗(t) = 1− 5
24−2t ,→ q(T ) = 0
20 w(t) = 50
(−12+t) + 2t +
31
6
, w(T ) ≈ 0. 1 q∗(t) = 1− 10
24−2t ,→ q(T ) = 0
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Consequently, when all the parameters of the model are fixed, w(t) is increasing over
time and the degree of offence is a decreasing function of time. Unfortunately, we must
conclude that, for example, when the fixed penalty equals 2, which is the instantaneous
monopoly profit for the firm for these parameter values, it does not allow to achieve
complete deterrence even in the last period. On the contrary, the last period degree of
price-fixing is quite high (75% out of 100%).
We can conclude that the policies with fixed penalty appear to be highly inefficient,
since to achieve q∗(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ] we should have 1 − s(t)p
2πm(1+γ(T−t)) ≤ 0, which
implies s(t) ≥ 2πm(1+γ(T−t))
p
. In the example with parameter values T = 10, πm = 2, γ =
1
2
, p = 1
2
we get s(0) ≥ 48 = 24πm and s(T ) = s(10) ≥ 8 = 4πm. This enormous penalty
will drive the firm bankrupt immediately16. Moreover, this result is counterintuitive and
unfair, since the firm colluding for one period will obtain less extra gain than a firm
colluding for ten periods, and, consequently, should be punished less.
The main result of the analysis of the model with fixed penalty is represented in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4.1 In the optimal control model, where p(t) = p > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ],
the no collusion outcome (i.e. complete deterrence of price-fixing) occurs when Smax ≥
2πm(1+γ(T−t))
p




It follows from this proposition that if the regulator would be able to take into
account the duration of the infringement while setting the fixed maximal upper bound
for the fine, Smax, then this fixed upper bound would have to be decreasing function
of time and rate of law enforcement and positively related to possible monopoly profits
in the industry and total length of the planning horizon. One of the implications of
this result is that the penalty for antitrust violation, which potentially can provide
complete deterrence, should be imposed by the antitrust authority (thus, not by the
court), i.e. by the authority which has complete information about the probability of
law enforcement. Another interesting implication is that the fine should be inversely
related to the probability of investigation (similar to Becker (1968)). Moreover, the
penalty should be based mainly on the instantaneous monopoly profits in the industry.
Of course, this value is different for each industry, so the specifics of the industry also
should be taken into account when the optimal fine for antitrust violations is determined.
The length of the planning horizon should also play a role in determining the optimal
penalty.
16Here we define bankruptcy as a situation where the fine imposed on the firm is higher than the
maximal possible gain from the violation.
4.3: The Model where the Penalty is Represented by a Fixed Monetary Amount 81
However, in real life the implementation of this scheme is problematic, since the court
(not the antitrust authority) imposes the penalty and, consequently, the parameter p
cannot be verified.
Unfortunately, the fixed penalty system does not always work. For Smax < 2π
m(1+γ(T−t))
p
for some t, the result with no price-fixing outcome during the whole planning period is
not possible. For reasonable parameter values (such as p = 1
5
, πm = $1 million, γ =
1
5
, T = 10) we obtain that, for example, for violation of 1 million gravity discovered
in the fifth period of planning horizon (impling 5 years duration) the fine Smax must
be at least 8 million. This is clearly higher than the current fine levels determined by
European Sentencing Guidelines. In this situation the new policy sugession to increase
the legal upper bound or completely remove it from the rules, as it has been done in
Norway, Denmark, or US, can be a good solution.
Moreover, this result resembles the result of Emons (2003), where the subgame per-
fect punishment for repeated offenders in a repeated game setting was investigated. The
final conclusion of his paper is that if the regulator’s aim is to block violation at the
lowest possible cost, the penalty should be a decreasing function of time. Moreover, he
concludes that the first period penalty (penalty for the first detected violation) should be
the highest and should extract the entire wealth of the offender. So, another drawback
of this system is that it does not explain escalating sanctions based on offense history
which are embedded in many penal codes and sentencing guidelines.
Another problem with this result is that the fixed penalty, which can ensure complete
deterrence, is too high. It is clearly unbearable for the firm and leads to immediate
bankruptcy. Already for the first violation we have to punish twenty times more than
the maximal per-period monopoly profit. To resolve this ”impossibility result” we look
for another scheme. Again we take an example from current legislation. This other
system relates the penalty to the illegal gains from price-fixing. Moreover, it has already
been implemented in a number of developed countries and the US.
In particular, in the next section we introduce the penalty as a linear increasing
function of accumulated gains from price-fixing for the firm given by the expression
(4.2) above. The proportional scheme appears to be better than the fixed penalty, since
it can ensure the no collusion outcome in the long run even in the case where penalties
are moderate.
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4.4 Analysis of the Model with a Proportional Penalty
This setup reflects another important feature of the penalty systems for violations of
antitrust law suggested by current sentencing guidelines. Namely, that the fine is pro-
portional to the illegal gains from cartel formation. This more advanced system has
already been implemented in the US, Germany, New Zealand and some other countries.
Utility maximization.






µ(t)− rµ(t) = −γ + αpq(t). (4.12)
Since the control region of the offence rate q is limited by [0, 1], the maximization





0 if C ≤ 0
C if 0 < C ≤ 1
1 if C > 1
, (4.13)
where
C = 1− αw(t)p
2πm(1 + µ(t))
. (4.14)
We conclude that the optimal degree of price-fixing by the firm is a decreasing func-
tion of both the penalty for violation and the probability of law enforcement. This is
also quite intuitive from an economic point of view. The profit maximizing firm will
reduce their optimal degree of price-fixing in response to the increase in the rate of law
enforcement, since it makes conviction more likely. Secondly, increase in accumulated
illegal gains from collusion also rises the expected penalty, and this gives an additional
incentive for the firm to reduce the degree of price-fixing. This allows the system to
gradually converge to the socially desirable outcome with no price-fixing.
The analysis of the state-costate dynamics
Substituting (4.14) into (4.1) and (4.12) gives the following system of differential
equations:
{ .




µ(t) = −γ + αp(1− αwp
2πm(1+µ)
) + rµ = 0.
(4.15)
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A stationary point can be obtained by intersecting the locuses
.























→ q∗ = 0).
Existence of stationary points
Both the
.
w = 0 and
.
µ = 0 locuses are increasing functions of µ. From the expression
for
.
µ = 0 we obtain w(0) = 2πm(−γ+pα
α2p2
) and limµ→∞ w(µ) = ∞. Similarly, from the
expression for
.
w = 0 it follows w(0) = 2π
m
pα
and limµ→∞ w(µ) = ∞ .
Now we see that one condition for the existence of a stationary point in the positive
orthant (where w ≥ 0) is 2πm
pα
≥ 0, which is always true. Another necessary condition





This is always true. The final condition, that has to be satisfied in order to obtain the
existence of a unique point of intersection of the locuses
.
w = 0 and
.
µ = 0 in the positive
orthant, is that the slope of the line that corresponds to
.
µ = 0 in the (µ,w)- plane is









µ = 0 implies that
w′(µ) = 2πm(−γ+pα+2µr+r
α2p2
) . Comparing these two expressions, we can conclude that the
final condition for existence of stationary points in the positive orthant is satisfied for
any non-negative µ only in case that γ < r. This means that, when the extra benefits
for the firm from cartel formation do not increase much with the experience of the firm
in cartel formation, the outcome with no collusion is more likely to be sustained in the
long run, since it is less attractive for the firm to participate in the cartel agreements.
So a unique stationary point in the positive orthant always exists, except when p = 0
(i.e the probability to be caught is zero) or when γ > r (i.e. the extra benefits for the
firm from cartel formation increase very fast when the experience of the firm in cartel
formation increases). The optimal control problem does not have a stable solution in
these cases.
The solution procedure and construction of the phase portrait is illustrated via the
next example.
Example. We construct the phase portrait when the parameters are γ = 0.5, πm =
1, α = 2, p = 0.2, r = 0.2. The
.
w = 0 isocline is given by 1−( 25w
2(1+µ)
)2 = 0, which implies
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(225 + 160w). This implies that w∗ = 35
2
and µ∗ = 2.5.
 

















Figure 4.2: Phase portrait in the (w, µ)-space for the optimal control model for the set
of parameter values γ = 0.5, πm = 1, α = 2, p = 0.2, r = 0.2, where the penalty schedule
is given by s(w) = αw.
Studying the stability of the steady state equilibrium w∗ = 35
2
and µ∗ = 2.5 we obtain
the following expressions for the values of the trace and determinant of the Jacobian
matrix of system (4.15):
















































This allows us to conclude that the point with w∗ = 35
2
, µ∗ = 2.5, q∗ = 0 is a saddle
point.
Stability analysis
Starting with the system dynamics (4.15) in the state-costate space, we can calculate

















Obviously, the determinant has to be evaluated in the steady state (µ∗, w∗, q∗). It
turns out that trace J > 0 and det J < 0, so that the steady state is a saddle point.
In general, with arbitrary values of the parameters and arbitrary equilibrium values
the matrix J has two real eigenvalues of opposite sign and the steady state has the
local saddle-point property. This means that there exists a manifold containing the
equilibrium point such that, if the system starts at the initial time on this manifold and
at the neighborhood of the equilibrium point, it will approach the equilibrium point at
t →∞.
This proves the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2 The outcome with complete deterrence is sustainable in the long run,








and q∗ = 0 is a saddle point.
The proposition implies that in the long run the full compliance behavior arises in a
sense that the outcome with q∗ = 0 is the saddle point equilibrium of the model. This
means that one can always choose the initial value for the adjoint variable such that the
equilibrium trajectory starts on the stable manifold and converges to the steady state.
Economically speaking, the firm which maximizes profits over time under a proportional
penalty scheme will gradually reduce the degree of violation to zero. However there is
one exception: for p = 0 the degree of offence is maximal. The parameter α influences
only the speed of convergence to the steady state value, not the steady state value of the
control variable. Clearly, a higher α increases incentives for the firm to stop the violation
earlier. Basically, deciding on the time of stopping the violation the firm compares the
expected punishment and expected benefits from crime. Consequently, since in the setup
with proportional penalty the expected punishment also rises when the benefits from
price-fixing rise, in the long run the system will end up in the equilibrium with full
compliance.
Trajectories of the state, control and costate variables of the model
It is also illuminating to investigate the behavior of the variables of the model over
time and with respect to the main parameter of the penalty scheme.
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We can obtain analytical solutions for control, state and costate variables of the
model only in case p = 0 for all t:
p = 0 =⇒ q∗(t) = 1 for all t ∈ [0, T ] =⇒ µ(t) = γ(T − t) .























T       t 
Figure 4.3: Trajectories of the state, control and co-state variables of the model, where
p = 0 and α = 2, πm = 2, w0 = 0, γ =
1
2
, T = 10, r = 0.
Note that p = 0 never leads to complete deterrence, since (4.14) implies that the
best response of the firm in this case is q∗ = 1.
Now consider the situation where p > 0. Combining (4.15) and (4.14) we obtain that
.
w(t) = πm(1− ( αw(t)p
2πm(1 + µ(t))
)2), w(0) = w0. (4.16)
Even if we have the information about the dynamics of µ(t) we cannot obtain an
analytical solution for the differential equation (4.16). We can only conclude that in the
model, where the penalty is determined by s(w) = αw, the antitrust authority, whose
aim is to achieve no price-fixing outcome at least by the end of the planning period will
have to commit to the following policy:
s(t) = αw(t) for all t ∈ [0, T ] and p(t) =
{
1 for all t ∈ [0, t∗∗]
min{1, 2πm(1+µ(t))
αw(t∗∗) } for all t ∈ [t∗∗, T ]
Where t∗∗ is the root of the equation q(t) = 1− αw(t)
2πm(1+µ(t))
= 0 (see (4.14)).
4.4: Analysis of the Model with a Proportional Penalty 87
Note, that µ(t) > −1 for all t is an additional condition for the existence of the root





−γ + αpq(t) < 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
So the trajectories of the state, control and costate variables of the firm together
with the most cost efficient policy of the antitrust authority will have the following
form. When the firm is subject to antitrust enforcement with proportional penalty,
the degree of offence by the firm gradually declines and finally reaches its steady state
value. This happens because the expected penalty rises over time as well when the
firm commits offence more often. Consequently, the accumulated rents from price-fixing
activities to the firm increase over time, but the speed of this increase declines when the
system approaches the steady state equilibrium level. The aim of the antitrust authority
is to block the violation as fast as possible. In this case the most cost efficient policy
of the antitrust authority in response to this behavior of the firm would be to keep
the probability of law enforcement at the highest possible level until the state variable
reaches its steady state value and then reduce the efforts gradually keeping expression
(4.14) q∗(t) = 1− αw(t∗∗)p(t)
2πm(1+µ(t))
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Figure 4.4: Trajectories of the state, control and co-state variables of the model, with
optimally chosen p and α = 2, πm = 2, w0 = 0, γ =
1
2
, T = 10, r = 0.
A no price-fixing outcome (q(t) = 0) can be sustained, but it occurs only at the end
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of the planning period. To be more precise, the dynamics of the optimal behavior of
the firm is such that, given the parameters of the penalty system (p and α), the firm
gradually reduces the degree of offence to zero, which happens at time t∗∗. After that
no more collusion will take place. Consequently, accumulated gains from price-fixing
will gradually increase and after t = t∗∗ will stay at the level w(t∗∗). The parameters of
the penalty system (p and α) have an impact on the optimal behavior of the firm and
consequently on the deterrence power of the penalty system, which is measured by the
timing of optimal deterrence or, in other words, by the value of t∗∗. The higher α and p
the closer t∗∗ to the origin, and consequently the earlier the cartel formation is blocked.
Sensitivity analysis
Here we investigate in which direction the saddle point equilibrium moves if the
set of parameter values changes. Analyzing the properties of the proportional penalty
scheme (s(t) = αw(t)), the main parameters of our interest are the scale parameter of the
penalty schedule, α, and the parameter which determines the certainty of punishment,
p. They appear to be also quite important parameters for the firm, whose objective is to
maximize the expected rents from price-fixing in the presence of antitrust enforcement.
Clearly, the firm will condition its behavior on the parameters of the penalty scheme,
chosen by the regulator (see expression (7.1)). Moreover, the result obtained below will
provide hints on how to choose the optimal enforcement policy to minimize the steady
state degree of price-fixing by the firms.
As a result of the necessary optimality conditions, in the steady state equilibrium it
holds that
.
w(t) = f(q, w, µ, α, p) = πmq(2− q) = 0,
.
µ(t) = rµ(t)−Hw(q, w, µ, α, p) = rµ− γ + αpq = 0,
Hq(q, w, µ, α, p) = (2π
m − 2πmq)(1 + µ)− αwp = 0.
Computing the total derivative of the above equations with respect to α we get

fµ fw fq























0 0 2πm(1− q)
−r 0 −αp




















Performing the same exercise for parameter p we obtain that
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

0 0 2πm(1− q)
−r 0 −αp




















The next step is solving this system of linear equations with Cramer’s rule. In order












we first observe the sign of the
determinant 4 of the matrix of the coefficients:
4 = 2πm(1− q)rαp > 0.
The sign of ∂µ
∂α




0 0 2πm − 2πmq
pq 0 −αp
wp −αp 2πm(1 + µ)

 = −2πm(1− q)αqp2 < 0.




2πm(1−q)rαp = − qpr < 0. The same result holds





2πm(1−q)rαp = −αqr < 0. This means that the equilibrium steady
state value of the shadow price decreases when the slope of the penalty function (α)
increases or the rate of law enforcement increases. The reason is that with higher α or
p a higher accumulated wealth increases the expected punishment much faster than in
the case when α or p are low.










0 0 2πm(1− q)
−r pq −αp
2πm(1− q) wp 2πm(1 + µ)

 = −2πm(1 − q)rwp − 4pq(πm)2(1 −
q)2 < 0.


















This means that either an increase in the scale parameter of the penalty scheme or
an increase in the certainty of punishment would cause a reduction of the equilibrium
accumulated rents from collusion, so that the firms will try to reduce their gains in order
to be punished less.
Finally, we have a look at the change of the offence level caused by a change in the
slope of the punishment function or a change in the rate of law enforcement. That means
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So we can conclude that the effect of either change in certainty or in severity of the
penalty on the equilibrium value of the degree of offence is absent. It follows logically
from the model, since q∗ = 0 is a steady state solution of the model and its absolute
value and existence does not depend on the size of the parameters α and p.
The change in α or in p only influences the t∗∗ value in Figure 4.517. Numerical
analysis of the behavior of the state and control variables of the model with respect to
the main parameters of the penalty scheme (α and p) shows that a higher α or p leads
to earlier deterrence, i.e. t∗∗ moves closer to the origin (see Figure 4.5). Consequently,
the degree of price fixing is lower at each instant of time and total accumulated gains
from price-fixing by the colluding firm are lower. Moreover, this policy allows to reduce
the costs for society as well, since we can block violation earlier and hence reduce the
control efforts earlier.
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Figure 4.5: Numerical analysis of the behavior of the state and control variables of the
model with respect to the scale parameter of the penalty scheme (α) when parameter
values are γ = 0.5, πm = 1, p = 0.2, r = 0.2.
Looking at the partial derivatives of the state variable of the model with respect to
the main parameters of the penalty scheme we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3 a) Under the policies that provide underdeterrence, i.e. when α is





∣∣∣, the effects of detection probability and severity
of punishment on the deterrence power of the penalty scheme in the steady state are
equal.
17Recall also Figure 4.4 in the part where we describe optimal trajectories of the state, control and
costate variables of the model.
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∣∣∣, i.e. under the policies
that can potentially provide more efficient deterrence, the effect of an increase of the
probability of punishment on the deterrence power of the penalty scheme in the steady
state is much stronger.
Proof.
Consider the partial derivatives of the state variable of the model with respect to the

















Now we can show that, when α is higher than p, thus, for instance, when α > 1,
the decrease in w, in absolute terms, when α increases, is less than the decrease in




. Similarly, keeping in mind that p ∈ [0, 1] by construction, from
(4.18) we obtain that
∣∣∣∂w∂p
∣∣∣ > wr+2πm(1−q)qr .
The general conclusion of this subsection is that, when w0 = 0, only partial deterrence
is feasible. But nevertheless, q(t) = 0 for some t ∈ [t∗∗, T ] can be achieved in the model
if p(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ] and the equilibrium with q∗ = 0 can be sustained as the
long run saddle point steady state equilibrium of the model with penalty system given
by s(t) = αw(t) and p > 0 under certain additional conditions on the parameters of the
model.
Moreover, studying the sensitivity of the steady state values of the main variables of
the model with respect to the parameters of the penalty scheme we found an interesting
result, which gives new insights into the problem of optimal trade-off between the prob-
ability and severity of punishment. This problem has been studied quite extensively in
a static setting by Polinsky and Shavell (1979) and later by Garoupa (1997) and (2001).
The result, stated in Proposition 4.3, shows that, when the penalty is high a further
increase in the severity of punishment is less efficient than an increase in probability of
punishment.
4.5 Conclusions
The main problem addressed in this chapter is how the fine, which takes into account
the history of the violation, i.e. determined on the basis of accumulated turnover of
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the firm participating in cartel, affects the efficiency of the deterrence. To motivate this
problem, we refer to two main features of penalty systems for violations of the antitrust
law prescribed by the current sentencing guidelines. Firstly, there exists an upper bound
for the fine. The penalty is constrained from above by either a certain monetary amount
or by the amount of 10% of the total annual turnover of the firm. Secondly, the penalty is
based on the accumulated gains from cartel or price-fixing activities for the firm. These
regulations suggest to model the penalty as an increasing function of the accumulated
illegal gains from price-fixing to the firm.
The main innovation of the chapter compared to the existing literature, e.g. Fent et
al. (1999) or Feichtinger (1983), is the idea that the accumulated wealth of the firm takes
the role of the state variable in the optimal control model. This modification allows to
incorporate two main features of the current penalty systems for antitrust law violations,
discussed above, into a dynamic model of intertemporal utility maximization by the
firm under antitrust enforcement. In particular, this modification allows to develop a
framework, in which the penalty for antitrust violations can be constructed in such a
way that it can capture the history of the violation. In order to capture the history,
we model the penalty for price-fixing as an increasing function of the accumulated gains
from price-fixing throughout the entire duration of the infringement (which is the state
variable of the model).
First, we look at the case where the penalty is fixed. We derive an analytical ex-
pression for this penalty, which allows to achieve the result of complete deterrence of
price-fixing, given a strictly positive rate of law enforcement by the antitrust authority.
Numerical calculations show that the policy aiming at increasing or even abolishing the
legal upper bound for fine might be successful. But, unfortunately, this system does not
solve the problem of optimal deterrence as well, since the penalties in this case, which
allow to achieve complete deterrence, are too high, and thus unbearable for the firm
because they can drive the firm to immediate bankruptcy.
We also analyze the optimal control model, in which the penalty is determined as
a linear increasing function of the accumulated rents from price-fixing. On the basis
of this analysis we conclude that the parameters of the penalty system have an impact
on the optimal behavior of the firm and consequently on the deterrence power of the
penalty system, which is measured by the timing of optimal deterrence. The higher
the probability and severity of punishment the earlier the cartel formation is blocked.
Moreover, a proportional system seems to be more fair than one with a fixed penalty
and allows to achieve a full compliance outcome in the long run. The analysis of this
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model also confirms that modification of penalty systems suggested recently by OECD
(which, in terms of our model, implies an increase of multiplier α) is quite promising,
since it will lead to earlier deterrence.
In addition, we conduct sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium values of the main
variables of the model with respect to the changes in the scale parameter of the propor-
tional penalty scheme and probability of law enforcement. Studying the sensitivity of
the steady state values of the main variables of the model with respect to the parame-
ters of the penalty scheme we found an interesting result, which gives new insights into
the problem of optimal trade-off between the probability and severity of punishment.
This result states that when the penalties are high a further increase in the severity of
punishment is less efficient than the increase in certainty of punishment. This implies
that in order to achieve improvements in deterrence when penalties are already high, it
is more efficient to spend resources and increase the probability of punishment rather
than simply raise the upper bound for the fine.
We can also suggest a number of possible extensions of the model. One possibil-
ity is to introduce a second state variable (offender’s criminal record) into the model
in addition to accumulated gains from price-fixing. This will allow to relate penalty
to both important factors: gravity of the violation and past reputation of the offender
(recidivistic behavior). This extension will help to explain escalating sanctions based
on offence history which are embedded in many penal codes and sentencing guidelines.
Another interesting direction is to extend the analysis to two players case and consider
a similar problem in the framework of differential games. One would say that a dy-
namic game situation would be more appropriate to describe the problem at hand. A
pursuit-evasion game of the Feichtinger (1983) type would help to reflect the idea that
competition authority can also act strategically and not rule based. However, the scope
of the current chapter, which is aiming to compare the effects of fixed and proportional
penalties on the behavior of the firms that violate competition law, does not require a
competition authority acting strategically. Although, the differential game framework
would be an interesting extension of the problem at hand in case we want to find an
optimal combination of both instruments of antitrust authority (fine and rate of law
enforcement), which allows to achieve the result of complete deterrence.

CHAPTER 5
Effects of Leniency Programs on Cartel Stability
5.1 Introduction
This chapter analyzes the effects of leniency programs by employing a game between
two firms, which participate in a cartel agreement and decide on the optimal time of
revealing the information about the cartel to the antitrust authority. The enforcement
problem we study has several ingredients. Firstly, we analyze the design of self-reporting
schemes, where we have a group of defendants. Secondly, we consider a dynamic set-up,
where accumulated benefits and losses from crime are taken into account. Leniency
programs allow for complete or partial exemption from the fine for firms that reveal
information about the cartel to the antitrust authority. It is intuitively clear that a
legally sanctioned opportunity for costless self-reporting changes the nature of the game
played between the antitrust authority and the group of firms. To analyze the impact
of this opportunity on cartel stability we apply tools of timing games. In particular, we
study a dynamic game of the preemption type.
Leniency programs have been recently introduced in the European antitrust legisla-
tion and have quite a long history in the US. ”Leniency programs” grant total or partial
immunity from fines to firms that collaborate with the authority. To be more precise,
leniency is defined as a reduction of the fine for firms, which cooperate with the antitrust
authority by revealing information about the existence of the cartel before the investi-
gation has started, or by providing additional information that can help to speed up the
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investigation. Leniency programs work on the principle that firms, who break the law,
might report their crimes or illegal activities if given proper incentives and, therefore,
reduce harm for society by reducing the number of cartels and their duration.
In the US the first Corporate Leniency Program was introduced in 1978. Then
it was refined and extended in August 1993. Later the Antitrust Division of the US
Department of Justice revised its Corporate Leniency Program to make it easier for and
more attractive to companies to come forward and cooperate with the Division1. Three
major revisions were made to the program, namely, amnesty is automatic if there is no
pre-existing investigation, amnesty may still be available even if cooperation begins after
the investigation is underway, and all officers, directors, and employees who cooperate are
protected from criminal prosecution. As a result of these changes, the Amnesty Program
is the Division’s most effective generator of international cartel cases. Moreover, the
revised Corporate Amnesty Program has resulted in a surge in amnesty applications.
Under the old amnesty policy the Division obtained roughly one amnesty application
per year. Under the new policy, the application rate has been more than one per month.
In the last few years, cooperation resulting from amnesty applications led to scores of
convictions of over $1 billion in fines2.
In Europe the first Leniency Programs were introduced in 1996. The modified Le-
niency program introduced by the EC in 2002 gives complete immunity from fines to
firms, which were the first to submit evidence about the cartel to the antitrust author-
ity. Moreover, partial reduction of fines (approximately by 50%) takes place even if
firms reveal information after an investigation has started. Similar programs have been
introduced in 2002 in the UK and other European countries.
There is some empirical evidence that Leniency programs improve welfare by sharply
increasing the probability of interrupting collusive practices and by shortening the inves-
tigation. In the US, for example, the fines collected in 1993 almost doubled the ones in
1992, which can be connected with the major modification of leniency programs. How-
ever, there are also other effects of leniency programs, which are now difficult to identify
in empirical studies due to the absence of data. For example, questions of how the
introduction of leniency programs would influence cartel stability and duration of cartel
agreement, or whether leniency facilitates collusion or reduces it, still require deeper
investigation. In this chapter we give some insights by analyzing these problems.
Other contributions that analyze optimal policies for the deterrence of violations of
1See Spratling Gray R. (1998).
2See O.E.C.D. report (2002a).
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antitrust law in the presence of leniency schemes are Motta and Polo (2003), Spagnolo
(2000), or Malik (1993). Most papers on leniency employ a discrete time framework.
However, proportional penalty schemes that most closely reflect current antitrust rules
were not analyzed in the discrete time repeated games models so far. Though they con-
sidered collusive behavior in a dynamic setting with antitrust laws, these papers excluded
the important sources of dynamics that are the foci for this thesis: in particular, they
did not allow detection and penalties to be sensitive to firms’ current and past pricing
behavior. However, a number of papers have already looked into this problem, namely,
Hinloopen (2003, 2004) and Harrington (2004, 2005). They investigated settings, in
which cartel detection probabilities were influenced by firms’ behavior and where these
probabilities changed over time. However, penalties which are proportional to the degree
of offence and change over time, and that most closely reflect current antitrust rules were
not analyzed by the above-mentioned researches. In this chapter we study the problem
of how an additional enforcement instrument, such as a leniency program, influences the
stability of cartels under two different regimes of fines, fixed and proportional. We ana-
lyze a setting with a proportional penalty scheme employing a continuous time dynamic
preemption game, in which accumulated gains from price-fixing is the state variable.
We investigate intertemporal aspects of this problem using dynamic optimal stopping
models and tools of dynamic continuous time preemption games and obtain that the
strength of incentives to preempt is the driving force of success of leniency programs. In
this way we extend the existing literature.
It should be stressed that a legally sanctioned opportunity for costless whistle-blowing
changes the game played between the antitrust authority and the group of firms, com-
pared to a setting where leniency is not available. Intuitively, this opportunity should
reduce cartel stability and increase the incentives for firms to reveal the cartel. In this
chapter we investigate the effects of leniency programs on the behavior of firms partic-
ipating in price-fixing agreements. The main finding of this chapter is that depending
on the design of leniency programs, they may reduce duration of cartel agreements but
this result is not unambiguous. This problem has already been discussed in a number of
earlier papers (see for example, Spagnolo (200b) or Ellis and Wilson (2003)). They found
that wrongly designed leniency programs may facilitate collusion rather than break car-
tels. In this chapter we obtain a similar result. The analysis of this chapter implies that
under strict antitrust enforcement, i.e. when only the first reporter can obtain complete
immunity from the fine and penalties and the rate of law enforcement are high, the
possibility to self-report and be exempted from the fine increases the incentives for firms
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to stop cartel formation. This reduces the duration of cartels. However, when both first
and second reporters are treated similarly, and penalties and rate of law enforcement
are low, introduction of leniency programs may, on the contrary, facilitate collusion.
Under a fixed penalty scheme, even in the presence of leniency, the efficiency of cartel
deterrence (in terms of reduction of duration of cartel agreements) depends only on the
amount of the fine and the probability of law enforcement. We also show that ”too
lenient ” leniency programs may facilitate collusion, when penalties are fixed and fall
below a certain threshold.
We distinguish two regimes with respect to the rules of leniency programs and the
application procedure. The first regime corresponds to more strict enforcement, i.e. only
the firm, which is the first to self-report, is eligible for complete exemption from the fine
and the application procedure is strictly confidential. The second firm bears either the
full fine or, if it provides sufficient evidence, it can be exempted from up to 50% of the
fine. This set up most closely reflects the rules of current guidelines for reduction of
fines for firms that cooperate with antitrust authorities and reveal information about
existing cartels3. The second regime corresponds to the case where the rules of antitrust
enforcement are not too strict (more lenient). In this case also the firm, which is the
second to self-report, obtains partial exemption from the fine. This implies that the
first and second reporter are treated similarly and the antitrust authority makes the
application procedure publicly observable. Comparison of these two regimes implies
that, if the rules of leniency programs and the procedure of application for leniency
are more strict (in the sense that only the first self-reporting firm can obtain complete
exemption from fine), cartel occurrence is less likely.
A number of earlier papers have studied the problem of self-reporting. Malik (1993)
and Kaplow and Shavell (1994) were the first to identify the potential benefits of schemes
which elicit self-reporting by violators. They focus on the set-up with individual wrong-
doers and conclude that self-reporting may reduce enforcement costs and improve risk-
sharing, as risk-averse self-reporting individuals face a certain penalty rather than the
stochastic penalty faced by non-reporting violators. A similar paper in this field is Innes
(1999), who considers environmental self-reporting schemes.
The use of leniency programs in antitrust has been extensively studied by Motta
and Polo (2003). They show that such programs might play an important role in the
prosecution of cartels provided that firms can apply for leniency after an investigation
has started. They conclude that, if given the possibility to apply for leniency, the firm
3See O.E.C.D. report (2002).
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might well decide to give up its participation in the cartel in the first place. They also
find that leniency saves resources for the authority. Finally, their formal analysis shows
that leniency should only be used when the antitrust authority has limited resources, so
that a leniency program is not unambiguously optimal. The paper by Motta and Polo
(2003) is closely related to the paper by Spagnolo (2000). He shows that only courageous
leniency programs that reward self-reporting parties may completely and costlessly deter
collusion, while moderate leniency programs that reduce or cancel sanctions for the
reporting party cannot affect organized crime.
A next attempt to study the efficiency of leniency programs in antitrust enforcement
was made in Feess and Walzl (2003). They compare leniency programs in the EU
and the USA. For that purpose they construct a stage-game with two self-reporting
stages, heterogeneous types with respect to the amount of evidence provided, and ex
post asymmetric information. Their analysis shows that self-reporting schemes are much
more promising for criminal teams than for single violators, since strategic interactions
between team members lead to increased expected fines, and reduce the frequency of
violations. Hence, their model once again confirms the effectiveness of leniency programs
in the fight against cartels.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the basic model. In section
5.3 we consider the benchmark model and solve the timing game of cartel formation in the
situation where leniency is not available. There are two symmetric firms that participate
in a cartel agreement and decide on the optimal stopping time, i.e. the moment of
quitting the cartel in the absence of leniency programs. Further, in section 5.4 we study
a timing game with two identical firms forming a cartel after the leniency programs are
introduced. We suggest a new approach to analyze the efficiency of the leniency programs
that differs from the earlier papers and that is based on the Reinganum-Fudenberg-Tirole
Model. Reinganum (1981), Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), and Huisman (2001) applied
timing games to a technology adoption problem. We apply a similar procedure to the
cartel formation game between two firms in the presence of a leniency program. Section
5.5 analyzes the effects of leniency while the leniency program is less strict. In section
5.6 we solve the game in case penalty is fixed and compare it with the result under
proportional penalty. Section 5.7 deals with an extension of the model of section 5.4 by
including dynamic price competition and tacit collusion. The last section summarizes
the results and suggests directions for future work.
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5.2 The Model: Formal Description and Assump-
tions
We introduce the basic ingredients of the intertemporal optimization problem of an
expected profit-maximizing firm, which participates in an illegal cartel. The key variable
is the accumulated gains from prior criminal offences at time t, w(t). In case of a cartel,
these offences are price-fixing activities. Further we call w(t) the value of collusion at
time t.
Let us consider an industry with two symmetric firms engaged in a price-fixing agree-
ment. Assume that they can agree and increase prices from pc = c to pm > c each, where
c is the constant marginal cost in the industry and pm is the monopoly price. Since firms
are symmetric, each of them has equal weight in the coalition and, consequently, total
cartel profits will be divided equally among them. In a game theoretic model we assume
that there is a possibility of strategic interaction between the firms in the coalition in
the sense that they can break the cartel agreement by self-reporting. By doing this we
allow for the possibility for the firms to betray the cartel and this influences the internal
stability of the cartel.
The instantaneous monopoly profit in the industry under consideration is denoted
by πm. Consequently, since the firms are assumed to be symmetric, the instantaneous




We consider two cases: the case where the penalty, s, is constant over time, i.e.
s(t) = F n,4 and the case where the penalty is a fraction of the accumulated gains from
price-fixing activities for the firms. In the latter case the penalty is represented by the ex-
pression s(t) = αw(t), where α is the scale parameter of the penalty scheme. This setup
will also allow us to compare the efficiency of fixed and proportional penalty schemes.
Both of them are currently used in the sentencing guidelines of different countries5.
The main feature of a leniency program is the reduction of the fine (or complete ex-
emption from the fine) for the firm that first reveals the information about the existence
of the cartel. To be more precise, in the model we assume the following set-up. If one
of the firms reports the cartel, then this firm pays no fine, sL = 0, while the other firm
will pay the normal fine, sn, that (according to current sentencing guidelines for viola-
tions of antitrust law) can be approximated by the amount of 10% of overall turnover
of the enterprise. Following the current rules, we also assume that, if the second firm
4Fn denotes the normal fine level in the absence of leniency.
5See O.E.C.D. (2002a).
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decides to cooperate, the fine for this firm will be reduced by the amount in the range
between 0% and 50%, i.e. sF ∈ (1
2
sn, sn]. Next, we assume that if both firms report the
cartel simultaneously, then each of them pays the reduced fine, sM = 0.5sn. These rules
are roughly consistent with partial immunity clauses that often apply if more than one
cartelist reports6.
The rate of law enforcement by the antitrust authority equals λ ∈ (0, 1]. This variable
denotes the instantaneous probability that the firm is checked by antitrust authority and
found guilty.
Given this set-up, firms, participating in the cartel agreement, decide on the optimal
stopping time, i.e. the moment of revelation of information about the violation to the
authority. An alternative way of stopping may be described in terms of quitting the
cartel without reporting to the antitrust authority. We assume that, after the cartel has
been discovered due to self-reporting by one or both firms or simply due to the efforts of
antitrust authority, collusion stops forever and, consequently, the stream of illegal gains
also stops. It is quite realistic to assume that firms would not renew the agreement, if
one of them betrayed the other.
The expected penalty if the firm, which was participating in the cartel, is caught at
date t is given by λs(t). The discount rate is denoted by r. We assume that there are two
identical firms that form a cartel and restrict analysis to the symmetric pure strategy7
equilibria. The infinite planning horizon is considered, on which the risk-neutral firms
maximize their value at discount rate r.
5.3 Benchmark: Timing Game without Leniency
To study the effects of leniency programs on cartel stability, we, first, consider a bench-
mark case, where leniency is not available, i.e. the firms act without taking into account
the possibility of self-reporting. Second, in section 4 we move to the setting where the
6Moreover, Apesteguia, Dufwenberg and Selten (2003) use a similar mechanism to design one of the
treatments in their experimental paper, which studies the effects of leniency on the stability of a cartel.
Feess and Walzl (2003) also consider partial reduction of fines for both firms in case of simultaneous
self-reporting.
7Taking into account that we employ timing games for analysis of the problem described above, we
restrict our attention to search only for pure strategy equilibria. This is motivated by the fact that
mixed strategy equilibria for timing games, where firms self-report at a certain point in time only with
some probability, do not make economic sense and would not give any reasonable policy implications
for antitrust enforcement.
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antitrust authority introduces leniency. In that case the dynamic interactions between
two firms, which form a cartel but can also betray it, are modeled by employing tools of
preemption games.
To analyze a benchmark case, where leniency is not available, we consider a simple
timing game8 with two symmetric firms. Each firm’s choice is when to choose the action
”stop cartel”, and once one of the players chooses this action cartel formation stops
forever. That is, if the game has not stopped at any τ < t, the action set for each player
i, i ∈ {1, 2} is Ai(t) = {stop, continue}; if game has stopped at any τ < t, then Ai(t)
is a null action ”don’t move”. We will consider here only two player timing games, and
restrict our attention to the subgame-perfect equilibria in pure strategies. Following
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), we are able to express both players payoffs as functions of
the time
T = min{t : ati = stop cartel for at least one i}
at which the first player stops; if no player ever stops we set T = ∞. Here ati denotes
action of player i at time t. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) describe players payoffs using
the functions Li, Fi and Bi : if one player i stops at T , then he is the leader and
receives Li(T ), and his opponent receives follower payoff Fj(T ). If both players stop
simultaneously at T , the payoffs are B1(T ) and B2(T ). They also assume that
limT→∞Li(T ) = limT→∞Fi(T ) = limT→∞Bi(T ), (5.1)
which will be the case if payoffs are discounted.
In our set-up, since, after cartel formation stops, profits are assumed to be zero and
also the value of being leader is the same as the value of simultaneous stopping, we have
that Li(T ), Fj(T ) and Bi(T ) coincide. The only relevant value is the value of stopping
the cartel at time T , denoted by St(T ).
The last step is to specify the strategy space. The history at date t is simply the fact
that the game is still going on then. Thus, pure strategies si are simply maps from the
set of dates t to {stop, continue}. So, pure strategies are simply stopping times. Here,
as we have already mentioned, we will restrict attention to pure strategies, since mixed
strategies do not make sense from the point of view of policy implications.
Now we determine the payoff function of the game described in section 5.2. The













8For general definition and analysis of simple timing games see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p. 117).
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The value of stopping the cartel at time T , St(T ), is determined as an integral
over time of instantaneous expected gains from collusion before time T . It should be




and negatively related to the instantaneous expected penalty, λs(t). We assume that
cartel formation stops only in case firms decide to quit the cartel or self-report to the
antitrust authority, while firms always renew collusive agreement after they are caught
and punished by the antitrust authority without cooperation of cartel members. So, the
value of stopping the cartel at time T for each firm in the absence of leniency programs








In case the fine is proportional to the accumulated illegal gains from price-fixing,













e−rldl. Clearly, the limiting conditions (5.1) is also satisfied in this
setting.
To find the optimal time of stopping the cartel, we differentiate (5.3) with respect to










e−2rT = 0. This implies that in the
symmetric equilibrium the optimal stopping time for each firm, which takes a decision






It is easy to show that given that both firms stop at time T ∗, neither of them can gain
by deviation from T ∗. Assume that firm i decides to stop cartel at time t′ < T ∗. Then
both firms get St(t′) < St(T ∗), and, hence, deviation to t′ is not profitable. The same
happens for any t′ > T ∗. This proves that simultaneous stopping at T ∗ is a subgame-
perfect equilibrium of the timing game that describes the situation of cartel formation
in the absence of leniency programs.
Expression (5.4) shows that the optimal time of stopping the cartel decreases when
both the probability and the severity of punishment increases. The higher the expected
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5.4 Preemption Game with Leniency
Now we describe a timing game of the preemption type played between two symmetric
firms. The leader in this game (i.e., the firm which is the first to self-report) has the
advantage of complete exemption from the fine, i.e. sL = 0. Moreover, since firms are
identical it seems natural to consider symmetric strategies.
First, we consider a setting where firms cannot respond immediately to the actions
of their rivals. Following the rules of application for leniency currently used by most
antitrust authorities, the information about applications is kept confidential. This in-
formation normally does not become public immediately after the firm has applied for
leniency. That is why in this section we analyze a setting where it is not possible to
react instantaneously. The firm, which self-reports as second, can be exempted only for
less than 50% of the fine, while the leader gets complete immunity from fine.
Next, in section 5.5 we compare the regime described above with the case where the
rules of leniency programs are less strict and the procedure of application for leniency is
less confidential. We model this by relaxing the assumption that instantaneous reaction
is not possible. That is, we consider a setting where firms can respond immediately to
their rival’s decisions. This implies that actions of the firms are perfectly observable and
the procedure of self-reporting is instantaneous (does not take any time). Clearly, in
this case simultaneous self-reporting is possible.
We study a continuous time preemption game and employ the feedback equilibrium
solution concept in order to solve it. First, we determine the payoffs and the objec-
tive functions for the first mover (leader), the second mover (follower), and in case of
simultaneous self-reporting. Next, we determine optimal stopping times for each case.
Finally, we derive the feedback equilibrium of the preemption game with leniency.
The definition of feedback equilibrium solution concept as it is employed in the
current chapter is taken from Huisman (2001, p. 77-79). He states that in a feedback
equilibrium the leader (player that moves first) takes into account that its decision to
self-report affects the decision of the follower. To determine the equilibrium we should
plot the leader’s payoff as a function of its own stopping time and take the stopping
time of the follower equal to its optimal reaction. The feedback equilibrium is given by
the stopping time at which the leader’s payoff is at its maximum and optimal reaction
of the follower on that stopping time9.
9The feedback equilibrium is also, sometimes, referred as a closed loop equilibrium (as in Fudenberg
and Tirole (1991, p. 131)) or perfect equilibrium concept for timing games (as in Fudenberg and Tirole
(1985)). Some authors, for instance, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), also mention that feedback equilibria
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We assume that after the first firm has reported about the existence of the cartel
to the authority, the cartel stops, and consequently, the stream of illegal gains also
stops. In case of complete information about the actions of the rival the best response of
the second firm would be to cooperate and reveal the cartel immediately after the first
firm (the leader) does so. In addition, our approach represents a quite extreme form of
preemption in that the follower loses entirely its chance to be completely exempted from
the fine if it is forestalled by the leader. In the general setting the leader reports at the
same time or before the follower, i.e. 0 ≤ TL ≤ TF , where TL and TF are the optimal
stopping times for the leader and follower, respectively.
Given the times TL and TF , and due to the special structure of the game, the value




, less the instantaneous expected penalty, λs(t). By construction of the game
the fine the leader has to pay equals zero, sL = 0. Hence, the value of the leader when
TL < TF is given by













After time TL , i.e. after the cartel was reported to the authority, the flow of illicit
gains stops, so the exact value of TF is not relevant for the determination of VL(TL, TF )
and VF (TL, TF ), since it does not directly influence the payoff. However, the optimal
reaction of the follower can still influence the decision of the leader.
In the same way the value of the follower, VF (TL, TF ), can be derived. The follower




, less the instantaneous expected penalty, λs(t). The term −sn(TL) reflects
the value of the normal (full) fine that has to be paid by the follower after the cartel is
discovered10. Hence, the follower value, when TL < TF , is given by






− λs(t))e−rtdt− sn(TL)e−rTL = VL(TL, TF )− sn(TL)e−rTL . (5.6)
Similarly, the value of the firm in case of simultaneous self-reporting is determined
by expression (5.7) below. Recall that in case of simultaneous self-reporting both firms
in continuous-time games can be related to subgame perfect equilibria of discrete-time timing games.
10Note that the results of the analysis below are valid for any sF ∈ ( 12sn, sn]. This is in line with
current leniency rules (see OECD report 2002).
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pay 50% of the normal fine.









−rTc , iff TL = TF . (5.7)
Now we define the optimal stopping times for the leader (T ∗L) and in case of si-
multaneous self-reporting (T ∗c ). First, we define T
∗
c = arg maxTc VM(Tc, Tc) and T
∗
L =
arg maxTL : (TL≤TF ) VL(TL, TF ). Note also that VL(TL, TF ) = VM(TL, TF ), when TL = TF .
From expressions (5.5) - (5.7) it is clear that VF (TL, TF ) < VM(TL, TF ) < VL(TL, TF )
for any TL < TF .
5.4.1 Confidential Leniency Programs
In this subsection we analyze a model, where it is not possible for firms to react instan-
taneously to the actions of their rivals, i.e. the rules and procedure of application for
leniency are very strict. This corresponds to the first regime mentioned in the intro-
duction to the chapter, namely the regime with more strict enforcement, i.e. only the
firm, which formally self-reports the first (even if second firm also does it voluntary), is
eligible for complete exemption from the fine. The second firm bears the full fine (even it
is several seconds later to self-report than the first firm), and the application procedure
is strictly confidential.
The objective functions of the firms can be described as follows. In a feedback
equilibrium11 the leader takes into account that its stopping decision affects the decision
of the follower. However, for this particular problem it holds that the decision of the
follower does not influence the value of the leader’s payoff after he decides to reveal the
cartel, see (5.5) or (5.8). This implies that the expressions (5.8) and (5.9) below do not
depend on the reaction of the follower.















− λαw(t))e−rtdt− αw(T )e−rT , (5.9)
11See Huisman (2001).









αw(T )e−rT . (5.10)
The function L(T ) (F (T )) is equal to the expected discounted value at time t = 0 of
the leader (follower) when the leader reports at time T . M(T ) is the discounted value
at time t = 0 of the firm when there is simultaneous self-reporting at time T .
Here we assume that the firms cannot react instantaneously, i.e. only a lagged
reaction is possible. The implication is that the payoff of M(t) is no longer available for
the follower. Therefore, given the expressions (5.8), (5.9) and (5.10), in equilibrium the
following inequalities hold
L(t) > M(t) > F (t) for all t ∈ (0,∞). (5.11)
Note that L(0) = F (0) = M(0).
To find feedback equilibria of this model we consider the dynamic timing game12.At
each instant of time t the following simultaneous move matrix game is played (see Table
5.1).
Self-report(S) Not self-report(N)
Self-report(S) (M(t),M(t)) (L(t), F (t))
Not self-report(N) (F (t), L(t)) repeat game
Table 5.1. Payoffs and strategies of the matrix game played at time t.
We denote by π the value of the infinitely lasting cartel. In case of proportional







value will be extensively used in the proof of Proposition 5.1.
The game described in Table 5.1 is played at time t if no firm has reported about
the existence of the cartel so far. Playing the game costs no time and if firm 1 chooses
action Not Self-report (N) and firm 2 also the game is repeated. If necessary the game
will be repeated infinitely many times13. Clearly, in this matrix game the outcomes,
12For the definition of feedback equilibrium as it is employed in the proof of the main results of
the models of this chapter, we refer to Huisman (2001) or Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). Note also
that in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) this equilibrium is called a perfect equilibrium for timing games.
It is still subject to discussion whether a subgame perfect equilibrium of an arbitrary discrete-time
dynamic game would converge to a feedback equilibrium of the continuous-time game. However, for the
particular game described in our model this property holds, when you let the length of the time period
of the discrete-time game approach zero. The result of Proposition 5.1 confirms this statement.
13This representation is borrowed from Huisman et al. (2004).
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simultaneous self-reporting by both firms - (S, S) and the decision not to reveal the
cartel by both players - (N, N), can arise as a Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies. The
result depends on the magnitude of the maximal simultaneous self-reporting value and
the value of the profits in case of infinitely lasting cartel.
The results of the analysis in the setting with proportional penalty are summarized
in the next proposition. Later, in section 5.6, we compare these results to the solution
of the model with fixed penalty.
Proposition 5.1 For the setting with proportional penalty, the unique feedback equilib-
rium (and unique SPNE) of the game with leniency, where firms cannot react instanta-
neously to the actions of their rivals, is
immediate simultaneous self-reporting, i.e. (t∗1, t
∗
2) = (0, 0), if αλ > r,
or cartel forever, i.e. (t∗1, t
∗
2) = (∞,∞), if αλ < r.
Proof: See Appendix 1.14
Although the proposition has been proven using the subgame perfect equilibrium
of a discrete-time preemption game and the property of its convergence to the equilib-
rium of continuous-time game, it also holds that this outcome arises as a special case
of Proposition 2 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), where the perfect equilibrium concept
for continuous-time timing games is employed. In particular, the special case of Fuden-
berg and Tirole’s model with L(t) > M(t) implies that perfect equilibria exhibit rent
equalization, i.e. firms stop when T = min{t ∈ (0, TL) : L(t) = F (t)}. In our model
this implies simultaneous stopping by self-reporting at t = 0, at which the leader value
equals the value of the follower.
The result of this proposition suggests that after the introduction of leniency pro-
grams antitrust enforcement appears to be more efficient than in the absence of leniency.
Even in combination with moderate penalties it leads to immediate self-reporting by
both firms in the beginning of the game. Depending on the severity of punishment, two
possible outcomes can arise. Either both firms report the cartel simultaneously in the
beginning of the game, or the cartel lasts forever.
Let us compare this result with the conclusion of the model, where firms take decisions
in the absence of leniency programs. Recall that from expression (5.4) we obtain that
if the optimal stopping time of the model without leniency (T ∗) exists, then T ∗ > 0
for any values of parameters of the model (α ∈ (0,∞), λ ∈ (0, 1], r ∈ (0, 1] such that
αλ > r), since expression αλ
αλ−r is always greater than one, when αλ > r. In the game
14Here t∗i denotes the optimal time of self-reporting by firm i.
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with leniency we have immediate self-reporting by both firms in the beginning of the
game, when αλ > r. This result suggests that antitrust enforcement after introduction
of leniency programs is more efficient than in the absence of leniency. Hence, strictly
confidential leniency programs improve upon the situation without leniency. Moreover,
clearly preemption mechanism is the reason for the strength of leniency programs.
5.5 Non-confidential Leniency Programs
In this section we discuss the preemption game with leniency under the assumption that
firms can react instantaneously to the actions of their rivals. In particular, this implies
that here we study the second regime, mentioned in the introduction, namely, where
the rules of antitrust enforcement are not too strict and the procedure of application
for leniency is less confidential. However, this could be a too strong assumption for the
model that describes leniency programs, since in most cases the procedure of application
for leniency is very confidential. Nevertheless, we consider it in order to compare the
results of the two regimes described above and show that if the rules of leniency programs
and the procedure of application for leniency were stricter, cartels would be less likely.
One can also think about the economic justification for this case by considering situation
of collusion between two symmetric firms that are threatened by possibility of conviction
and punishment. It is realistic to assume that they agree and come forward with the
application for leniency simultaneously as soon as the expected penalty, which also
takes into account reduced fine, exceeds expected future benefits. In this case it would
be reasonable that both firms obtain equal reduction of fine.
First, we determine the objective functions of both players in case there is a first
mover (leader) and a second mover (follower), and in case of simultaneous self-reporting
for proportional penalty setting. Next, we find optimal stopping times for each case.
This will be necessary for further analysis in order to obtain equilibria of the model and
derive policy implications. Finally, we derive the feedback equilibrium of the preemption
game with leniency under the assumption that instantaneous reaction is possible. We
will employ the definition of feedback equilibrium given in Huisman (2001, p. 77-79).
Now, we describe in more detail the derivation of the optimal stopping times for
the leader and in case of simultaneous self-reporting in a setting where the penalty is
proportional to the amount of illicit gains, i.e. s(t) = αw(t) for all t ∈ [0,∞).
In this case the value of the leader is obtained by substituting s(t) = αw(t) into









Similarly, after substitution of s(t) = αw(t) into expression (5.6) the value of the
follower equals






− λαw(t))e−rtdt− αw(T )e−rT . (5.13)















e−rsds, w(0) = 0. For further analysis, similarly to section 5.4, we
define Tc to be the optimal time of simultaneous self-reporting and TL(TF ) the optimal
time of self-reporting by the leader (follower).
Now we move to the derivation of TL = arg maxT L(T ) and Tc = arg maxT M(T )
that are used further for determination of an equilibrium of the preemption game and
also in the discussion of policy implications of the model. Taking the derivative of (5.12)






Note that TL = T
∗ = arg maxT St(T ). Recall expression (5.4).




From expression (5.15) we obtain, that the earliest time of revelation (i.e. breaking
the cartel agreement) by one of the firms will decrease when either α or λ increases. This
result is quite intuitive, because it means that the cartel stability should be reduced when
either severity or probability of punishment increases. At the same time, the effect of an
increase in the discount rate on the optimal time of self reporting gives ∂TL
∂r
< 0. Hence,
the firms will find it more attractive to stop earlier if the discount rate is higher, since
future illicit gains become less valuable.
Similarly to the above analysis we take the derivative of (5.14) with respect to T and
equalize it to zero. In this way we obtain the optimal stopping time in case both firms
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From this expression we obtain, that the earliest time of revelation (i.e. breaking
the cartel agreement) by both firms simultaneously will decrease when either α or λ in-
crease. So, the cartel stability is lower when either severity or probability of punishment
increases.15
Moreover, the solution of this problem exists only when λ > r (i.e. the rate of law
enforcement is higher than the discount rate) and αλ > r(2+α)
2
(i.e. the coefficient of
expected penalty is greater than the sum of the discount rate and half of the product of
the scale parameter and discount rate)16. In other words, the expected penalty is high
enough to outweigh the current benefits from crime compared to the future penalties.
Comparison of expressions (5.15) and (5.16) implies the following lemma.
Lemma 5.2 Given λ > r and αλ > r(2+α)
2
, there exist TL = arg maxT L(T ) = T
∗ =
arg maxT St(T ) and Tc = arg maxT M(T ) such that
T ∗ < Tc, when r < αλ < 2r and T ∗ > Tc, when 2r < αλ.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
This result shows that when the multiplier of the expected penalty is lower than twice
the discount rate, in the absence of leniency programs the firm stops cartel formation
sooner than in case of simultaneous self-reporting after introduction of leniency. And vice
versa, when the instantaneous expected penalty is high enough, the firm that decides
about the optimal time of quitting the cartel on its own, in the absence of leniency
programs, will choose to report later than in case the firms coordinate their actions after
introduction of the leniency program. The result of this lemma will also be used later
when we consider the implications of the feedback equilibrium of the preemption game
with leniency.
5.5.1 Derivation of the Feedback Equilibrium
The above described preemption game has a special feature in that the leader payoff
is not influenced by the decision of the follower. However, in the feedback equilibrium
the reaction of the follower should influence the decision of the leader about the optimal
15It also should be mentioned that ln( 2α(λ−r)2αλ−2r−αr ) > 0 only if α < 2. For any α ≥ 2, we obtain
ln( 2α(λ−r)2αλ−2r−αr ) ≤ 0, consequently, Tc = 0, since Tc ∈ [0,∞).
16Note, that αλ > r(2+α)2 implies αλ > r. Hence, existence of non-negative value for optimal stopping
time of simultaneous self-reporting in the presence of leniency implies existence of non-negative optimal
stopping time in case when leniency is not available.
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time of self-reporting. The leader should take into account that the second firm can
react instantaneously to the actions of the leader. This implies that the second firm will
choose the same action as the leader at each instant of time due to the fact that its fine
will be halved in this way. Hence, TF = TL for any TL ∈ [0,∞). This implies that the
firm that moves first maximizes the value of simultaneous self reporting, M(T ), at each
instant of time. Hence, Tc = arg maxT≥0 M(T ) , and TL = arg maxT≥0 L(T ) satisfy
L(TL) > M(Tc).
Due to the assumptions of symmetry and the possibility of instantaneous reaction for
the second firm, from the expressions (5.12)-(5.14) it is clear that in equilibrium, with
equilibrium stopping time of simultaneous self-reporting denoted by t∗, the following
condition is satisfied L(t∗) = F (t∗) = M(t∗).
To find feedback equilibria of this model we represent the matrix game played at
each instant of time as in Table 5.2.
SR Not SR
SR (M(t∗),M(t∗)) (L(t∗), F (t∗))




Not SR (M(t∗),M(t∗)) repeat
Table 5.2. Payoffs and strategies of the matrix game played at time t under the
assumption of possibility of instantaneous reaction.
We again denote by π the value of the infinitely lasting cartel. In case of proportional








So the equilibrium where both firms self-report, (S, S), arises as a pure strategy
Nash Equilibrium of the matrix game described above in case M(t∗) > π . On the other
hand, the decision not to reveal cartel by both players, (N,N), is a pure strategy Nash
Equilibrium of this matrix game in case π > M(t∗) or π > M(t) for all t ∈ [0,∞). Recall











where Tc is the equilibrium time of simultaneous self-reporting.
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Based on expressions (5.17) and (5.18) we conclude that π > M(t) for all t ∈ [0,∞)
only in case αλ < r + αr
2
. Hence, when αλ < r + αr
2
the unique SPNE of the game
is (N, N)t for all t ∈ [0,∞). This means that self-reporting is never optimal when
αλ < r + αr
2
, because firms prefer to keep the cartel forever. In this case, introduction
of leniency programs does not have any effect on cartel stability.
To complete the analysis, we consider the setting where αλ > r + αr
2
. In this case,
self-reporting occurs at the moment, Tc , when M(t) reaches its maximum. Hence, the
unique SPNE of the game is to play (N, N)t for all t ∈ [0, Tc) and to play (S, S)t when
t = Tc. Hence, the game stops after period Tc. In this case, introduction of leniency
programs can influence the cartel stability. We will study these effects in more detail in
the next proposition.
In case αλ > r + αr
2
, according to Lemma 5.2 two possible outcomes can arise:
T ∗ < Tc or T ∗ > Tc. The first inequality implies that the result, obtained in case we
consider the game with leniency, leads to a later time of self-reporting compared to the
solution of the simple timing game when leniency is not available. And the latter case
implies an earlier stopping time after introduction of leniency. In both cases the result
described in the following proposition holds17.
Proposition 5.3 In the feedback equilibrium of the game both firms report simultane-






Proof: See Appendix 3.
In short, the intuition behind the proof of this proposition is as follows. There exists
a continuum of simultaneous self-reporting equilibria, from which simultaneous self-
reporting at time Tc Pareto dominates all other equilibria. In this Pareto dominant (or
payoff dominant) equilibrium, firms ”tacitly cooperate” by keeping the cartel until time
Tc and then reveal it simultaneously and pay half of the fine, which is most beneficial
for both of them.
Clearly, in contrast with the benchmark case, in the preemption game, which takes
into account the possibility of leniency, the antitrust authority can influence the outcome
of the game, i.e. the decision about the time of breaking the cartel agreement by
both firms, not only by changing the fine and the probability of law enforcement. The
17This proposition has been derived using the definition of feedback equilibrium as it is described
in Huisman (2001). However, we believe that employing the notion of SPNE we will obtain the same
result.
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introduction of leniency programs also appears to be an important factor that may either
reduce cartel stability or facilitate collusion.
The above result also states that in the model without possibility of instantaneous
reaction, leniency programs appear to be more efficient, since they enforce immediate
self-reporting for lower expected fines compared to the model where instantaneous reac-
tion is possible. Recall the model without possibility of instantaneous reaction. There
we got that self-reporting became a dominant strategy already when αλ > r. On the
other hand, in the model, where instantaneous reaction is possible, self-reporting be-
comes a dominant strategy only when αλ > r + αr
2
. This comparison clearly gives the
result of earlier self-reporting in case the rules are more strict, i.e. there is no possibility
of instantaneous reaction. This implies that the incentives for the firms to break the
cartel are stronger under the assumption that they cannot react instantaneously to the
actions of their rivals.
We conclude that if the rules of leniency programs are stricter and the procedure of
application for leniency is more confidential, cartel occurrence is less likely. This can
happen due to the fact that the absence of the possibility to react to the actions of a
rival instantaneously increases the expected future losses if the cartel is revealed, since
the payoff of M(t) is no longer available for the follower.
5.5.2 Effects of Leniency Programs when Instantaneous Reac-
tion is Possible
The equilibrium of the game with leniency may lead to either earlier or later deterrence
than in case the firms take the decision about the stopping cartel agreement in the
absence of leniency programs.
Earlier deterrence happens if 2r < αλ, while the result of later deterrence arises if
r < αλ < 2r. A special case occurs when r > αλ. In this case maxima of M(t) and St(t)
in the positive orthant do not exist and M ′(t) > 0 and St′(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0,∞).
Hence, the best strategy is cartel forever, since self-reporting is never profitable. This
situation is depicted in Figure 5.1.
Moreover, for α ≥ 2 we obtain from expression (5.16) that Tc ≤ 0. This means that
cartel formation stops immediately, Tc = 0, i.e. in the equilibrium of the preemption
game with leniency when instantaneous reaction is possible it is optimal for both firms
to reveal the cartel immediately after the introduction of the leniency program. So, we
can conclude that,- for proportional penalty similarly to fixed penalty,- in combination
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with a strict enforcement policy (when α is high, α ≥ 2) leniency programs appear to
be quite efficient. They allow to achieve immediate deterrence.
If we compare the impact of the penalty of the form s(t) = αw(t) (with α ≥ 2) in
the absence of the leniency programs, we do not observe the outcome with complete
deterrence in the beginning of the planning horizon for any parameter values, whereas
with the introduction of leniency programs this result becomes unambiguous18.
Moreover, for any α < 2, thus when penalties are low, introduction of leniency does
not lead to the outcome with immediate complete deterrence, since Tc > 0.
To illustrate the above analysis, in Figures 5.2 and 5.3 the two functions , M(t) and
St(t), are plotted for cases r < αλ < 2r and 2r < αλ, respectively. The solid lines
correspond to the value of stopping in situation without leniency, and the dotted line
represents the value of simultaneous self-reporting that is relevant value in the game
with leniency where instantaneous reaction is possible.
In case r < αλ < 2r, see Figure 5.2., we get that Tc > T
∗, where Tc =
arg maxt≥0 M(t) and T ∗ = arg maxt≥0 St(t). This implies that the result, obtained in
case we consider equilibria of the preemption game with leniency, leads to a later optimal
stopping time. Hence, compared to the benchmark case where no leniency is available,
greater harm is done to the consumers. Recall that T ∗ = arg maxt≥0 St(t) reflects the
optimal time of stopping the cartel formation in the benchmark model, where firms do
not take strategic considerations into account, see expression (5.4). So, the fact that
the firms take into account the reaction of the other firm clearly increases the stability
of the cartel for intermediate values of α and λ, i.e. r < αλ < 2r, compared to the
optimum of a single decision maker in the situation without leniency. However, in case
2r < αλ, the equilibrium of the game with leniency (Tc, Tc) leads to an earlier stopping
time than in the benchmark model. In this case, see Figure 5.3, in the solution of the
game with leniency the duration of cartel agreement is reduced, since arg maxt≥0 M(t) <
arg maxt≥0 St(t) or Tc < T ∗.
The main conclusion of the above analysis is that, when the procedure of application
for leniency is not confidential, leniency may still reduce duration of cartel agreements,
but not in all cases. When leniency programs are non-confidential and penalties and
rate of law enforcement are low, introduction of leniency programs may, on the contrary,
facilitate collusion. In other words, when incentives to preempt are reduced, i.e. leniency
programs are less confidential, the effects of introduction of leniency programs on cartel
stability will be weaker or even adverse.
18For a complete derivation of this result see chapter 4 that is based on Motchenkova and Kort (2004).










Figure 5.1: Graphs of π (horizontal line), St(t) (solid line), and M(t) (dashed line) for










Figure 5.2: Graphs of St(t) (solid line) and M(t) (dashed line) for the case r < αλ < 2r.
Parameter values are α=1,λ=0.2,r=1/8,πm=1.











Figure 5.3: Graphs of St(t) (solid line) and M(t) (dashed line) for the case αλ > 2r.
Parameter values are α=1.5,λ=0.2,r=0.1,πm=1.
5.6 Analysis of the Model with Fixed Penalty
5.6.1 Benchmark Model without Leniency
In case the penalty is fixed the value of stopping the cartel formation is determined as
in expression (5.2) with s(t) = F n, so that it has the following form:







− λF n)e−rtdt. (5.19)
Following the same arguments as in section 5.3, in order to find the optimal time of
stopping the cartel agreement, we maximize (5.19) with respect to time. This implies
that the optimal time of quitting the cartel agreement for firm i is given by
T ∗i → ∞ if
πm
2
> λF n (5.20)




So, we can conclude that, while taking the decision about the optimal time of quitting
the cartel agreement, the firms just compare expected instantaneous benefits from price-
fixing and expected punishment. Moreover, from expression (5.20) it follows that when
the expected penalty is high enough, i.e. λF n > π
m
2
, cartel formation stops immediately
at time zero.
Expression (5.20) shows that the optimal decision is either to stop collusion imme-
diately or never. The higher the expected penalty the more likely that cartel formation
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stops immediately. On the other hand, the higher the instantaneous illegal gains the
more likely that the cartel will last forever.
5.6.2 Analysis of the Game with Leniency
Regime with Confidential Procedure of Application for Leniency
Depending on the severity of punishment, two possible outcomes can arise in a feedback
equilibrium of a preemption game with leniency where instantaneous reaction is not
possible. Either both firms report the cartel simultaneously in the beginning of the
game or the cartel will last forever.
Proposition 5.4 The feedback equilibria of the game, when penalty is fixed and equals
F n, are immediate simultaneous self-reporting, i.e. (t∗1, t
∗





cartel forever, i.e. (t∗1, t
∗




We refrain from presenting the proof of Proposition 5.4, since it is similar to the
proof of Proposition 5.1 with a number of simplifications. Clearly, in case firms cannot
react instantaneously to the actions of their rivals, under the fixed penalty scheme the
solution of the game with leniency coincides with the outcome of the benchmark model,
where leniency is not available (see expression (5.20)).
Non-confidential Procedure of Application for Leniency
In this subsection we consider a situation with less strict leniency programs, where
firms can react instantaneously to the actions of their rivals. If we compare the optimal
stopping time in a setting without leniency and the equilibrium of the preemption game
with leniency we can conclude that for any positive discount rate the optimal time of
simultaneous self-reporting in case of leniency is more likely to be greater than the
optimal stopping time, which maximizes the individual payoff when leniency is not
available. To be more precise, due to the discontinuity result of the model with fixed
penalty, in case of leniency the outcome of infinitely lasting cartel is more likely than
the outcome of immediate simultaneous self-reporting compared to the benchmark case.
These results are summarized in the following proposition.






1. In the setting without leniency both firms report at t∗1 = t
∗
2 = 0.
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2. If we consider the equilibrium of the game with non-confidential leniency, imme-
diate self-reporting does not occur: both firms report at Tc = t
∗
c →∞.
Proof: See Appendix 4.
So, with a fixed penalty scheme, even in the presence of leniency, the efficiency of
deterrence depends only on the amount of the fine and the probability of law enforcement.
Moreover, we show that, when penalties are fixed and fall below a certain threshold,
leniency programs may well facilitate collusion.
Hence, if we consider the setting where self-reporting is not possible, we can conclude
that cartel formation stops immediately, at the beginning of the planning horizon, only
when the penalty is fixed and high enough to outweigh the expected benefits from collu-
sion. However, in case the government introduces leniency that is not confidential, even
an expected penalty being greater than instantaneous gains from price-fixing, cannot











F n, can ensure immediate self-reporting in case firms take
into account the possibility of leniency and are able to react instantaneously to the
actions of their rivals. So, when penalties are fixed and the procedure of application
for leniency is not confidential, the introduction of leniency programs reduces the effec-
tiveness of antitrust enforcement. This implies that the authority will have to increase
either the amount of the penalty or the rate of law enforcement in order to achieve
whistle-blowing by both firms immediately in the beginning of the planning horizon.
Otherwise, when the penalty is low, i.e. F n < π
m
2λ−r , introduction of leniency makes
the cartel more stable. This is a very surprising result, since intuitively leniency should
increase the incentives for firms to betray the cartel and, hence, reduce cartel stability.
However, when the penalty is low, and does not depend on the amount of illegal gains,
it may be the case that the reduced (as a consequence of leniency) net expected fine is,
actually, less than the instantaneous gains from price-fixing, and this drives the result.
5.7 Effects of Leniency in the Model of Dynamic
Price Competition and ”Tacit Collusion”
In this section we study the effects of leniency programs on the behavior of the firms
in the model of dynamic price competition where ”tacit collusion” may arise19. In the
previous sections the situation of a formalized cartel was considered. In particular, we
19See, e.g., Tirole (1988), chapter 6.
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analyzed a model where there is a formal cartel agreement. This can be discovered by
the antitrust authority and punished on the basis of official documents, which provide
evidence of illegal price-fixing agreement. However, it is often the case that firms do
not form an explicit cartel, but sustain high prices by means of ”tacit collusion”, which
harms consumers. This is also an illegal activity and can be punished according to the
Article 81 of the EC Treaty. Recall, for example, the Soda-Ash case. In that case the
Commission decided that tacit collusion between ICI, a British company, and Solvay, a
Belgian company, was an infringement of Article 81 (ex-85). The Commission motivated
the decision by the fact that the term ”concerted practices” mentioned in Article 81
among the prohibited practices also covered the case of tacit collusion between these
two companies.
The situation of ”tacit collusion” assumes that when there is no formal agreement
between two firms, but they still keep prices above competitive level, both of them
have incentives to undercut and obtain monopoly profits. Hence, this situation involves
the possibility of undercutting. This special feature makes this case different from the
assumptions of the preemption game described above20.
In this section we incorporate the possibility of undercutting into the model of le-
niency without instantaneous reaction21. We consider a game between two symmet-
ric firms that may cooperate by charging the monopoly price, and obtain half of the
monopoly profits in the industry, π
m
2
, each period. However, there is a threat that this
violation will be discovered by the antitrust authority. There are two other options for
the firms: self-reporting or undercutting. The second option is to self-report to the
authority and obtain leniency (reduction of the fine). The third option is to undercut
by reducing the monopoly price by a minimal amount. Then it obtains monopoly prof-
its, πm, for one or more periods. We also assume that after one of the firms betrayed
and another firm discovers it, collusion stops forever. We define here an information
lag, which delays the punishment phase and allows the firm to enjoy extra profits for
several periods, by ε. This setup gives us a number of interesting results that differ from
the model where undercutting is not possible. We can summarize these results in the
following proposition.
20In the case of an explicit cartel undercutting is not possible. In addition, in case of an explicit
cartel there should be no possibility of renegotiation in order to sustain an agreement. So, if we assume
that renegotiation is either impossible or very costly, then we can include an additional strategy in the
form of ”possibility of undercutting” in the model of explicit collusion as well.
21Clearly, the model of dynamic price competition and ”tacit collusion”, as it is described in Tirole
(1988) rests on the assumption that instantaneous reaction is not possible.
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Proposition 5.6 The feedback equilibria of the game with proportional penalty are
1. immediate stopping by undercutting, i.e. (t∗1, t
∗
2) = (0, 0), if αλ > 2r − rerε;
2. cartel forever, i.e. (t∗1, t
∗
2) = (∞,∞), if αλ ≤ 2r − rerε.
We refrain here from presenting the proof of this proposition, since it uses the same
methods as the proof of Proposition 5.1. We sketch the main arguments of the proof
here. First, we describe the objective function of the firm that chooses the undercutting
option. If firm 1 decides to undercut at instant T , it obtains half of the cartel profits,
πm
2
, from the initial period until T and full monopoly rents, πm, from T until T + ε.
At instant T + ε, the second firm discovers that firm 1 betrayed the cartel and, hence,
collusion stops forever. However, there is a threat of expected punishment throughout

























At the same time the leader value or the value of self-reporting at instant T has the






− λαw(t))e−rtdt. Clearly, the value of undercutting intersects the
leader value from above in the point where
T+ε∫
T
(πm − λαw(t)e−rtdt = 0. This point is







This implies that the best option and, hence, the option that is chosen by both firms
(due to symmetry) up to the time T ∗∗ is the undercutting option, if an additional
condition, λα > 2r, for existence of T ∗∗ is satisfied. Hence, up to T ∗∗ the undercutting






− λαw(t))e−rtdt, being the value of the







22For a graphical representation see also Figure 5.4.
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will be compared to the value of the infinitely lasting cartel.23
Firstly, for any αλ < 2r − rerε, the value of an infinitely lasting cartel gives the
highest payoff to both firms and, hence, collusion forever will arise in equilibrium. It is
also instructive to show that in case αλ > 2r−rerε undercutting at (0, 0) is an equilibrium
since no firm can gain by deviating. In the intermediate case, thus when 2r − rerε <
αλ < 2r, it holds that U(t) > L(t) for all t ∈ [0,∞) and U(t) > π for some t ∈ [0,∞).
This implies that the outcome of immediate stopping at (0, 0) by undercutting arises. A
more difficult case arises when αλ > 2r. Then there exists a point of intersection of U(t)
and L(t). In that case collusion forever, which gives (π, π) to both players, cannot be
an equilibrium. The reason is that if one of the firms deviates and undercuts at t = 0,
it gains πm > π. 24 On the other hand, undercutting at T ∗u by both firms also cannot
be an equilibrium, since then both firms get only (St(T ∗u ), St(T
∗
u ))
25, which is less than
what one of the firms can obtain if it deviates by preemption and undercuts at T ∗u − ε.
Recall that U(T ∗u − ε) > St(T ∗u ) = L(T ∗u ), due to the fact that U(t) > St(t) = L(t) for
all t ∈ [0, T ∗∗) given αλ > 2r. We illustrate these considerations in Figure 5.4.
L(t), U(t)
           U(t)
                                                              L(t)
                   T*U       T**       T*                                                           t
Figure 5.4: Graphs of L(t) (solid line) and U(t) (dotted line) for the case αλ > 2r.
Proposition 5.6 states that in the preemption game with leniency, where firms illegally
fix the prices above competitive level and can undercut each other, the no collusion (or
immediate stopping) outcome arises when the coefficient of the expected penalty, αλ, is
greater than 2r− rerε. Now, if we compare the result of Proposition 5.6 to the result of
23See the proof of Proposition 5.1. The complete proof of proposition 5.6 is available from the author
upon request.
24Note that for αλ > 2r we have π = π
m
2r (1− αλ2r ) < 0. Hence, π < πm.
25Recall that by construction of objective functions St(T ∗u ) = L(T ∗u ).
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Proposition 5.1, we can conclude that, since r > 2r−rerε for any r ∈ (0, 1), the possibility
of undercutting improves the result: a smaller expected penalty, αλ > 2r − rerε,
insures immediate stopping compared to the model where only the self-reporting option
is available to the firms. Hence, the antitrust authority has to put less efforts into
control in order to achieve the outcome of complete deterrence. This result is also quite
intuitive, since the possibility of undercutting increases the incentives for the firms to
betray the cartel and, hence, it reduces the stability of price-fixing agreements.
Another interesting observation is connected with the influence of the size of the
informational lag in case of undercutting on the stability of cartel agreement. From
Proposition 5.6 it follows that the bigger the ε (information lag) the easier for the
antitrust authority to block the violation, since a smaller expected penalty insures im-
mediate stopping. Moreover, for ε > ln 2
r
collusion will never arise in equilibrium. This
can be explained by the fact that, when the information lag is bigger, the cartel is less
stable due to the fact that undercutting brings benefits for a longer period and, hence,
it is a more attractive option.
However, it should also be mentioned that introduction of leniency does not influence
stability of collusive agreements in case undercutting is possible26. To give an intuitive
explanation of this result we compare the model described above to the model of dynamic
price competition without leniency. In the latter case only the three following options
are available for each firm: just stopping the cartel agreement at T ∗, undercutting at
T < ∞ or collusion forever. Analogous to the above reasoning, we have to determine
whether the value of undercutting intersects the value of stopping and whether the value
of undercutting exceeds the value of the infinitely lasting cartel for some t ∈ [0,∞) or
not. This leads to the following result, which exactly coincides with Proposition 5.6.
Proposition 5.7 The feedback equilibria of the game without leniency, where firms can
undercut each other in prices, and the penalty is proportional are
immediate stopping by undercutting, i.e. (t∗1, t
∗
2) = (0, 0), if αλ > 2r − rerε
or cartel forever, i.e. (t∗1, t
∗
2) = (∞,∞), if αλ ≤ 2r − rerε.
Hence, introduction of leniency in the game where undercutting is possible would
not influence the stability of collusive agreements. On the other hand, harshness of
penalty, rate of law enforcement, and size of information lag do affect cartel stability.
The bigger the fine, rate of law enforcement, or information lag, the more likely that the
26Formal proof of this result uses the same arguments as Proposition 5.6 above and is available from
the author upon request.
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outcome with immediate stopping by undercutting will arise and, hence, the less stable
the collusive agreement is.
5.8 Conclusions
The main problem addressed in this chapter is how leniency programs influence the
stability of cartels under two different regimes of fines. First, we study the effects of
leniency in case the penalty is an increasing function of the accumulated illegal gains
from price-fixing to the firm. Next, we look at the case where the penalty is fixed. We
denote the former system by proportional penalty scheme. The enforcement problem we
study has several ingredients. We analyze the design of self-reporting incentives, having
a group of (and not a single) defendants. Moreover, we consider a dynamic setup, where
accumulated benefits and losses from crime are taken into account.
For this purpose we use the tools of optimal stopping and timing games. In particular,
the preemption game is studied in order to identify the advantages of being the leader
in the race to the court game between the members of the existing cartel after the
introduction of leniency programs. The approach, we use, is based on the Reinganum-
Fudenberg-Tirole approach, who applied the concept of timing games to a technology
adoption problem. We apply a similar procedure to a cartel formation game between
two firms in the presence of leniency programs, which allows taking into account the
possibility to influence the internal stability of the cartel.
Comparison of results in the situations with and without leniency suggests that
antitrust enforcement after introduction of leniency programs is more efficient than in
the absence of leniency. Hence, leniency improves upon the situation without leniency.
We also obtain that in the settings with a strictly confidential procedure of appli-
cation for leniency, the outcome is immediate self-reporting by both firms in case the
expected penalty is sufficiently high (but still below the threshold of the model where
instantaneous reaction is possible). This implies that strict leniency programs unam-
biguously increase the efficiency of antitrust enforcement and reduce cartel stability.
The reason is that the impossibility to react instantaneously to the actions of the rival
increases expected future losses in case the cartel is revealed. This happens due to the
fact that it is no longer possible for the follower to obtain reduction of the fine from
simultaneous self-reporting. Hence, we conclude that if the rules of leniency programs
are stricter and the procedure of application for leniency is more confidential, cartel
occurrence is less likely.
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We find that in most cases leniency reduces duration of cartel agreements but this
result is not unambiguous. In case leniency programs are not too strict and fines are
proportional to the accumulated illegal gains from price-fixing the result is as follows.
Under strict antitrust enforcement27, the possibility to self-report and be exempted from
the fine increases the incentives for the firms to stop cartel formation, and, hence, reduces
the duration of cartels. However, when penalties and rate of law enforcement are low,
introduction of leniency programs may, on the contrary, facilitate collusion.
Under a fixed penalty scheme, even in the presence of leniency, the efficiency of
deterrence depends only on the amount of the fine and the probability of law enforcement.
Moreover, we have shown that in some cases, when penalties are fixed and fall below a
certain threshold, less strict leniency would programs facilitate collusion.
The main conclusion of the chapter is that the strength of the preemption mechanism
is the main determinant for the successfulness of leniency programs. Cartel stability is
reduced if the rules of the leniency programs are stricter and the procedure of application
for leniency is more confidential, i.e. when incentives to preempt by self-reporting are
stronger.
Another interesting conclusion comes from a numerical comparison of the efficiency
of antitrust enforcement under proportional penalty in the absence of leniency and after
introduction of leniency. In the earlier case we do not observe the outcome of complete
deterrence in the beginning of the planning horizon for any relevant (from the legislation
point of view) parameter values, whereas after the introduction of leniency programs
this result becomes unambiguous for sufficiently high (but still in the range of legally
acceptable) values of the scale parameter of the penalty scheme.
We also study the effects of leniency programs on the behavior of firms in the model
of dynamic price competition and ”tacit collusion”, where firms can undercut each other
in prices. The result of this model implies that in environments where undercutting
is possible it is easier for competition authority to prevent price-fixing, since a smaller
expected penalty insures immediate stopping. This implies that the antitrust authority
has to put less efforts into control in order to achieve the result of complete deterrence.
However, this result is purely due to the possibility of undercutting and leniency does not
play a key role in this setting. Only severity of punishment and rate of law enforcement
can influence stability of collusive agreements in this case.
Another interesting extension would be to study the behavior of asymmetric firms.
They may differ either in costs or size. This extension would make the model much closer
27Here by strict antitrust enforcement we mean high fines and rate of law enforcement.
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to real world situation but solution of dynamic games with asymmetric information it
not a trivial task. This task will be accomplished in the next chapter.
5.9 Appendix
5.9.1 Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 5.1
Following the book by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), which suggests to use subgame
perfect equilibria for the solution of two-player timing games (see pages 117-128), in
this proof we restrict attention to subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies28 of
a discrete-time preemption game. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) also claim that for a
continuous time formulation of the similar game (as it has been described in the main
text of the chapter) symmetric continuous-time perfect equilibrium of timing game can
be obtained as a limit of symmetric discrete-time equilibrium (or SPNE) when time
intervals between periods tend to zero. Then the feedback equilibrium of continuous-
time dynamic game, as stated in the main text, can be approximated by an SPNE of
the discrete time repeated game considered in this appendix.
Proof. Let the penalty be proportional to the accumulated illegal gains from cartel
formation s(t) = αw(t). In this case two possible outcomes can arise depending on the
parameters of the model. Either both firms report the cartel simultaneously in the
beginning of the game or the cartel will last forever.
1. Consider the case αλ ≤ r.












) > 0, with the leader’s value that can be






e−rt). Hence, given αλ ≤ r, we obtain
π > L(t) for all t ∈ [0,∞). This implies that the matrix game played at each instant t,
which has been described in section 5.4.1, has two pure strategy Nash Equilibria, and
the equilibrium (N, N)t Pareto dominates (S, S)t for all t ∈ [0,∞). This implies that,
when αλ ≤ r the unique SPNE of the dynamic game is (N,N)t for all t ∈ [0,∞). Hence,
(t∗1, t
∗
2) = (∞,∞) is the unique feedback equilibrium of the preemption game if αλ ≤ r.
The above considerations imply that in case αλ ≤ r the cartel will last forever, and
28We restrict our attention to search only for pure strategy equilibria, since mixed strategy equilibria
for timing games where firms self-report at a certain point in time only with some probability do
not make economic sense and and would not give any reasonable policy implications for antitrust
enforcement.
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self-reporting is never a dominant strategy for any of the firms. See also Figure 5.1
above.
End of the proof of part 1.
2. Consider the setting with αλ > r. Two possible sub-cases can arise here.
a) π < 0 , so that π < L(t) for all t ∈ [0,∞) This can hold only if αλ > 2r. See
Figure 5.3.
b) π < L(t) for some t ∈ [0,∞) holds when r < αλ < 2r. This situation is depicted
in Figure 5.2.
In both cases the dominant strategy for each firm is to play St (self-report at time
t) at each instant of time. This implies that (t∗1, t
∗
2) = (0, 0) is the unique feedback
equilibrium of the preemption game if αλ > r.
We prove this statement by backward induction.
We can show that in both cases, αλ > 2r and r < αλ < 2r, the function L(t)
approaches π from above when t tends to infinity, i.e. there exists a finite number t̂





. It is clearly finite for any finite values of α, λ and r when αλ > r.






e−rt) > 0 for all t > t̂.
Since M(t) > F (t) for all t ∈ (0,∞), given sF ∈ (1
2
sn, sn] and sm = 1
2
sn, and L(t) > π
for t > t̂, we can conclude that for both firms the strategy St (self-report at t) strictly
dominates strategy Nt for all t > t̂. Hence, for any t ∈ [t̂,∞), there is a unique Nash
Equilibrium of simultaneous move matrix game played at instant t of a dynamic game,
which is described by (S, S)t.
Now we apply the backward induction argument. We look at the matrix game played
at instant t and assume that, if the game continues for one more period, the equilibrium
of the game at t+ will be (S, S)t+ , since simultaneous self-reporting should be part of
the subgame perfect strategy given the result above. Then the payoff matrix at t will
have form as in Table 5.3.
Self-report Not self-report
Self-report (M(t),M(t)) (L(t), F (t))
Not self-report (F (t), L(t)) (M(t+),M(t+))
Table 5.3. Payoffs and strategies of the matrix game played at time t.
By assumption of the model, the function L(t) is always above the function M(t) and,
hence, L(t) > M(t+) for any t, t+ ∈ (0,∞). This inequality implies that the strategy St
29Recall Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3.
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(self-report at t) is dominant for both firms. This implies that the matrix game at t has
a unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium: (S, S). Repeating this argument backwards to
the initial period of the game, and taking into account the fact that L(t) > M(t+) for
any t, t+ ∈ (0,∞), we obtain that self-reporting is a dominant strategy for both players
at each instant of time. Consequently, immediate simultaneous self-reporting at t = 0
is an SPNE of the infinitely repeated game. And, hence, (t∗1, t
∗
2) = (0, 0) is the unique
feedback equilibrium of the preemption game when αλ > r.
In other words, when αλ > r, both firms want to become leader and report at
TL = arg max L(t). As a result a firm will try to preempt the other firm by reporting at
time TL− ε. But then the other will try to preempt by reporting at TL− 2ε and so forth
and so on. This process stops at time t = 0, where both values L(t) and F (t) are equal.
End of the proof of part 2.
5.9.2 Appendix 2: Proof of Lemma 5.2
Proof. First, we reformulate expressions (5.15) and (5.16) in order to make them































(αλ− r) (2αλ− 2r − rα) . (5.21)
It is clear that expression (5.21) is negative when r < αλ < 2r. This implies that
Tc > TL when r < αλ < 2r.
In case 2r < αλ expression (5.21) becomes strictly positive and, consequently, we
obtain that TL > Tc when 2r < αλ.
5.9.3 Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 5.3
Proof. For derivation of this proposition we employ the definition of feedback equilib-
rium as it is given in Huisman (2001).
If the leader reports at time TL, then the best response of the follower, given the
possibility to react instantaneously, is to report at time TL as well. But this means
simultaneous self-reporting and, consequently, the payoffs for both firms will be M(TL),
which is less than M(Tc) by definition. So, the rational leader will anticipate this and
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take into account this best response of the follower. Consequently, his optimal strategy
would be to wait until Tc and then both firms report simultaneously at time Tc.
Here (t∗1, t
∗
2) = (Tc, Tc) is a feedback equilibrium of the preemption game with le-
niency, since no one of the firms has incentives to deviate either by waiting with self-
reporting till t > Tc or by preempting the other firm by playing t < Tc. In both cases,
given the assumption that firms can react instantaneously and, hence, the second firm
will also self-report immediately after the first firm does so, both firms obtain lower
payoffs: M(t) < M(Tc) for any t 6= Tc, since by definition Tc = arg maxt≥0 M(t).
Note, that this result holds only under the assumptions that firms are completely
symmetric and can react instantaneously to the actions of their opponents. In case when
we relax the assumption that firms can react instantaneously, the feedback equilibrium
of the game is (t1, t2) = (0, 0) if αλ > r or cartel forever, i.e. (t1, t2) = (∞,∞) if αλ < r.
5.9.4 Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 5.5
Proof. To prove the result of proposition 5.5, we first derive the optimal stopping
time for the firm when there is no leniency and the optimal stopping time in case of
simultaneous self-reporting with leniency in the setting where the penalty is fixed.
Following the result of the benchmark model, we obtain that the optimal stopping
time in the model without leniency is given by
TL → ∞ if π
m
2
> λF n, (5.22)




In the game with leniency, following the reasoning similar to Proposition 5.3, we
conclude that (t1, t2) = (Tc, Tc) is a feedback equilibrium of the preemption game with
leniency, where Tc = arg maxt≥0 M(t). In this case the firms have no incentives to deviate
either by waiting with self-reporting till t > Tc or by preempting the other firm by playing
t < Tc. In both cases, given the assumption that firms can react instantaneously and,
hence, the second firm will also self-report immediately after the first firm does so, both
firms obtain lower payoffs: M(t) < M(Tc) for any t 6= Tc.







− λF n)e−rtdt− 1
2
F ne−rTc . (5.23)
Next, we derive exact formulas for the feedback equilibrium of the game with leniency
where the penalty is fixed. Recall the game described in Table 5.1. The outcome, i.e.
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whether (S, S) or (N, N) will occur, depends on the magnitude of gains from cartel
formation and the expected fine. Maximizing expression (5.23) with respect to time we
conclude that Tc → ∞ if πm2 > (λ − r2)F n and Tc = 0 if π
m
2
≤ (λ − r
2
)F n. Hence,
(S, S)t with t = 0 is an SPNE when
πm
2
≤ (λ − r
2
)F n, while (N,N)t is an SPNE for
all t ∈ [0,∞) when πm
2
> (λ − r
2
)F n. We conclude that two outcomes can arise as
an equilibrium in feedback strategies: one is immediate self-reporting at Tc = 0, i.e.
(t∗1, t
∗





Strictness of Leniency Programs and Cartels of Asymmetric Firms
6.1 Introduction
The main question we address is whether the leniency rules work (and if so – for what
types of companies) given that there are other costs to admitting an infraction of compe-
tition law other than the fine. As an example of those costs we will consider reduction of
sales due to the reputation effect after cartel is discovered. We define effective leniency
programs in the sense that they achieve the objective of voluntary applications for le-
niency which in return results in the break-up of illegal cartels. Since the leniency rules
only offer a reduction in the fine calculated on the basis of the affected turnover, but do
not take into account the expected costs of admitting illegal behavior and ignore other
costs which can potentially outweigh the fine, one can question the effect that may be
expected from the leniency rules. The literature has already noted these other negative
effects on the expected number of requests for leniency (see, for example, Motta and
Polo (2003) or Spagnolo (2000b)). We add to the literature a specific notion: companies
are diversified to a certain extent and the measure of diversification is not identical for
the firms. We will present a model that takes into account fines that result from a con-
viction by the competition authority and also other costs resulting from affected sales
in markets other than those involved in illegal behavior. Earlier papers on leniency do
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not take this aspect into account.1 We will investigate how companies will react to a
leniency rule given that firms are diversified to a specific extent, which is unique for each
firm, and that the leniency rules do not take into account the effects on markets other
than the markets on which the cartel was proven to operate.
In general, introducing a legally embedded sanctioned opportunity for whistle-blowing
rewarded by fine reduction or even exemption changes the game played between the an-
titrust authority and the group of firms. Intuitively, this opportunity should reduce
cartel stability by increasing the incentives for firms to reveal the cartel. This conclu-
sion is well established in the literature (see, again, Motta and Polo (2003)). However, in
the presence of asymmetries these incentives change. In the symmetric situation where
the cartel members are identical in all respects, the firms all have identical incentives
and will all apply for leniency at the same moment in time. This, however, is a very the-
oretical situation and, therefore, we introduce asymmetries on the basis of the measure
of diversification of the firm. We will show that the effectiveness of Leniency Programs
is different for different types of companies and depends crucially on the number of mar-
kets in which a firm operates relative to the number of markets covered by the cartel if
one takes into account a reputation effect.
A number of earlier papers have studied effects of leniency programs in antitrust en-
forcement without taking into account possible asymmetries between the firms and the
reputation effect. Recall Motta and Polo (2003), Spagnolo (2000, 2004), or Hinloopen
(2003). Malik (1993) and Kaplow and Shavell (1994) were the first to identify the po-
tential benefits of schemes, which elicit self-reporting by violators. They conclude that
self-reporting may reduce enforcement costs and improve risk-sharing, as risk-averse self-
reporting individuals face a certain penalty rather than the stochastic penalty faced by
non-reporting violators. The difference is that they consider individual violators rather
than a group of violators. A similar paper in this field is Innes (1999), who consid-
ers environmental self-reporting schemes. Direct applications of leniency programs in
antitrust policy have been studied by Motta and Polo (2003). They show that such
programs might have an important role in the prosecution of cartels provided that firms
can apply for leniency after an investigation has started. They conclude that, if given
the possibility to apply for leniency, the firm might well decide to give up its partici-
pation in the cartel in the first place. They find also that leniency saves resources for
the authority. Finally, their formal analysis shows that leniency should only be used
1Our set-up can be linked to Kobayashi (1992). There he considered deterrence with multiple
defendants in the framework of asymmetric bargaining.
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when the antitrust authority has limited resources, so that a leniency program is not
unambiguously optimal.
Another attempt to study the efficiency of leniency programs in antitrust enforcement
was made in Feess and Walzl (2004). They compare leniency programs in the EU2
and the USA3. For that purpose they constructed a stage-game with two self-reporting
stages, heterogeneous firms with respect to the amount of evidence provided, and ex post
asymmetric information. Differences in leniency programs in the US and Europe include
the fine reduction granted for first and second self-reporters, the role of the amount of
evidence provided, and the impact of whether the case is already under investigation.
The paper by Feess and Walzl (2004) elaborates on the role of asymmetric information
to derive the optimal degree of leniency and uses these findings to compare the programs
in the US and the EU.
Another line of literature we will touch upon is the literature on reputation. One of
the conditions for the functioning of the reputation mechanism is that there should be
information on the performance of the company, see Graafland and Smit (2004). Miles
and Covin (2000) find empirical support that a reputation advantage enhances marketing
and financial performance. Whereas they investigate the proof for an environmental
reputation, we will consider the reputation of an offender of competition law. Graafland
and Smit mention several ways in which reputation loss due to admitting of having been
a member of a cartel may result in additional costs. A good reputation may attract
highly qualified workers, it could benefit the company on the goods market and on the
financial market. In this chapter, we restrict ourselves to the effects of reputation on the
goods market. We explicitly introduce the notion that the goods market is divided into
several markets, where the reputation in one market may to some extent carry over to
the reputation in another market. Of course, these effects in goods markets may directly
affect the financial position of the firm, but we will not discuss these links.
This chapter contributes to this literature4 by studying the effectiveness of leniency
programs for companies, which are not symmetric. We take into account that a convic-
tion by a competition authority results in costs other than the fine. The additional costs
we will single out are the cost associated with reduced sales in all markets the convicted
2For description of European system see Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed (PbEG
1998) and the report of EC ”Commission adopts new leniency policy for companies which give infor-
mation on cartels”, press release, Brussels, Feb. 13, 2002.
3For description of US system see Guidelines manual (chapter 8-Sentencing of organizations) and
The twelfth annual report (DOJ 1998).
4Our model also can be seen as an extension of Spagnolo (2000, 2004) or Motta and Polo (1999).
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cartel participant operates in. This, what we call reputation effect, depends on the size
of the firms. The effectiveness of a leniency program largely depends on markets outside
the market corrupted by the cartel agreement.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In section 6.2 we give a qualitative de-
scription of the problem followed by a summary of the system of leniency rules adopted
by the Dutch national competition authority, the Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit
(NMa). Section 6.3 provides formal description of the model. In section 6.4, we solve the
model and find subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. Section 6.5 outlines the opti-
mal enforcement strategies of antitrust authority and strategies that allow to implement
the no collusion outcome. Finally, section 6.6 concludes the analysis.
6.2 Outline of the Model
6.2.1 Qualitative Analysis
The model consists of three groups of actors - firms, consumers, and the competition
authority. We assume that companies are asymmetric in the sense that they are diver-
sified to different extents. We intend this to imply that firms operate in several distinct
relevant markets. The competition authority has the power to scrutinize all markets.
However, practical constraints (resources) imply that it cannot investigate all markets
to the same degree. The general public only gets proof on the existence of a cartel when
the findings of the competition authority result in a formal report. Enterprises only have
knowledge about the cartels in which they are involved. For the markets in which they
are not present they have no information advantage over the general public.
We assume that both the public and enterprises react to cartel findings in that they
reduce purchases from the enterprises that are fined. The intuitive explanation for this
behavior is that buyers have an instinctive desire to punish the cartel members and
reduce purchases from the offenders. The consumers thus apply a tit-for-tat strategy;
as soon as they discover that they have been deceived by producers they reduce their
purchases from the producers involved. This negative reputation effect can be modeled
as a factor R ∈ (0, 1) that denotes the reduction of the sales of the cartel members
that were part of the illegal agreement. Notice that if all producers are involved, the
consumers have a desire to reduce consumption, but they are not able to find alterna-
tive suppliers. In this situation, we assume that the buyers will temporarily withhold
6.2: Outline of the Model 135
purchases whenever possible5.
Another reasoning that is based more on rational behavior rather than introducing
reactions not normally associated with the “homo economicus” but reaching the same
conclusion involves uncertainty. Assuming that consumers (a) have a preference for
goods with a higher quality (dU/dQual > 0) but (b) cannot perfectly observe the qual-
ity of a good even after purchasing the good (because reliability and durability can only
be estimated after some time), one can argue that consumers take the relative prices as
an indication of relative quality. Profit margins are implicitly considered identical and
all firms all equally efficient resulting in a direct relation between production costs and
product quality. The consumers then choose the product with the optimal price/quality
ratio given the budget constraints. After the discovery of a cartel by the competition
authority, buyers know that they have paid a mark-up over and above normal profit mar-
gins to the enterprises that are involved in the cartel, implying that the cost component
(related to expected quality) must have been lower than that of non-cartel competitors.
Thus, the message to buyers is that the quality of the product of the cartel-members
must have been lower than expected. Since they have no reason to assume that other,
competing enterprises in the same market have applied the same mark-up, these prod-
ucts gain a quality reputation and buyers redress their buying patterns optimizing the
price/quality level incorporating the new information.
The crucial observation to make here is that consumers do not fine-tune their re-
taliatory actions to the relevant market(s) affected by the cartel, but rather reduce
expenditure on all the products and services produced by firms that were convicted for
participating in the cartel. Most of the public, and perhaps to some extent even pri-
vate enterprises, are unable to distinguish between organizational divisions within the
offending companies and the application of very specific defined relevant product and
geographic markets used by the competition authorities. Thus the subtleties of the fact
that an operational unit of a company is named as the participant of an illegal cartel in
a specific relevant market are lost and the company is considered to have participated
in a cartel increasing the price of (all) its products. This implies that the reduction is
5An indication of this behavior is clear in the building sector in the Netherlands. Following the
discovery and publication of an extensive documentation on widespread illegal transactions by hundreds
of construction companies, there have been a significant reduction in sales. The sector considers this
discovery as one of the causes of the economic downturn of the sector. The publication of this case
was made by a specific parlamentary inquiry board, whereas, in general only the information published
by the Competition authority will be available. However, this economic downturn of the sector can
possibly also be attributed to the business circle effect.
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applied to the sales of all products of the company (not only on the markets involved).
We consider the assumption that all sales are reduced to be very plausible. In markets
for final goods, this holds especially when sales on many independent relevant markets
are made under a common brand or company name and consumers simply associate
the brand name with the cartel. In markets for immediate goods, where the buyers are
professionals, there are two effects which may cancel out so that the level of reduction,
R, may be identical to that associated with final consumers. The first effect is that the
professional buyers may be better able to make a distinction between the part of the
seller’s organization that was part of the cartel and the part of the organization that
was not involved, thus resulting in an overall lower R. The second effect is that the
professional buyers may be better able to determine the origin of products even when
these are marketed using separate brand names, thus resulting in an overall higher level
of R. For simplicity, we will not make a distinction between markets for final consumers
and markets for intermediate consumers and therefore use a single value for R.
With enterprises that have issued publicly held and traded shares, one additional
source of loss of wealth is that the expectation of lower sales immediately results in a
lower valuation of the shares. If consumers act in the way that we model – i.e. they
reduce purchases from the companies involved in all markets where these enterprises
operate – the loss in share value may well be more significant than one would expect
on the basis of the reduction in sales in the markets where the cartel has been proven
to exist. Indeed there are such empirical indications that support the plausibility of the
existence of a reduction on all sales rather than on affected sales only. Soppe (2000),
considering the effects on companies after discovery of participation in a cartel, concludes
that the loss in investor returns is normally much bigger than what would be expected
on the basis of expected fines and compensations. Archer and Wesolowsky (1996) find
that owners of durable goods do not seem to tolerate more than one incident without
consequences for not only product loyalty but also manufacturer loyalty. This could
point to the existence of expectation of reduction of sales in other than the affected
markets.
6.2.2 The Leniency Policy of the NMa
In the EC competition law, a leniency policy was introduced in 1996. The Dutch national
competition authority (NMa) adopted leniency rules on July 2, 2002. The current version
we will discuss is the ”Richtsnoeren Clementietoezegging”, last amended on April 28,
2004. The text on the leniency rules is numbered in the margin, and we will refer to the
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numbers in the margin for ease of reference.
The purpose of the leniency rules is to give the NMa a choice of whether to impose
a fine or not when it discovers and proves breach of either article 6 Mw or article 81 EC
(2). The objective of leniency is to gain information on cartels and to make discovery,
punishment and termination of cartels more effective (1). Thus, the NMa can offer
reduction of fines to members of a cartel that wish to terminate their involvement in
behavior that is illegal under cartel legislation. The leniency rules make a distinction
between several situations. The biggest reductions are obtained when a cartel member
informs the NMa of a cartel before the NMa has started a formal investigation. The first
cartel member to approach the NMa with sufficient information to start an investigation
obtains 100% immunity for resulting fines unless this company forced other companies to
participate in the cartel or the company does not fully cooperate during the investigation
(5). Who is first depends on the exact time the companies first contacted a leniency
officer (14). The first cartel member to help the NMa with additional information after
starting an investigation of this cartel will receive a reduction of between 50 and 100%
of the fine given that this company has not forced other companies to participate in the
cartel and that the company cooperates during the investigation. Additional information
is defined as information that the NMa did not have before and without which the case
cannot be proven (9). Companies that were either not the first to approach the NMa
with additional information with respect to a specific cartel or that were the first to
contact the NMa with additional information but that had forced other companies to
participate in the cartel can obtain fine reduction ranging from 10 to 50% (7). In
addition, the companies providing additional information do receive 100% immunity
for information resulting in an increase in the fine on which the reduction is applied
(10) (e.g. because the cartel was in operation longer than assumed on the basis of the
investigation of the NMa or the information of the informer that resulted in the start of
the investigation).
6.3 The Model (Formal Analysis)
We consider a group of firms, which may form a cartel, taking into account the enforce-
ment activity of the antitrust authority. The antitrust authority commits to a certain
enforcement policy, which uses leniency programs. Leniency programs grant either com-
plete or partial reduction of fines to the firms, which reveal the existence of a cartel to
the antitrust authority. The main innovation of this model, compared to the earlier pa-
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pers on leniency by Motta and Polo (1999) and (2003) or Feess and Walzl (2003), is that
we consider asymmetric firms that have different size and operate in several different
markets, but form a cartel only in one market. This gives rise to additional costs in case
of disclosure of cartel that are caused by a reduction of the sales in other markets due
to a negative reputation effect. This effect is asymmetric: firm 1 bears additional costs
of Rh1, while firm 2 suffers additional costs of Rh2. Here h1 and h2 are the total sales
in other markets, in which the relevant company does not form a cartel. The second
innovation of the model is that the leniency policy of antitrust authority is not only
limited to the option of fine reduction for self-reporting firm, but also takes into account
possibility of different treatment of the first and second reporter that is imbedded in the
current leniency rules of many competition authorities worldwide.
First, we describe the policy choices of the antitrust authority. Second, we specify
the firms’ strategies. And, finally, we describe the timing of the game.
Enforcement policy: The main goal of the antitrust authority is to prevent cartel
formation in the first place. However, if the cartel has already been formed, the antitrust
authority aims to discover it at the lowest possible cost. Following Becker (1968), we
distinguish two main parameters of enforcement policy: penalty and probability of detec-
tion. Hence, the antitrust policy in the presence of leniency programs can be described
by the following three parameters.
- The full fines F ∈ [0, Fmax] for firms that are proved guilty and that have not
cooperated with the antitrust authority, where Fmax reflects the upper bound for the
fine that is exogenously given by the law6. Following the Becker’s argument, in this
set-up, the fixed fine F will generally be set at Fmax.
- The reduced fines f ∈ [0, F ) specified by leniency programs. In particular, if
only one of the firms reports the cartel, then this firm pays no fine, while the other
firm will pay the normal fine, F . Moreover, we consider the set-up in which all the
firms that cooperate can be granted reduced fines f . However, the amount of reduction
depends on the circumstances, especially the order of self-reporting and the ”value” of
additional information. Applying the rules of current Dutch leniency practices discussed
in section 6.27, the possibility of simultaneous self-reporting by the firms should be ruled
out. However, the model, described in this chapter, is richer and can also predict in the
situation where firms self-report simultaneously. To simplify the analysis, we consider
6According to the NMa, the maximum fine depends on the turnover in all markets, not only the
market where the illegal agreement applied to.
7Richtsnoeren Clementietoezegging, last amended on April 28, 2004.
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a two-firms’ game. The first firm to self-report gets complete exemption from the fine,
while the second pays the reduced fine, f = 1
2
F.8 This set-up describes the most strict
adherence to the Leniency rules. However, we will also consider an alternative set-up,
where the antitrust authority is less strict and grants partial immunity to both firms in
case they self-report almost at the same time. This possibility will be captured by an
additional (non-traditional) instrument of antitrust authority, which we call ”strictness”
of leniency rules, and which is denoted by α. This parameter reflects the estimated
probability that the firm, which self-report almost simultaneously with its rival, gets
zero fine.
- The probability of law enforcement by the antitrust authority equals p ∈ (0, 1].
This variable can be thought as an instantaneous probability that the firm is checked
by antitrust authority and found guilty. Contrary to Motta and Polo (2003), we assume
that whenever the antitrust authority checks the guilty firm, the violation is successfully
discovered. Moreover, we assume that p is determined by an exogenous budget of the
antitrust authority financed by the government that can be used to promote enforcement,
so that p reflects the costs of efforts of antitrust authority put into law enforcement
activities.
Firms’ strategies: We analyze two different collusive strategy profiles of the
firms ”Enter Cartel and Self-report” and ”Enter Cartel and Not Self-report” and one
competitive strategy profile ”Not Enter the Cartel in the first place”.
First, we consider the strategy Enter Cartel and Self-report (E S). The firms decide
to enter a cartel agreement. This may give them per period profits πm if the cartel is
stable. At the next stage of the game one or both firms choose to report the existence
of the cartel to the authority. This allows them to obtain a reduced fine. However, they
loose not only extra profits from cartel formation, but also a fraction of the sales in
other markets, since information about cartel becomes publicly available. The second
collusive strategy is Enter Cartel and Not Self-report (E NS). In this case the payoff is
determined as an expectation of the monopoly gains, πm ( if cartel is not found), and
competitive profits, πn, less the fine and losses due to the reputation effect ( if violation
is discovered by antitrust authority).
8These rules are roughly consistent with partial immunity clauses that often apply if more than one
cartelist reports. Moreover, Apesteguia, Dufwenberg and Selten (2003) use a similar mechanism to
design one of the treatments in their experimental paper, which studies the effects of leniency on the
stability of cartel. Feess and Walzl (2003) consider partial reduction of fines for both firms in case of
simultaneous self-reporting.
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The competitive strategy profile is ”Not Enter the Cartel in the first place”: (NE),
which implies that the two stage game is reduced to one stage. In this case both firms
obtain competitive profits πn forever. Note that 0 ≤ πn < πm .
Timing of the game: The two asymmetric firms play the two stage game without
knowing the action of the rival. At time t = 0 the antitrust authority sets parameters
of enforcement policy: F and p. Here we assume that leniency program is not yet into
existence at time t = 0 and, hence, no reduction of fine is possible in case the firm
cooperates with the antitrust authority. Consequently, self-reporting is not an option
at this stage. This set up resembles the policy of, for example, Dutch Competition
Authority (NMa) before the year 2001, when the leniency programs were introduced in
The Netherlands9.
Next, at time t = 1 ”the cartel formation subgame” is played. At t = 1 both
firms decide whether to participate in the cartel or stay out and realize the per-period
associated payoff, respectively πm and πn. If both firms agree to participate, the cartel
is formed and the game continues into second stage. If at least one of the firms decides
to stay out, the game stops and both firms obtain competitive profits, πn, forever. We
assume that the existence of a collusive outcome in the industry cannot be observed by
the antitrust authority until it starts an investigation in this market.
Further, at time t = 2 (an analogy of the year 2001 in The Netherlands) the antitrust
authority introduces leniency programs, which allow firms to be exempted from the fine
in case of self-reporting. Now those firms, who already formed a cartel, have the choice
either to keep it secret or report it to the antitrust authority. Hence, at t = 2 ”the
revelation subgame” is played, where both firms simultaneously decide whether to report
the existence of the cartel to the authority or not. If at least one of them does so, cartel
formation stops and both firms obtain πn. If no firm reveals, the antitrust authority
is able to prove them guilty and punish with probability p ∈ (0, 1] in any subsequent
period. We assume here again, differently from Motta and Polo (1999), that a firm
proved guilty does not collude any more, so after being punished firms do not go back
9When leniency programs are already present, then ((E S),(E S)) equilibrium is dominated by Not
Entering ((NE),(NE))equilibrium. In that case the game played is not a two stage game anymore but
can be considered as a simultaneous move game and there are no additional cartel profits realized in the
first stage. This implies that in the situations where the structure of the penalty scheme and leniency
programs are both introduced in the beginning of the game, as it is at the moment in most developed
economies, the solution of the game would follow the same lines as described in section 6.4 with the
simplification that the strategy (E,S) will not be played in equilibrium any more (for any possible
parameter values), since it’s strictly dominated by the strategy not to enter the cartel in the first place.
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to collusion, while in case the cartel has not been revealed or discovered, firms sustain
the collusive strategy for at least one more period and obtain monopoly profits, πm.
The antitrust authority does not take an active part in the game. It only sets policy
parameters, F, f , p, α, and the rules of leniency programs. As said before, the strictness
of the leniency rules is modelled through parameter α. A ”strict” antitrust authority
would give complete exemption from the fine only to the self-reporting firm, which is
literally the first to self-report. In this case the parameter α is close to zero and the
firm that cooperates will almost surely get only partial exemption. Hence, it pays the
reduced fine, f = 1
2
F . A ”mild” antitrust authority can give complete exemption from
the fine to all the firms that cooperated. In this case the parameter α is equal to 1 and
every cooperating firm gets zero fine. It speaks for itself that in our model α is only
relevant when both firms self-report at the same stage of the game.
It should also be mentioned that under a regular antitrust policy without a leniency
program, collusion can be sustained only when the short run gain from an unilateral
deviation from collusive agreement by undercutting in prices is smaller than the expected
loss triggered by the deviation. This loss follows from the fact that cartel profits, πm,
will be replaced by competitive profits, πn. Hence, collusion under a regular antitrust
policy (i.e. when leniency is not available, and only rate of law enforcement and fine are
instruments of competition authority) takes place only when the following inequality is
satisfied for each firm
πm − p(F + Rhi)
1− δ > 2πm − p(F + Rhi) +
δπn
1− δ for i = 1, 2. (6.1)
Here 2πm reflects the extra profits from undercutting, since we assume there are
only two firms in the market. This inequality implies that collusion can arise only
when the discount factor is large enough, namely, δ ≥ πm
2πm−πn−pF−pRhi for i = 1, 2.
This condition states that the discount factor required to induce collusion is smaller
if either the difference between monopoly profit and competitive profit (the gains of
cartel) increases and/or the expected fine (the expected costs following discovery of the
cartel) decreases. If this condition is not met, it is more attractive for either of the
firms to deviate from the collusive strategy, and obtain monopoly profits for one period
and then compete for the rest of the game. For the further analysis we restrict our
attention to the case where this condition is met for both firms, which implies that in the
absence of leniency programs, the equilibrium state is collusion. Hence, inequality (6.1)
represents a necessary condition for the second stage of the game (”revelation subgame”
played at t = 2) to be reached. Another important restriction on the discount factor is
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δ ≥ πm
2πm−πn , which implies that in the absence of the antitrust policy, collusion would
arise in equilibrium10. Note that in this case the second stage of the game (”revelation
subgame”) is also automatically reached, since it is implied by δ ≥ πm
2πm−πn−pF−pRhi .
It should be stressed that for any t > 2 , the decisions of both players do not change
and payoffs obtained at t = 2 will be discounted into the future. This is due to the fact
that the penalty is fixed and, hence, the environment does not change.
We summarize the above description of the game as follows:
Stage 0: Antitrust authority announces parameters of the penalty scheme, p and F .
Stage 1: Firms decide whether to be in a cartel or not (once and for all decision).
Stage 2a: Antitrust authority introduces leniency program.
Stage 2b: Firms decide whether to self-report or not (once and for all decision). If no
self-reporting by both firms is chosen then repeated game between authority and firms,
where authority can discover violation with probability p in each period, is played till
infinity.
The discount factor is denoted by δ = 1
1+r
, where r is the interest rate. The game
tree and players’ payoffs are described in Figure 6.1.
We now proceed to establish the subgame perfect equilibria of the two stage game,
which is described in Figure 6.1, played among firms once the policy parameters are set.
6.4 Solution of the Game
6.4.1 Solution of ”Revelation Subgame”
To find the subgame perfect equilibria of the game, consider first the ”revelation sub-
game”, which is played in stage 2. In case of simultaneous self-reporting, a firm i gets
a payoff of πn
1−δ − Rhi − (1−α)2 F. This expression reflects the rules of current sentencing
guidelines that the first firm to self-report gets complete exemption from the fine, while
the second pays the reduced fine, f = 1
2
F . Given that the other firm self-reports at
approximately the same time, the probability to be the first to report and get zero fine
is α. However, there is also a chance (1− α) that another firm is the leader in the ”race
to the court”. If a firm i does not self-report but the other firm does, then this firm
10In the absence of any antitrust enforcement, i.e. when neither fines nor rate of law enforcement
can be used, collusion can be sustained only when the short run gain from an unilateral deviation from
collusive agreement by undercutting in prices together with competitive profits thereafter is smaller
than the payoff from sustaining collusive strategy forever: πm1−δ > 2πm +
δπn
1−δ for i = 1, 2.
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Figure 6.1: Game tree and players’ payoffs.
receives a payoff of πn
1−δ − Rhi − F, while the other firm is granted complete leniency
and obtains πn
1−δ − Rhj. Recall that there is still a negative reputation effect, because
information about the cartel becomes public. Finally, if no firm self-reports, each firm




11. The normal form of the simultaneous
move ”revelation subgame” is given in Table 6.1.
11The complete derivation of this expression is quite easy to show using the recursive formula. Value of
the strategy (Enter and Not self-report) can be written as V = (1−p)[πm+δV ]+p[(πn−Rhi−F )+ πnδ1−δ ].
Here, with probability (1 − p) firms can continue collusion in the next period and with probability p
cartel will be discovered in the next period which causes fine and losses due to the reputation effect.
Now, solving for V , we obtain that V =
p( πn1−δ−Rhi−F )+(1−p)πm
1−δ+δp .
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firm 1
firm 2 Self-report (S) Not Self-report (NS)
Self-report (S)
πn
1−δ −Rh1 − (1−α)2 F,
πn




1−δ −Rh2 − F
Not Self-report (NS)
πn









Table 6.1: The normal form of the simultaneous move ”revelation subgame”.
It is easily verified that the tuple (Self-report, Self-report), that we denote as (S, S),
in which all firms choose to cooperate with Antitrust Authority obtaining a reduction
of fines, is always a Nash Equilibrium. The tuple (Not Self-report, Not Self-report), or
(NS, NS), is a Nash equilibrium if
p( πn
1−δ−Rhi−F )+(1−p)πm
1−δ+δp ≥ πn1−δ −Rhi, i = 1, 2. Note also,
that the (NS, NS) would also be Pareto dominant or payoff dominant equilibrium if
p( πn
1−δ−Rhi−F )+(1−p)πm
1−δ+δp ≥ πn1−δ − Rhi − (1−α)2 F .12 This implies that Not to Self-Report can
be sustained in equilibrium if the following condition holds:




πm − πn + Rhi(1− δ) + (1− δ(1−α)2 )F
= p∗(F, hi, α) for i = 1, 2. (6.2)
It is easily verified that for player i the payoff in the (NS,NS) equilibrium is strictly
greater than the payoff in (S, S) equilibrium, when p ≤ p∗(F, hi, α)13. Therefore, follow-
ing the Pareto-dominance criterion, firms self-report only if p > p∗(F, hi, α) for i = 1
or i = 2. This gives us the first incentive compatibility constraint. We represent it in
Figure 6.2 by the line p∗, which plots α(p) as a convex decreasing function of p in the
(p, α)− plane.
In addition, comparative statics of the behavior of p∗(F, hi, α) with respect to the










The first inequality is a result of incorporating the level of diversification (or asym-
metries) of the firms. The more diversified the firm is (strictly speaking, the higher
12The notion of Pareto-dominant equilibrium is well established in the literature (see, for example,
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) pp. 20-22). Following their arguments, players will coordinate on the
Pareto-dominant equilibrium if they are able to talk to one another before the game is played and agree
to play highest payoff equilibrium in case of multiple Nash Equilibria. And, since firms are perfectly
rational payoff maximizing agents, there is no reason for them to deviate from this agreement later on.
13Given p ≤ p∗(F, hi, α), we obtain p(
πn
1−δ−Rhi−F )+(1−p)πm




1−δ −Rh1 − (1−α)2 F, since (1−α)2 F > 0.
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the turnover from markets not cartelized compared to total turnover) the bigger the
incentives for the firm to abstain from self-reporting. In other words, this implies that
the bigger the size of the firm (or the greater the amount of ”honest” sales) in other
markets, the higher the incentives for this firm to keep the cartel secret, since a bigger
threshold probability p∗(F, hi, α) implies that greater efforts from antitrust authority,
in terms of increasing the rate of law enforcement, are needed in order to induce the
self-reporting by this firm. The second inequality in (6.3) reflects the usual trade-off be-
tween the probability and severity of punishment extensively discussed in Becker (1968)
and in Garoupa (1997, 2001). The third inequality in (6.3) implies that the uncertainty
of the firms about getting the first price (or, in other words, strictness of the rules for
leniency14, which can grant the complete exemption from the fine only to one firm)
actually reduces the incentives for both types of the firms to self-report.
6.4.2 Solution of ”Cartel Formation Subgame”
Now we move on to the decision taken by the firms in stage 1 of the game. For each firm,
we have to calculate the discounted sum of profits if firms form a cartel and compare it
with the discounted sum of profits in case the cartel is not formed. This comparison has
to be done for both cases, either when firms decide to self-report in the second stage of
the game, and when they prefer to continue the cartel.
First, we consider the betrayal scenario where both firms choose the strategy Enter
Cartel and Self-report, which we denote (E S). According to the analysis of the previous
section this strategy can arise when p > p∗(F, hi, α) for i = 1 or i = 2, or both. In
case both firms self-report in the second stage of the game, the expected payoff for
each firm includes the collusive profits obtained at t = 1 plus the expected payoff from











14We refer here to the current Leniency rules of NMa. These rules correspond to low α in our setting,
which means that there is very high uncertainty for the firms about getting the first prize. From the
third inequality in (6.3) it follows that in this case the threshold probability p∗(F, hi, α) is maximal
and, hence, the incentives for the firms to self-report are reduced.
15To simplify the calculations we evaluate all the payoffs at time t = 2. So, we discount payoffs
obtained at t = 1 into second period with the factor (1 + r) = 1δ , and payoffs obtained in periods t > 2
into second period with discount factor 1(1+r)t−2 = δ
t−2.
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However, when no agreement about cartel formation is reached the discounted payoffs
for both firms, evaluated at t = 2, are given by VNE =
πn
δ(1−δ) .




−Rhi − (1− α)
2
F > 0. (6.5)
This implies that the value of the parameter α that is necessary in order to ensure
that the cartel is not formed, should satisfy:
α < α∗(hi, F ) =
2Rhiδ + Fδ − 2(πm − πn)
δF
, i = 1 or 2. (6.6)
This expression provides the second incentive compatibility constraint, which is rep-
resented in Figure 6.2 by the horizontal line α∗. Note, that three considerably dif-
ferent solutions can arise depending on the parameter values of the model. When
2Rhiδ + Fδ > 2(πm − πn) > 2Rhiδ, we obtain from (6.6) that 0 < α∗(hi, F ) < 1
and then the graph in the right part of Figure 6.2 applies. When 2(πm − πn) < 2Rhiδ
we obtain from (6.6) that α∗(hi, F ) > 1 and then the incentive compatibility constraints
and SPNEs of the game are represented by the graph in the left part of Figure 6.2. The
third possibility is when 2Rhiδ + Fδ ≤ 2(πm − πn), so that α∗(hi, F ) ≤ 0. In this case
the equilibrium with no collusion will be lost. The competitive outcome will not arise in
equilibrium for any parameter values. The intuition behind this result refers to the fact
that when the losses to the firm both due to the fine imposed and due to the reduction
of sales caused by the reputation effect are not high enough, the leniency programs can,
actually, have a perverse effect. Too low fines can lead to an outcome were all the firms
will participate in a cartel agreement and then depending on the size of relative gains
and losses reveal it or keep it secret.
The expression (6.5) implies that the higher the hi, the less likely this inequality will
hold. Hence a bigger firm, which operates in many markets, would be less willing to
enter the cartel agreement in the first place. In other words, for bigger firms the strategy
to form a cartel and then self-report is more likely to be dominated by a strategy of not
entering the cartel agreement in the first stage of the game, than for a smaller firm, for
which hi is low.
We may also notice that the decision of both firms when they choose between the
strategy Enter Cartel and Self-report or Not Enter the cartel at all does not depend on
the value of p (rate of law enforcement). However, it does depend on other parameters of
the model, such as F and α. In particular, a higher fine reduces the value of the strategy
Enter Cartel and Self-report, and increases the incentives for the firms to stay out of
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the cartel. At the same time the lower the parameter α, which reflects the perceived
probability for the firm to be the first to report, or the higher the uncertainty about
getting the first prize, the greater the incentives for the firms to stay out of the cartel.
Looking at the first and second incentive compatibility constraint simultaneously16,
we obtain that for α < α∗(hi, F ), i = 1, 2 firms choose not to enter the cartel in the first
place, and for all α > α∗(hi, F ), i = 1, 2 and p > p∗(F, hi, α), i = 1, 2 firms prefer to
collude and then self-report in the second stage of the game. This proves the following
lemma.
Lemma 6.1 For given policy parameters (F, f, p, α), a subgame perfect equilibrium in
which firms enter the cartel and self-report exists if p > p∗(F, hi, α) and α > α∗(hi, F )
for i = 1, 2.
The outcome of this lemma is depicted in the right part of Figure 6.2 by the shaded
trapezium. In the left part of Figure 6.2 this equilibrium is absent, since for more
diversified firms the value of α∗ is likely to be greater than 1. The right part of Figure
6.2 shows that for p > p∗ and α > α∗ both firms decide to enter the cartel in the first
stage and then, because of the high probability of conviction and the fact that rules of
leniency programs are not too strict, so that almost surely every cooperating firm gets
complete immunity from fine, firms choose to reveal the violation.
Next, we look at the second possible outcome of the stage 2 of the game, where both
firms choose not to self-report. This outcome arises under condition p ≤ p∗(F, hi, α)
for both i = 1, 2. In this case, firms anticipate that neither of them will reveal any
information. The expected payoff from playing this strategy for each firm includes the
collusive profits obtained at t = 1 plus the expected payoff from non-cooperation with






1−δ −Rhi − F ) + (1− p)πm
1− δ + δp .
Again, when no agreement about cartel formation is reached, the discounted payoffs
for both firms evaluated at t = 2 are given by expression VNE =
πn
δ(1−δ) .
Collusion will arise if VENS > VNE, that is if the following condition is satisfied:
p ≤ πm − πn
δ(F + Rhi)
= p∗∗(F, hi) for i = 1, 2. (6.7)
16See the right part of Figure 6.2, which reflects the case where the critical value of α∗ is less than
one.
17Recall section 6.4.1.
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Comparative statics of the expression (6.7) with respect to the main parameters of







The first inequality implies that the bigger the size of the firm (or the greater
the amount of ”honest” sales) in other markets, the smaller the threshold probabil-
ity p∗∗(F, hi), and, hence, the easier for antitrust authority to prevent the firm from
entering the cartel agreement in the first stage of the game. The second inequality, as
above, reflects the usual trade-off between the probability of detection and the severity
of punishment discussed in Becker (1968) and Garoupa (1997) and (2001).
Expression (6.7) provides the third incentive compatibility constraint, which implies
that the strategy ”Enter cartel and Not Self-report” is preferred to not entering by
both firms when p ≤ p∗∗(F, hi), i = 1, 2, see also Figure 6.2. Further, recall the first
incentive compatibility constraint, which implies that not self-reporting is preferred to
self-reporting in the second stage if p ≤ p∗(F, hi, α), i = 1, 2. Combining these two
constraints we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 6.2 For given policy parameters (F, f, p, α), a subgame perfect equilibrium in
which firms enter the cartel and do not self-report exists if p ≤ p∗(F, hi, α) and p ≤
p∗∗(F, hi), i = 1, 2.
The result of this lemma is quite intuitive. For low values of rate of law enforcement,
the worst outcome for society may arise, i.e. firms collude and keep the cartel secret,
even when leniency is introduced. However, looking at the right part of Figure 6.2,
we conclude that for high values of α, when leniency programs are not too strict, the
efficiency of antitrust enforcement can be improved more easily, since then a lower rate
of law enforcement is necessary in order to obtain the second best outcome, namely,
”Enter and Self-report”.
Finally, on the basis of Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2 we can conclude that the following
proposition holds.
Proposition 6.3 Once the policy parameters (F, f, p, α) are set, in the repeated game
played by the firms from t = 1 on, we can describe the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
(SPE) in the (p, α)−space as follows:
1. When α∗(hi, F ) ≥ 1 for i = 1, 2, i.e. when (πm − πn) < Rhiδ for both firms, the
Pareto dominant SPE is ((E NS),(E NS)) for p < mini=1,2p
∗∗(F, hi)), while the unique
SPE is (NE, NE) otherwise.
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Figure 6.2: Incentive compatibility constraints for two types of firms.
2. When 0 ≤ α∗(hi, F ) < 1 for i = 1, 2, i.e. when Rhiδ + 12Fδ > (πm − πn) > Rhiδ
for both firms, the Pareto dominant SPE is ((E NS),(E NS)) for p < mini=1,2p
∗∗(F, hi))
and p < mini=1,2p
∗(F, hi, α), it is ((E S),(E S)) for p > maxi=1,2p∗(F, hi, α) and α >
maxi=1,2a
∗(F, hi), while the unique SPE is (NE, NE) otherwise.
3. When α∗(hi, F ) < 0 for i = 1, 2, i.e. when (πm − πn) > Rhiδ + 12Fδ for both
firms, the Pareto dominant SPE is ((E NS),(E NS)) for p < mini=1,2p
∗(F, hi, α), while
the outcome with self-reporting arises otherwise.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
This proposition identifies the regions where the (Enter and Self-report), (Enter and
Not Self-report), and (Not Enter) equilibria exist. Clearly, both parameters p and α
influence the choice of the non-collusive strategy. Moreover, all three possible outcomes




(πm− πn) > Rhiδ for i = 1, 2. For low gains from collusion, when (πm− πn) < Rhiδ, i =
1, 2, a SPE where both firms choose to enter and self-report does not exist. While, when
gains from collusion are high, (πm−πn) > Rhiδ + 12Fδ, i = 1, 2, a pure competitive SPE
does not exist.
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6.5 Optimal Enforcement with Asymmetric Firms
(Implementing the No Collusion Outcome)
This section provides an analysis of the enforcement strategies of an antitrust authority,
which has the aim to prevent cartel formation in the industry. Here, we study the opti-
mal enforcement policy in the game described in Section 6.4. The objective of antitrust
authority is to maximize the discounted consumer surplus and the amount of collected
fines minus the costs of control. The costs of control and amount of fines are completely
determined by parameter p. Hence, the enforcement strategies are determined mainly
through the rate of law enforcement, p. Further, we assume that the fine is fixed and
equals its legal upper bound. However, in our setting there are two additional instru-
ments that the antitrust authority can use to achieve the no-collusion outcome. One of
them is leniency, i.e. the possibility of fine reduction if firms self-report; and the second
is the strictness of leniency programs, or the possibility of getting complete exemption
from the fine even in case simultaneous self-report occurs. As the amount of collected
fines also depend on the strictness of leniency programs, the antitrust authority max-
imizes the following objective function: W (p, α) = maxp,α{ CS1−δ − C(p) + p
∑
fi(α)}.18
Here the aim of the authority is to maximize discounted stream of consumer benefits.
The authority also wants to minimize the costs of control that are reflected in the term
C(p), which serves as a generalized notation for accumulated costs of audit, where dis-
counting is already taken into account. Finally, we assume that the regulator’s aim is
to maximize the amount of fines. This is reflected in the term p
∑
fi(α), which serves
as a generalized notation for expected accumulated collected fines.
The specific characteristic of our model is the fact that we consider asymmetric firms,
in the sense that they are diversified to different extends. We point out the following
regularities for the threshold probabilities which have been derived above. Assume
h1 > h2, i.e. firm 1 is more diversified, then for the threshold probability determined
in the ”revelation subgame” the following inequality holds: p∗(F, h2, α) < p∗(F, h1, α).
However, for the threshold probability determined in the ”cartel formation subgame”
the opposite holds: p∗∗(F, h1) < p∗∗(F, h2). Hence, it is more difficult to enforce self-
reporting by bigger (more diversified) firms, but at the same time a smaller rate of law
18We will also consider another form of objective function where the regulator is benevolent and does
not have as a direct aim maximization of collected fines. In this case the objective function of the
authority is as follows: W (p, α) = maxp,α{ CS1−δ − C(p)} = CS1−δ + minp{C(p)}. This set-up gives similar
but less general results.
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enforcement (less policing) is necessary in order to prevent the bigger firm from entering
the cartel agreement in the first place.
First, we specify the enforcement technology and calculate welfare gains from im-
plementing outcomes that are most desirable for society. These outcomes maximize the
sum of consumer surplus and collected fines less the costs of control. We assume that
imposing the monetary fines and determining the strictness of leniency programs is not
costly, while increasing the probability of discovery involves costs. In general we expect
a trade-off not only between the rate of law enforcement (policing) and the amount of
imposed fines (fining), but also between the rate of law enforcement (policing) and the
rules of leniency programs: increasing the strictness of leniency rules would imply a
reduction in the level of policing required to reach a desired level of cartel formation and
discovery. However, we will see that this intuitive trade-off does not always work in this
direction.
In the further analysis deadweight losses will approximate losses of consumer surplus
due to the fact that the market outcome does not coincide with competitive one. The
traditional deadweight loss (DWL) measures the welfare gains associated with a suc-
cessful intervention that induces a more competitive market equilibrium. We evaluate
the welfare gains of antitrust enforcement by comparing the equilibrium outcomes where
both firms ”do Not Enter”, ”Enter and Self-report”, and ”Enter and Not Self-report” to
the situation with collusion. Note that the antitrust authority will rank the regions as
follows: (NE) gives higher welfare gains than (E S); and (E S) gives higher welfare gains
than (E NS). Cartels entail an allocative efficiency loss, and, therefore, the antitrust au-
thority aims to deter or break them if they are already formed. In the first case, (NE),
cartels are deterred; in the second case, (E S), cartels are broken in the second stage if
they happen to be formed in the first stage; in the third case, (E NS), only those cartels,
which are investigated, will be broken.
6.5.1 Optimal Enforcement in the Two Stage Game
In this subsection we identify the optimal policies of the antitrust authority. Recall that
the antitrust authority changes its policy throughout the planning horizon in the sense
that leniency is introduced later in time than the penalty scheme. We first characterize
the optimal policy when the antitrust authority wants to implement each of the three
outcomes (NE), (E S), or (E NS). Then we compare the implementable outcomes and
select the best one.
As a general point in all the equilibrium outcomes, it is always optimal to set the
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fine equal to its legal upper bound since increasing the fines is not costly and allows to
obtain more favorable (lower) boundaries for the threshold probabilities for the rate of
law enforcement.
In the model described above savings of dead weight loss SDWL
1−δ are the welfare
gains from the ”Not Enter” equilibrium. The welfare gains, in case of the ”Enter and
Self-report” equilibrium are SDWL
1−δ − SDWL = δSDWL(1−δ) 19. In the ”Enter and Not Self-
report” equilibrium the antitrust authority interrupts collusion only with probability p,
hence the welfare gains are pδSDWL






(1−δ) . Hence, the most favorable for society outcome is no cartel formation,
second best is when firms collude and then reveal the cartel after leniency programs are
introduced. The worst for society outcome is ”Collude and Not Reveal”. Of course, this
information is not enough for determination of the equilibrium that maximizes welfare,
since costs of enforcement and revenues from collecting fines are not taken into account
yet.
Figure 6.3 illustrates the optimal policies to implement each of the three outcomes




1 , and α
∗
1 represent the incentive
compatibility constraints for the more diversified firm, while the dashed lines p∗2 , p
∗∗
2 ,
and α∗2 represent the incentive compatibility constraints for the less diversified firm.
Moreover, in Proposition 6.4 we state the optimal policies that implement the ”Not
Enter”, ”Enter and Self-report”, and ”Enter and Not Self-report” outcomes.
Proposition 6.4 Let h1 > h2. Given the objective function of antitrust authority: W (p, α) =
maxp,α{SDWL1−δ −C(p) + p
∑
fi(α)}, in the repeated game played by the firms from t = 1
on, the optimal policies are:
-Implementing (NE) outcome20 sets p = p∗∗1 and α ∈ [0, α∗(F, h1)].
-Implementing (E S) outcome21 picks up the point that satisfies the equation (p∗2(α))
′
α =
−F , if at this solution p < p∗∗1 . Otherwise, if p > p∗∗1 , then the optimal policy to imple-
ment (E S) sets p = p∗2(1) and α = 1 or p = p
∗∗
1 and α = α
∗.
-Implementing ((E NS), (E NS))22 sets p = 0 and α ∈ [0, 1] if δSDWL
(1−δ) − 11−δ +2F < 0,
or p = p∗∗1 and α ∈ [0, α∗] if δSDWL(1−δ) − 11−δ + 2F ≥ 0.
19Here we substract the DWL in the first stage of the game, when the cartel is formed, from the total
savings of DWL from period t = 1 on, given by SDWL1−δ .
20The (NE) outcome will arise already when it is profitable for at least one firm not to enter the
cartel agreement.
21The (E S) outcome will arise already when it is attractive to self-report for at least one of the firms.
22The (E NS) outcome can only arise when entering the cartel agreement and keeping it secret is
attractive for both firms.
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Figure 6.3: The optimal policies that implement the (NE), (E S), and (E NS) outcomes.
Solid lines represent incentive compatibility constraints for the more diversified firm and
dashed lines represent incentive compatibility constraints for the less diversified firm.
Proof.
To simplify the calculations, throughout the proof of this proposition we assume
that C(p) is a linear increasing function of the following form C(p) = p
1−δ . Clearly, this
implies per period costs of control will be equal to p. However, qualitative results would
not change, if we assume any increasing and convex functional form.
1. The proof of the first part of the proposition follows directly from Figure 6.3.
The social welfare in case cartel formation does not occur is given by W(NE)(p, α) =
SDWL
(1−δ) − p + 0. It does not depend on α. Hence, the optimal policy to implement (NE)
would just minimize p and, hence, sets p = p∗∗1 and α ∈ [0, α∗1].
2. The proof of the second part of this proposition is based on the idea that the
solution of the maximization problem:
{maxp,α{ δSDWL1−δ − p + (1 − α)F} s.t. VES > VNE and VES > VENS} is given by
the tangency point of the iso-welfare curve in case the (E S) outcome is implemented
with the lowest incentive compatibility constraint for self-reporting to be profitable, i.e.
p∗2(α). See Figure 6.4.
In this situation two cases can arise:
Firstly, if at the tangency point p < p∗∗1 , the welfare, in case the (E S) outcome is
implemented, is given by W(ES)(p, α) =
δSDWL
(1−δ) − p + (1 − α)F . Hence, the slope of
the iso-welfare curve will be equal to −∂W(ES)(p,α)/∂α
∂W(ES)(p,α)/∂p
= −F, implying that the tangency
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point is determined by the solution of the following equation: (p∗2(α))
′
α = −F . See point
A in Figure 6.4, where the dashed negatively sloped straight lines represent iso-welfare
curves.
Secondly, if at the tangency point p > p∗∗1 , we consider two corner solutions.
The first is given by p = p∗2(1) and α = 1. This is illustrated by point B in Figure




(1−δ) − p∗2(1) + 0
The second is given by p = p∗∗1 and α = α
∗, where α∗ : p∗2 = p
∗∗
1 . This is illustrated





p∗∗1 + (1− α∗)F.
3. The third part of the proposition follows directly from Figure 6.3 and the objective
function of the antitrust authority: W(E,N)(p, α) = maxp,α{pδSDWL(1−δ) − p1−δ + p2F}.
Then there are only corner solutions given by p = 0 and α ∈ [0, 1] if δSDWL
(1−δ) − 11−δ +
2F < 0; and by p = p∗∗1 and α ∈ [0, α∗] if δSDWL(1−δ) − 11−δ + 2F ≥ 0. So, if gains to the
society from conviction are low, it is reasonable not to control at all. And vise versa, if
gains due to the savings of DWL and fines that can be collected are high, it is desirable
for the antitrust authority to impose a strictly positive rate of law enforcement, p = p∗∗1 .
 
   p 
p2*   p1* 
 0 
 












Figure 6.4: Implementation of (E S) outcome.
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We can conclude that the first best outcome, i.e. when the cartel is not formed, can
be achieved only with a sufficiently high rate of law enforcement, i.e. p ≥ p∗∗1 , and when
the rules of leniency programs are strict enough, α < α∗(F, h1), in other words, in case of
simultaneous self-reporting both firms almost certainly get no exemption from the fine.
However, if the cartel has already been formed in the first stage, before the leniency
program was introduced, the optimal policy that can ensure the second best outcome,
i.e. self-reporting in the second stage, should impose a lower rate of law enforcement,
p∗2(1), and less strict rules of leniency programs, α = 1. Hence, in general the enforcement
that aims at stopping formation of already existing cartels should be less strict.
In the next proposition we state a similar result for the less general case, where
the objective function of the antitrust authority is given by W (p, α) = maxp,α{SDWL1−δ −
C(p(α))} = SDWL
1−δ +minp,α{C(p(α))}. However, it must be noted that the former case is
more relevant for the current objectives of antitrust enforcement, since in most cases the
authority takes into account the objective of maximizing the amount of fines collected.
While, ideal benevolent antitrust authority takes into account only the objective of
minimizing dead weight loss and reducing the costs of law enforcement. In this case the
following proposition holds.
Proposition 6.5 Let h1 > h2 and the objective function of the antitrust authority is
given by W (p, α) = maxp,α{SDWL1−δ − C(p(α))}.
In the repeated game played by the firms the optimal policies of antitrust authority
that implement the (NE), (E S), and (E NS) outcomes are:
-The optimal policy to implement (NE) sets p = p∗∗1 and α ∈ [0, α∗(F, h1)).
-The optimal policy to implement (E S) sets p = p∗2(1) and α = 1.
-The optimal policy to implement (E NS) sets p = 0, α ∈ [0, 1] if δSDWL
(1−δ) − 11−δ < 0,
or p = p∗∗1 , α ∈ [0, α∗] if δSDWL(1−δ) − 11−δ ≥ 0.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
We conclude that under a different objective function still the result is qualitatively
the same. An interesting implication of this analysis is that the regulation by a benev-
olent authority would not only lead to lower fines for firms and less strict leniency
programs, but will also reduce the costs of law enforcement in some scenarios.
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6.6 Conclusions
This chapter studies the effects of antitrust enforcement and leniency programs on the
behavior of firms participating in cartel agreements. The main innovation of our analysis,
compared to the earlier papers on leniency by Motta and Polo (1999, 2003), Spagnolo
(2000, 2004), or Feess and Walzl (2003), is that we consider asymmetries between firms.
In general, firms have different size and operate in several different markets. However,
they form a cartel in one market only. This gives rise to additional costs in case of
disclosure of cartel caused by a reduction of sales in other markets due to a negative
reputation effect. This effect is asymmetric for firms that are diversified to different
extends, that is the smaller the percentage of turnover in markets covered by the cartel
in relation to total turnover of a firm. The same modelling framework can be applied
to the case of international cartels, where firms that form a cartel come from different
countries and, consequently, will be subject to different punishment procedures. The
most striking example of this asymmetry concerns international cartels of European and
US firms. In this situation, due to the fact that in US consumers engage in private law
suits more often than in Europe, the actual penalty for the US firm would be greater
than for the European firm in case the cartel is discovered and information about its
existence becomes public. Hence, following the terminology introduced in this chapter,
US firms will correspond to more diversified firms, or the firms that suffer higher costs
other than fines in case of disclosure of cartel.
In the chapter we study the situation where the antitrust authority changes its policy
throughout the planning horizon in the sense that leniency is introduced later in time and
not simultaneously with the penalty scheme23. This reflects the situation, for example,
in The Netherlands before and after the year 2001, when the leniency programs were
introduced in Dutch Competition Law. This model can also be used for analyzing the
economic implications of the introduction of leniency programs in countries, where these
programs have not yet been introduced, such as developing or countries in transition.
Another feature of our approach is that the enforcement strategies of antitrust au-
thority are determined not only through the rate of law enforcement, but also through
an additional instrument (called ”strictness” of leniency programs), i.e. introducing the
possibility of getting complete exemption from the fine even in case many firms self-
23The same framework can be applied to study the effects of leniency programs on the behavior of
firms participating in cartel agreements in case, where the structure of the penalty schemes and leniency
programs are introduced at the beginning of the game. For more details see subsection on timing of
the game.
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report simultaneously. We study the impact of the ”strictness” of leniency programs on
the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement and derive the optimal enforcement strategies.
First, we describe the general results, which come from the analysis of the behavior of
asymmetric firms. We found that the bigger the size of the firm (or the more the firm is
diversified), the higher the incentives for this firm to keep the cartel secret. Then greater
efforts from the antitrust authority, in terms of increasing the rate of law enforcement,
are needed in order to induce self-reporting by this firm. So, leniency programs work
better for small (less diversified) companies in the sense that they result in self-reporting
by small firms while the rate of law enforcement is lower, which implies lower costs for
society.
Furthermore, we can conclude that for bigger firms the strategy of not entering the
cartel agreement in the first stage of the game is more likely to be preferred over the
strategy to form a cartel and then self-report, than for smaller (less diversified) firms.
The bigger the size of the firm (or the higher its losses due to the reputation effect),
the easier it is for the antitrust authority to prevent the firm from entering the cartel
agreement in the first stage of the game. Hence, big firms (or firms for which costs other
than fines are higher) are more reluctant to start a cartel in the first place.
Next, we proceed by describing the optimal combination of instruments of antitrust
authority: rate of law enforcement and ”strictness” of leniency programs. Uncertainty
of the firms about getting the first prize (or, in other words, strictness of the rules
for leniency, which can grant the complete exemption from the fine only to one firm)
reduces the incentives for both types of firms to self-report. Therefore, in a highly
cartelized economy, where a lot of cartels are already formed, the best strategy for the
antitrust authority is to concentrate on policies that increase the incentives to self-report,
in particular, increase the fine or reduce the strictness of leniency programs. In other
words, the more cartelized the economy, the less strict the rules of leniency programs
should be, or in other words, complete exemption from fine should be granted to all
self-reporters.
On the other hand, when there are not too many cartels and leniency is not yet
introduced, the antitrust authority should implement the policy that reduces the incen-
tives to enter the cartel agreements in the first place. In this case both, the fine and the
strictness of the leniency programs, should be increased. Hence, when the economy is
not highly cartalized the rules of leniency programs should be more strict, i.e. complete
leniency should be granted only to the first self-reporting firm.
Finally, we conclude that the optimal enforcement can implement the no collusion
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outcome only when the rate of law enforcement is sufficiently high and the rules of le-
niency programs are sufficiently strict. Moreover, the second best outcome, i.e. ”Enter
cartel and Self-report”, can be implemented when the rate of law enforcement is suffi-
ciently high and the leniency programs grant complete exemption from fines to all the
firms that cooperate with antitrust authority.
To conclude the discussion, it is worthwhile to mention that the framework developed
in this chapter can also be used for an analysis of the effectiveness of leniency programs
in situations where disclosure of cartel can lead to additional costs for the firms different
from the fine for violations of competition law itself. Those costs can result from the
threat that tax authorities will conduct additional control and possibly frauds connected
with cartel agreements will be discovered, or consumers will challenge firms in the courts
applying for private law damages. Obviously, the threat of all these additional losses
would reduce incentives for the firms to self-report and diminish the effectiveness of
leniency programs for already existing cartels. However, the positive feature is that at
the same time this would also reduce the incentives for the firms to enter new cartel
agreements.
6.7 Appendix
6.7.1 Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 6.3
Proof. The result of this proposition follows directly from Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2 and
the fact that all three locuses p∗(F, hi, α), p∗∗(F, hi), and a∗(F, hi) intersect in the same
point. Simple algebraic calculations confirm that p∗(F, hi, α∗) = p∗∗(F, hi).




pression for p∗ in (6.2) and show that p∗(F, hi, α∗) = p∗∗(F, hi).




















6.7.2 Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 6.5
Again, in order to simplify the calculations, throughout the proof of this proposition
we assume that C(p) is a linear increasing function of the following form C(p) = p
1−δ .
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Clearly, this implies per period costs of control will be equal to p. However, qualitative
results would not change, if we assume any increasing and convex functional form.
Proof.
1. The proof of the first part of the proposition follows straightforwardly from Figure
6.4.
2. The second part of the proposition says that a combination of policy instruments
of the form p = p∗2(1) and α = 1 would minimize the costs of law enforcement in case the
(E S) outcome has to be implemented and, hence, it would maximize the social welfare
W (p, α) = δDWL
1−δ − p(α).
Indeed, recall expression (6.3), which says that ∂p
∗(F,hi,α)
∂α
< 0. This implies that
minα p
∗(α) = p∗(1). Now looking at Figure 6.4, we conclude that the optimal policy to
implement (E S) sets α = 1 and p = minα p
∗(α) = p∗2(1).
3. The third part of the proposition follows directly from Figure 6.4 and from the
objective function of the antitrust authority W (p, α) = maxp p(
δDWL−1
1−δ ). This implies
that p = 0, α ∈ [0, 1] if δDWL
1−δ − 11−δ < 0, and p = p∗∗1 , α ∈ [0, α∗] if δDWL(1−δ) − 11−δ ≥ 0.

CHAPTER 7
Cost Minimizing Sequential Punishment Policies for Repeat
Offenders
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter we concentrate on policies for crime control that are not only aimed at
reducing the number of violations but are also cost minimizing from the point of view of
the regulator. Unfortunately, these two objectives conflict with each other. Reduction
of expenditures on crime control will lead to a lower deterrence rate and vice versa.
However, both objectives seem to be very important for society. Society is better off
when both the number of violations and the costs of crime control are reduced.
Another important question addressed in this chapter is whether the optimal sanction
scheme should be decreasing or increasing in the number of offenses. For the law and
economics literature on optimal law enforcement, escalating sanction schemes, embedded
in most sentencing guidelines, are still a puzzle. Garoupa (1997) or Polinsky and Shavell
(2000) give excellent surveys of this literature.
The purpose of this study is to find the optimal penalty scheme which takes into ac-
count the two objectives, mentioned above. We study the problem of optimal sanctions
for repeat offenders in a multi-periods model employing the two-periods framework sug-
gested in Emons (2003). We assume that agents may commit a crime several times. The
criminal act is inefficient, it causes harm for society; the agents are thus to be deterred.
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An important assumption of the model is that the agents are wealth constrained so that
increasing the fine for the first offence means a reduction in the possible sanction for
the subsequent offences and vice versa. A simplification compared to Emons (2003) is
that in the forward looking solution we consider only history independent strategies of
the agents. The government seeks to minimize the probability of apprehension and the
number of crimes, since it is costly for society.
The main result is that the optimal penalty scheme is decreasing in the number of
offenses. We find that it is optimal to set the sanction for the first detected offense equal
to the entire wealth of the agent while the sanctions for all the subsequent offenses equal
zero.
In this chapter we discuss a general set up with representative offender and regulator
whose aim is to block violations of law. However, it is clear that a similar framework
can be applied in case of an antitrust authority dealing with a group of firms that
form an illegal cartel. Antitrust law violations often are committed repeatedly by the
same firm. Remarkably, sentencing guidelines in both US and Europe attach a higher
gravity factor to recidivistic violations and, hence, prescribe to punish repeated offenders
more heavily. Clearly, this does not go in line with the main results of the Emons
(2003) work and our analysis. This puzzle still requires deep investigation in the law
and economics literature. From the other point of view, our model, where offenders
are wealth constrained, captures another important feature of current penalty schemes,
namely, the existence of upper bound for the fine. Usually, this upper bound is given by
either 10% of overall turnover of enterprise or by fixed monetary amount. The motivation
for existence of this rule can be connected to the fact that antitrust authorities should
not force firms to go bankrupt, in other words, the fact that firms are wealth constrained
is taken into account.
We start the discussion with a review of the related literature. Rubinstein (1980)
considers a setup where an agent can commit two crimes. A high penalty for the second
crime is exogenously given. Rubinstein shows that for any set of parameters there exists
a utility function such that deterrence is higher if the sanction for the first crime is lower
than the sanction for the second crime. Landsberger and Meilijson (1982) develop a
dynamic model with repeated offenses. They studied how prior offenses should affect
the probability of detection rather than the level of punishments. In Polinsky and
Rubinfeld (1991) it was found that it may be optimal ( for some parameter values ) to
punish repeat offenders more severely, when the government cannot observe illicit gains
from criminal activities.
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In Burnovski and Safra (1994) agents decide on the optimal number of crimes. They
show that reducing the sanctions on subsequent crimes while increasing the penalty on
previous crimes will reduce the overall criminal activity, if the probability of detection
is sufficiently small. Our analysis is very similar to their paper. They also consider an
n-periods framework. The main difference is that they search for the most deterring
sequential policy for repeat offenders without taking into account that the regulator also
has an objective to minimize the enforcement costs.
In Polinsky and Shavell (1998) agents live for two periods and can commit a crime
twice. Their result is that young first-time offenders and old-second time offenders are
penalized with the maximum sanction. Dana (2001) argues that, contrary to what
is frequently assumed in the literature, probabilities of detection increase for repeat
offenders. As a result, the optimal deterrence model a la Becker dictates declining,
rather than escalating, penalties for repeat offenders.
Finally, the paper by Emons (2003) studies a two-period model, where agents may
commit a crime two times. One important assumption of his model is that the agents are
wealth constrained so that increasing the fine for the first offence means a reduction in the
possible sanction for subsequent offences and vice versa. He also assumes that, besides
crime deterrence, the main objective of the regulator is minimization of enforcement
costs. The paper concludes that the optimal penalty structure should be declining in
the number of offenses.
To summarize the results of earlier papers we conclude that the main argument in
favor of decreasing penalty schemes is that probabilities of detection, usually, increase
for repeat offenders and then Becker’s model implies declining sanctions. The main
policy implication from this analysis would be that sanctions should be declining when
the regulator is resource constrained and offenders are wealth constrained. On the other
hand, it is intuitively clear that recidivistic behavior should be punished more severely
than first time offences or crimes committed by accident, since it usually signals a more
grave criminal intent. With respect to policy implications, this scheme should be applied
when the government cannot observe illicit gains from criminal activities1.
In this chapter we first analyze an n-period repeated game, where the regulator’s
main objective is to block any violations of law and, at the same time, to minimize
the costs of crime control. We describe a forward looking solution, i.e. the regulator
can commit to a certain policy from the beginning of the game and does not change
the parameters of the penalty scheme ( fine and probability of control) till the end of
1See Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991).
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the planning horizon. The solution of this problem gives the desired result of complete
deterrence. Even the first crime never happens, unless benefits from crime are much
higher than the initial wealth of the offender. In the model of section 7.2 we rule out
this possibility. The main intuition that drives this result comes from the fact that the
agent pays the sanction for the first offence with probability p (rate of law enforcement).
While any further sanction will be paid with lower probability, since the second offence
can be detected only conditional on the fact that the first offence has been discovered.
Hence, since paying the first fine is more likely than paying any subsequent fine, shifting
resources from the last periods to the first increases deterrence for given rate of law
enforcement. Consequently, as in Emons (2003), p is minimized by putting all scarce
resources into the penalty for the first detected offence.
However, the outcome will be different in case the regulator follows a time consistent
(subgame perfect) strategy. This implies that the government is able to change its policy
every period, conditioning its choice on the outcome of the preceding periods. In this
case the regulator chooses the optimal subgame perfect action in the beginning of each
period. In section 7.3 we show that the scheme derived as a forward looking solution
in case of full commitment is not a time consistent (subgame perfect) strategy for the
regulator in a multi-period setting. Section 7.4 concludes.
7.2 Multi-period Model, Forward Looking Solution
(Full Commitment Case)
We consider a multi-period optimization problem of a cost minimizing regulator (an-
titrust authority or police ) whose aim it is to block violations of law (for example,
violations of antitrust law, violations of criminal law, violations of pollution standards).
We consider a continuum of potential offenders which has measure 1. Individuals
or firms live for n periods. In each period the agents can engage in an illegal activity,
such as polluting the environment, evading taxes, or violating competition law. If an
agent commits the act in either period he receives a monetary benefit b > 0. Following
Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991) b is the illicit gain and the crime creates no acceptable
gain. The act causes a monetary harm h > 0 to society and, thus, has to be deterred.
We assume that the following inequality is satisfied, h > b. So, the act is not socially
desirable.
To achieve deterrence the government chooses sanctions and a probability of appre-
hension. The regulator cannot tell in which period of its life the individual is. It can
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only observe the information after the crime has been discovered. Hence, the regulator
only observes whether the crime is the first or second or nth one. Accordingly, the gov-
ernment applies fines s1, s2, ..., sn ≥ 0, where si is the penalty in case the offense by this
particular agent is recorded by the authority already i times. Moreover, the government
chooses a rate of law enforcement, p, which can also be seen as the probability of con-
viction. We assume that p is the same for all (first time and repeated) offenses. Since
apprehension is costly, the government wishes to minimize p and reduce the number
of crimes. The overall objective of the regulator is to minimize the number of crimes.
Subject to that objective being reached, the regulator aims to minimize costs of control,
p. So, the objective function of the regulator can be written as max−(p+Hk) , where p
is the probability of control (or rate of law enforcement), k is the number of crimes, and
H is the disutility from crime for the regulator, which is assumed to be a large positive
number.
The agents are risk neutral and maximize expected income. They have initial wealth
W and hold it over all n periods unless the government interferes with sanctions. Benefits
from crime b are consumed immediately, and the maximum of what the government can
extract from the agents is W .2 Moreover, based on Becker’s (1968) maximum fine
result, we assume that in order to minimize p the government will use the agent’s entire




si = W. To simplify the analysis we also assume no discounting.
An agent chooses the number of crime that can be committed or, in other words, he
(she) can choose between following strategies:
Not to commit a criminal act (i.e. not to participate in a cartel) at all. Then the
utility from this strategy for the ”offender” has the following form U(0, 0, ..., 0) = W.
Commit crime (collude) only once in any of the periods.
The utility from this strategy for the offender equals U(1, 0, ..., 0) = W + b− ps1.
Commit crime in any two periods: U(1, 1, 0, ..., 0) = W +b−ps1+b−p(1−p)s1−p2s2.
Commit crime in any three periods: U(1, 1, 1, ..., 0) = U(0, 1, 1, 1, ..., 0) = U(0, 0, ..., 0, 1, 1, 1) =
W + b− ps1 + b− p(1− p)s1 − p2s2 + b− (1− p)2ps1 − 2p2(1− p)s2 − p3s3.
...................................................
Commit crime in all n periods:
2This assumption seems to be not quite realistic. In most of the cases, for example in case of tax
evasion or illegal price-fixing activities, the penalty takes in to account not only initial wealth of the
firm but also accumulated rents from illegal activities. However, this assumption is adopted here to
focus on obtaining analytical results with respect to establishing an optimal sequence of sanctions.
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U(1, 1, 1, ..., 1) = W + b−ps1 + b−p(1−p)s1−p2s2 + b− (1−p)2ps1−2p2(1−p)s2−
p3s3 + ....... + b− (C0n−1(1− p)n−1ps1 + C1n−1(1− p)n−2p2s2 + C2n−1(1− p)n−3p3s3 + .... +
Cn−2n−1(1− p)pn−1sn−1 + Cn−1n−1pnsn),
where coefficients of these polynomials are formed according to the following formula:
Ckh =
h!
k!(h− k)! , h ≥ k.
To clarify the notation:
b− ps1 is the expected benefit from the first detected crime
b− p(1− p)s1 − p2s2 is the expected benefit from the second detected crime
b− (1− p)2ps1 − 2p2(1− p)s2 − p3s3 is the expected benefit from the third detected
crime
b− (C0n−1(1− p)n−1ps1 + C1n−1(1− p)n−2p2s2 + C2n−1(1− p)n−3p3s3 + .... + Cn−2n−1(1−
p)pn−1sn−1 + Cn−1n−1p
nsn) is the expected benefit from n
th detected crime.
We impose the following assumptions on the parameters 0 < p < 1, b > 0, W > 0.
The possibility p = 0 does not make sense, since then there is no threat for the agent to
be convicted and no way to prove the criminal to be guilty.
We also assume here that agents have enough wealth so that deterrence is always
possible, i.e., nb <
n∑
i=1
si ≤ W . Further, we derive sanctions that give the agents the
proper incentives not to engage in criminal activities in either period. This means,
we derive a penalty scheme which ensures U(1, 0, ..., 0) < U(0, 0, ..., 0), U(1, 1, ..., 0) <
U(0, 0, ..., 0), ..., U(1, 1, ..., 1) < U(0, 0, ..., 0). These are included as constraints in the
optimization model. The main objective of the regulator is crime prevention and mini-
mization of costs of law enforcement, i.e. minimization of p. This leads to the following
model.
The aim of the regulator to prevent crime and to minimize the enforcement costs is
reflected in the objective function (7.1) below, while the aim to provide incentives for
the agents not to commit any crime is reflected in incentive constraints (7.2)-(n+1).
min p + Hk (7.1)
s.t.
b− ps1 5 0 (7.2)
2b− ps1 − p(1− p)s1 − p2s2 5 0 (7.3)
3b− ps1 − p(1− p)s1 − p2s2 − (1− p)2ps1 − 2p2(1− p)s2 − p3s3 5 0 (7.4)














Ck−1h−1(1− p)h−kpksk 5 0 (n+1)
s1 + s2 + ..... + sn−1 5 W (n+2)
s1 ≥ 0, s2 ≥ 0, ...., sn−1 ≥ 0, p > 0. (n+3)









Ck−1h−1(1− p)h−kpksk]− λ∗( s1 + s2 + .... + sn−1−w) (7.5)
Using Kuhn-Tucker conditions to solve the minimization problem (7.1)-(n+3), we
obtain the result stated in Proposition 7.1.
Proposition 7.1 The optimal cost minimizing sanction scheme sets the penalty for the
first detected violation equal to the entire wealth of the agent and for all subsequent
violations the penalties will be equal to zero, i.e. s∗1 = W and s
∗
2 = ... = s
∗
n = 0. The
probability of law enforcement is constant over time and equals p∗, which represents the
smallest positive solution of the polynomial of order n in p, given by expression (7.19).
The proof of Proposition 7.1 consists of several steps: first, we derive FOCs and com-
plementary slackness conditions of the minimization problem described above; second,





for any time period l ∈ {1, ..., n − 1}; finally, applying Lemma 7.2 and the comple-
mentary slackness conditions we obtain the optimal penalty schedule with s∗1 = W and
s∗2 = ... = s
∗
n = 0 and p > 0.
Proof. To derive the FOCs we take partial derivatives of expression (7.5) with
respect to all n − 1 variables, which denote the penalties in the corresponding periods.
Recall that, taking into account that the budget constraint must be binding, sn can
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So, differentiating and simplifying the expressions, we obtain n− 1 FOCs with respect
to penalties in corresponding periods (7.6)-(7.10) and one FOC with respect to the
probability of law enforcement (7.15). We also write down n+1 complementary-slackness























































λi)]− λnpn − λ∗ ≤ 0 (= 0 if sn−1 > 0)
(7.10)
Complementary slackness conditions are:
λ1 ≥ 0 ( λ1 ∗ (7.2) = 0 ) (7.11)
λ2 ≥ 0 ( λ2 ∗ (7.3) = 0 ) (7.12)
............................................................................................................
λn ≥ 0 ( λn ∗ (n + 1) = 0 ) (7.13)
λ∗ ≥ 0 ( λ∗ ∗ (
n−1∑
i=1




Next, we prove the following lemma.
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Proof. The proof of this lemma is based on mathematical induction.
1. First, we show that the result stated in Lemma 7.2 holds in case the number of
periods equals to three, i.e. n = 3.
We take n = 3, which implies that k ∈ {1, 2, 3} and l ∈ {1, 2}.






















= pλ1 + 2p(1− p)λ2 + (p2 − 2p + 1)λ3 > 0































2λ3−3p3λ3 = p2λ2+3p2(1−p)λ3 > 0.
2. Next, we show that the result stated in Lemma 7.2 holds for any arbitrary number
of periods. For that purpose we show that if the result of Lemma 7.2 holds for n = m,






















is true for any 1 < l ≤ n when n = m .
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Expression (7.17) is positive due to (7.16), while (7.18) will be strictly positive for
any p < 1
2
, which corresponds to current rates of law enforcement for major types of
economic crimes.
Next, using the result of Lemma 7.2, we derive the optimal penalty schedule.
We start by showing that it is impossible that constraint (n+2) is not binding.












si < W and si = 0 for some i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}.
The result of Lemma 7.2 immediately implies that the solution with si > 0 for all




si < W and si = 0 for all i ∈ {1, ..., n − 1}. Then the first order




< 0, ..., ∂L
∂sn−1
< 0 . Moreover, it holds










λi)]− λnpn < 0 for all l ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}.










λi)]−λnpn = pn−1λn−1+npn−1λn(1−p) > 0.
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Hence, condition (7.10) cannot be strictly negative. This implies that the outcome
with si = 0 for all i ∈ [1, n−1] and λ∗ = 0 cannot arise as a solution of the minimization




si < W and si = 0 for some i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}. Assume sl = 0 for










λi)]− λnpn < 0.










λi)]− λnpn > 0





si = W and si = 0 for i < k ∈ {1, ..., n − 1} and sl > 0 for
l > k ∈ {1, ..., n− 1} is impossible due to the result of Lemma 7.2.
Moreover, the outcome with
n−1∑
i=1
si = W and s1 > 0 , s2 > 0 and si = 0 for all











We conclude that only the following is possible: s∗1 > 0, s
∗
2 = ... = s
∗
n = 0 and
n−1∑
i=1
si = W , which implies that s
∗
1 = W, s
∗
2 = ... = s
∗
n = 0.
Finally, optimal behavior implies that only condition (n+1) on the benefits from
crime will be binding, so that λ1 = λ2 = ... = λn−1 = 0 and λn ≥ 0. Hence, the
expressions for the optimal probability of law enforcement, p∗, λ∗, and λn will be
determined from condition (n+1), ∂L
∂s1
= 0, and ∂L
∂p
= 0.
In particular, p∗ is represented as a solution of the polynomial of order n (7.19)






Ck−1h−1(1− p)h−kpksk = 0 (7.19)
Next we present the proof of of the fact that only constraint (n+1) on the benefits
from crime will be binding.
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Proof. We can show that for the penalty scheme given by s∗1 = W, s
∗
2 = ... = s
∗
n = 0,
only condition (n + 1) can be binding and, hence, p∗ is found as a solution of the
polynomial of order n given in (7.19).
The main intuition for the proof of this result is the observation that only constraint
(n + 1) can be binding due to the construction of the problem. Assume, for example,
that constraint (l +1) is binding for some l ∈ {2, ..., n− 1}, then it follows that the LHS
of the constraint (l + 2) has to be strictly positive, which is impossible by construction
of the problem.
Now we prove this statement using rigorous mathematical tools. First, we consider
the situation where constraint (l + 1) is binding. It can be written as follows:
b− ps1 + b− p(1− p)s1 − p2s2 + b− (1− p)2ps1 − 2p2(1− p)s2 − p3s3 + ....... + b−
(C0l−1(1− p)l−1ps1 + C1l−1(1− p)l−2p2s2 + .... + C l−1l−1pnsl) = 0.
At the same time constraint (l + 2) can be written as follows
(l + 1) + b− (C0l (1− p)lps1 + C1l (1− p)lp2s2 + .... + C llpnsl+1).
Now, taking into account that s∗1 = W, s
∗
2 = ... = s
∗
n = 0 and (l + 1) = 0, constraint
(l + 2) can be rewritten as
b− C0l (1− p)lpW = b− (1− p)lpW. (7.20)
Moreover, using the formula for finite geometric series and the fact that s∗1 = W,
s∗2 = ... = s
∗
n = 0, constraint (l + 1) can be rewritten as follows.
(l + 1) = bl − pW (1 + (1− p) + (1− p)2 + ... + (1− p)l−1) = bl −W (1− (1− p)l).




expression for constraint (l + 2) in (7.20) becomes
W (1− (1− p)l)
l
− (1− p)lpW = W
l
(1− (1− p)l − pl(1− p)l)
It is easy to show that the first derivative of this expression with respect to p is
strictly positive for any 0 < p < 1, l > 0, and W > 0. Hence, this function is strictly
increasing in p for any 0 < p < 1, l > 0, and W > 0. At the same time function
W
l
(1− (1− p)l − pl(1− p)l) = 0 when p = 0. Hence, this expression is strictly positive
for any 0 < p < 1.
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This proves the fact that given that constraint (l + 1) is binding, it must hold that
the LHS of the constraint (l + 2) in the problem (7.1)-(n+1) must be strictly positive,
but this would contradict the construction of optimization problem.
End of the proof of Proposition 7.1.
The main intuition behind this proposition is very simple. It follows immediately
from any of the incentive constraints (7.3)-(n+1). The agent pays the sanction s1 with
probability p, while any further sanction will be paid with lower probability : s2 with
probability p2, s3 with probability p
3, and sn only with probability p
n. In other words,
the agent is charged s2 with probability p only if he has paid already s1 . Hence, since
paying the first fine is more likely than paying any subsequent fine, shifting resources
from the last periods to s1 increases deterrence for given p. Consequently, as in Emons
(2003), p is minimized by putting all scarce resources into s1.
Example 7.3 Figure 7.1 illustrates the proof graphically in the (p, s1)-diagram for the
two-period case. The game in this case is described as follows. A strategy of player 1
(regulator) is given by σ = (p, s1, s2), while the strategy set of player 2 (offender) is given
by {0, 1, 2}.
In case n = 2, the optimization problem of the regulator will be as follows:
min p + Hk
s.t.
b− ps1 5 0 (1)
2b− ps1 − p(1− p)s1 − p2s2 5 0 (2)
s1 + s2 5 W (3)
0 < p 5 1.
Suppose b = 0, W > 2b, s2 = W − s1.
Graphically, the solution of this problem, which has the form s∗1 = W, s
∗
2 = 0, p = p
∗,
is represented in Figure 7.1, where the parameter values are b = 1, W = 3.
The solution of the problem is represented by point A in Figure 7.1, with s1 = W,
s1 = 0, p = p
∗ > 0. In general, for the n-period case this diagram will be an n-
dimensional (p, s1, ..., sn−1) and the solution of the problem will be represented by the
point of the n-dimensional cone which is the closest to the vertical axis and satisfies all
the incentive constraints.
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                                                        (1) 
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Figure 7.1: Graphical illustration of the solution in two-period case.
7.3 Optimal Sanctions if Government cannot Com-
mit
In this section we investigate under which conditions the sanction scheme described in
Proposition 7.1 is sub-game perfect. This means: Does the government really implement
these sanctions once the agent has committed a crime? To do so, we study the subgame
starting when the agent has been apprehended for the first time.
In the setting, where the regulator can change its strategy once the crime has oc-
curred, the scheme described in section 7.2 will no longer be optimal. To show this we
consider the subgame starting when the agent has been apprehended for the first time.
If the government sticks to the penalty scheme described in Proposition 7.1, the agent
will commit the second offence for sure because it comes for free. At the same time, in
this setting the government’s payoff is much higher in case it does not try to prevent
the next period crime, since in this way it saves on costs of control. So, clearly, an
equilibrium with the authority playing p = 0 and the agent committing the crime will
be chosen in each period after the first conviction and, hence, can emerge as an SPNE
of the multi-period repeated game. This implies that the scheme of Proposition 7.1 does
not appear to be a time consistent (subgame perfect) strategy for a government in an
n-period setting. Moreover, an argument given below shows that, if the government
cannot commit, equal rather than decreasing sanctions will be optimal.
Derivation of an SPNE in No-Commitment Case3
3Unfortunately, we were only able to find one possible SPNE penalty scheme for which it holds
that zero-crime outcome is sustained in equilibrium. However, we believe there exist many more SPNE
penalty schemes, where some of them could have positive levels of crime in equilibrium as well. Hence,
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Let us consider a finitely repeated game where objective functions and participation
constraints of the players have exactly the same form as in the model of section 7.2.
However, here we assume that the regulator can change its strategy in any period of the
game, hence, also once the crime has occurred. The game in this case will be described
as follows. A strategy of player 1 (regulator) is given by σ = (p1, ..., pn, s1, ..., sn), while
a strategy of player 2 (offender) is given by k ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., n}. We also assume that
agents have enough wealth so that deterrence is always possible, i.e., nb <
n∑
i=1
si ≤ W .
Here we aim to check whether the outcome with penalty scheme set by the regulator
(pi and si for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}) such that any strategy for the firm except of strat-
egy (0, 0, ..., 0) will be blocked can arise as an SPNE of this game. Solving this game
backwards we get the following results.
Consider the optimal strategy for the antitrust authority in the last period. Irrespec-
tive of what had happen before, in the beginning of period n the anti-trust authority
solves the following problem, where pn is probability of control as before, H reflects
disutility of crime for the regulator, and I is an indicator function that is equal to 1 in
case crime occurs in period n and 0 in case crime is blocked,
min pn + H ∗ I (7.21)
s.t.
b− pnsn 5 0 (7.22)
s1 + ... + sn 5 W (7.23)
0 5 pn 5 1. (7.24)
This problem shows that the primary aim of the regulator in the beginning of period
n is to block the nth period crime and this has to be achieved at the lowest possible cost.
So, at time n the regulator chooses sn and pn such that I = 0 is achieved in the period
n, but also such that the wealth that is left to the offender after the penalty sn is paid
is enough to block crimes in all the preceding periods. The I = 0 outcome in period n is
ensured if constraint (7.22) is satisfied. Moreover, constraints (7.23) and (7.24) on the
parameters of the penalty scheme must also be satisfied.
This implies that a possible solution of this problem has the following form: pn =
b
sn




we could not characterize in general the set of SPNEs of the game in question. That is why, we state
that the ”equal” sanctions scheme is only an example of a possible policy that can reach full compliance
behavior (k=0) in case the government cannot commit.
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Looking for an SPNE, now given that we have blocked the crime in period n, we will
try to find the optimal strategy for antitrust authority in the period n − 1. Again the
solution boils down to finding the optimum of the following problem:
min pn−1 + H ∗ I (7.25)
s.t.
b− pn−1sn−1 5 0 (7.26)
s1 + ... + sn 5 W (7.27)
0 5 pn−1 5 1. (7.28)




The same solution we get for every period. Hence, in the beginning of the first period
antitrust authority again solves a similar problem:
min p1 + H ∗ I (7.29)
s.t.
b− p1s1 5 0 (7.30)
s1 + ... + sn 5 W (7.31)
0 5 p1 5 1. (7.32)
A solution is p1 =
b
s1








and si = W −
∑
j 6=i







for all i ∈ {1, ..., n} (7.33)
In this SPNE the firm chooses not to commit any offence in any of the periods and
the regulator sets penalty and rate of law enforcement that are uniform over time.
The only condition for existence of this solution is bn < W, which is also respected
in the model of section 7.2.
The above analysis implies that in the repeated game setting the optimal penalty







all i ∈ {1, ...n}. In this SPNE of the repeated game both penalties and rate of law
enforcement are uniform over time.
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7.4 Conclusions
The main conclusion of this chapter is the result that, when offenders are wealth con-
strained and the government is resource constrained and can commit to a certain policy
throughout the whole planning horizon, cost minimizing deterrence is decreasing, rather
than increasing, in the number of offenses. We prove that for the agents who may com-
mit an act several times, optimal sanctions are such that the fine for the first crime
equals the offender’s entire wealth, and the fines are zero for all the subsequent crimes.
Since the agent can only be a repeat offender if he has been a first-time offender, there
are no further offenses if we completely deter the first one. This conclusion completely
supports the result obtained by Emons (2003) for a two-period model.
This result contradicts the widely prevailing escalating penalties imbedded in many
penal codes and sentencing guidelines. This puzzle still requires deep investigation in
the law and economics literature. However, we should be careful to make too strong
conclusions and policy implications on the basis of the model of Section 7.2, since,
unfortunately, analogous to Emons (2004), this scheme does not appear to be a time
consistent (subgame perfect) strategy for the government in an n-periods setting.
Finally, we suggest some extensions of the model described above. Introduction of
history dependent strategies will make the analysis more complete but at the moment
it does not seem to be analytically solvable. However, it seems that the main result,
namely a declining penalty scheme, will arise as a solution of optimization problem in
that case as well. Another possibility is to introduce the opportunity for both players
to react to the actions of the rival. This suggests to extend this model to a repeated
n-period game between the regulator and the offender. This also allows to consider
the case when full commitment is not possible and the set of strategies for the firm
will automatically include all history dependent and history independent strategies. A
third extension would be to introduce discounting. But this will only increase incentives
for the cost minimizing regulator to extract the fine as soon as possible, so that the
arguments in favor of a declining penalty scheme will be even stronger.
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Nederlandse Samenvatting
In dit proefschrift proberen we bij te dragen aan het probleem van optimale handhaving
van de mededingingswet. We beschouwen dit probleem vanuit de hoek van mogelijke
verfijningen van de bestaande strafmaatregelen voor overtredingen van de mededing-
ingswet. In het bijzonder bepalen we een optimale combinatie van instrumenten zoals
de hoogte van de boete, de mate van wetshandhaving en de optimale structuur en samen-
stelling van sanctiepakketten. De motivatie voor deze studie komt voort uit het feit dat
de in Europa en VS gehanteerde strafmaatregelen tegen overtredingen van de mededing-
ingswet niet voldoende zwaar zijn om de voordelen van kartelvorming te compenseren.
Hoewel de straffen aanzienlijk zwaarder zijn geworden en nieuwe instrumenten voor
het ontmoedigen van kartelvorming, zoals clementieprogramma’s, werden ingevoerd, is
volledige uitbanning van overtredingen van de antitrust wet nog steeds niet bereikt.
Door de eigenschappen van sanctieschema’s, zoals de afhankelijkheid van de ernst
en de duur van de overtreding, het verband tussen eerdere en huidige prijsvorming
en de gecumuleerde omzet van de onderneming, wordt de historie van de overtreding
een belangrijke factor bij het bepalen van strafmaatregelen. Dit vraagt om toepassing
van dynamische speltheorie in het modelleren van situaties waarin de mededingingswet
wordt overtreden. Dit is het kernidee van deze dissertatie. Het dient ook te worden
benadrukt dat de dynamische analyse van de handhaving van de medingingswet niet
buiten beschouwing mag worden gelaten, omdat het de antitrust regels en het overtred-
ingsproces in het algemeen beter beschrijft.
Door het toepassen van dynamische speltheorie kunnen we de huidige strafmaatrege-
len op het gebied van overtredingen van de antitrust wet in de VS en de EU met elkaar
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vergelijken. Bovendien kunnen we aangeven hoe de huidige sancties kunnen worden
aangepast zodanig dat kartelvorming zoveel mogelijk wordt ontmoedigd. De belangrijk-
ste implicaties van ons onderzoek met betrekking tot het beleid ten aanzien van overtred-
ing van de mededingingswet zijn dat de basisstraf en de maximale straf verhoogd dienen
te worden. Gegeven dat het maximum voor boetes wettelijk is begrensd in Europa, kan
de oplossing voor dit probleem gezocht worden in de verdere ontwikkeling en de invo-
ering van individuele boetes in combinatie met de reeds bestaande boetes in Europa.
Verder beredeneren we ook dat bij vaststelling van de optimale sanctie, rekening moet
worden gehouden met de ernst en de duur van de overtreding, maar ook met de de mate
van wetshandhaving (of de kans op veroordeling) door mededingingsautoriteiten.
Een volgende belangrijke bevinding, welke wordt bevestigd in eerdere papers, is dat
alleen zorgvuldig samengestelde clementieprogramma’s kan leiden tot self-reporting, tot
vermindering van beweegredenen om te participeren in een kartel en tot bevordering van
de welvaart. Wanneer clementieprogramma’s verkeerd worden samengesteld, is er een
kans dat contraproductieve effecten van clementieprogramma’s ontstaan. We vinden dat
kartelvorming minder waarschijnlijk wordt wanneer de regels voor clementieprogramma’s
strikter zijn en wanneer de aanvraagprocedure voor clementie vertrouwelijker is. Boven-
dien concluderen we dat wanneer de aanvraagprocedure voor clementie niet vertrouwelijk
is, clementie in bepaalde gevallen kan leiden tot een langere duur van kartelovereenkom-
sten. Dit komt vooral voor wanneer sancties en de mate van handhaving van de wetten
laag is.
Het proefschrift bestaat uit een inleiding die wordt gevolgd door zes hoofdstukken.
Hoofdstuk 2 geeft een beschrijving van het sanctiesysteem voor kartelvorming en van
de effectiviteit van de sancties die hedendaags worden gebruikt in de handhaving van
de antitrust wetten. In de hoofdstukken 3 en 4 maken we gebruik van optimal control
theorie en differential games om de eigenschappen en de ontmoedigingskracht van de
huidige sanctiepakketten te analyseren. De hoofdstukken 5 en 6 behandelen we de
optimale samenstelling clementieprogramma’s en de effecten van deze programma’s op
kartelstabiliteit. Hoofdstuk 7, tenslotte, bestudeert de vraag of sancties voor veelplegers
moeten worden verzwaard of verlicht.
De analyse van de hoofdstukken 3 en 4, waarin we intertemporele trade-offs mod-
elleren, vereist toepassing van instrumenten als dynamisch programmeren, optimal con-
trol theorie en, als er strategische interactie tussen agenten plaatsvindt, differential
games. De meeste van de papers die genoemd worden in sectie 2 van de introductie
onderzoeken de vraagstukken van optimale dynamische wetshandhaving en van mini-
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malisatie sociale verlies als gevolg van delicten. Dit wordt gedaan door het modelleren
van de interacties tussen de overtreder van de wet en de autoriteit die is aangesteld om
de wet te handhaven. In hoofdstuk 3 gebruiken we een vergelijkbare aanpak. Technisch
gezien sluit de analyse van hoofdstuk 3 aan bij Feichtinger (1983) waarin een competitie
model tussen politie en dief bestudeerd wordt. We breiden dit raamwerk uit door een ti-
jdsvariërende sanctie toe te staan. Bovendien, introduceren we een boete die afhankelijk
is van de ernst van de overtreding en van de kans op wetshandhaving op ieder tijdstip.
In dit hoofdstuk analyseren we in het bijzonder een differential game dat de interacties
tussen de antitrust-autoriteit en een onderneming die mogelijkerwijs de mededingswet
overtreedt. De doelstelling van deze autoriteit is om de sociale kosten te minimaliseren
(verlies in totale sociale welvaart) die worden veroorzaakt doordat prijzen hoger zijn
dan de marginale kosten. Als het criterium van consumentenverlies door prijszettingsac-
tiviteiten van de onderneming geminimaliseerd wordt dan blijkt dat de strafmaatregelen
die nu worden gebruikt in de EU en de VS wetgeving niet zo efficient zijn als gewenst.
We tonen in het bijzonder aan dat volledige naleving van de mededingingswet (dat wil
zeggen, een competitief prijsniveau) geen Nash-evenwicht is en bovendien zal dit gedrag
nooit optreden als het lange termijn steady-state evenwicht van het model. Ook de vraag
welk sanctiesysteem leidt tot volledig ontmoediging van kartelvorming in een dynamis-
che setting wordt bestudeerd. We vinden dat deze sociaal gewenste uitkomst kan worden
verkregen als de strafmaat een stijgende functie is van het gewicht van de overtreding
en negatief gerelateerd is met de kans op wetshandhaving.
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt onderzocht of een boete die bepaald wordt op basis van gecu-
muleerde omzet van de onderneming die zich bezighoudt met prijsafspraken, kan leiden
tot volledige ontmoediging van kartelvorming. Het model van hoofdstuk 4 is een uit-
breiding van het model in hoofdstuk 3 in de zin dat we de sanctie niet alleen relateren
aan de zwaarte van de overtreding maar ook aan de illegale winsten die zijn verkre-
gen door kartelvorming. We nemen hierbij aan dat bij de vaststelling van de opgelegde
boete rekening wordt gehouden met de historie van de overtreding. Dit houdt in dat
wanneer een overtreding van de antitrust wet wordt geconstateerd, de autoriteit in staat
is om alle gecumuleerde opbrengsten van de kartelvorming te bepalen. Daarom zal de
autoriteit een sanctie opleggen die gebaseerd is op deze informatie. We vergelijken ook
de ontmoedigingskracht van dit systeem met die van een vast boetesysteem.
De structuur van dit probleem leidt, net als in Fent et al. (1999) tot een optimal
control model. Het grootste verschil tussen onze aanpak en die van Fent et al. (1999)
of Feichtinger (1983) is dat de winst die door de onderneming wordt verworven als
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gevolg van kartelvorming wordt gezien als toestandsvariabele in onze aanpak terwijl
in Fent et al. (1999) het crimineel verleden van de overtreder als toestandsvariabele
wordt opgenomen. Een stijging van de toestandsvariabele is dus positief gerelateerd aan
de mate van prijszetting door de onderneming en leidt daardoor tot een stijging van
de boete in het geval de onderneming veroordeeld wordt. Door het oplossen van het
optimal control probleem van de onderneming worden in hoofdstuk 4 de implicaties van
verschillende boeteschema’s onderzocht.
In hoofdstuk 5 en hoofdstuk 6 analyseren we de effecten van clementieprogramma’s
op de stabiliteit van kartelovereenkomsten. De modellen in de hoofdstukken 5 en 6 zijn
een uitbreiding van voorgaande analyses in de zin dat rekening wordt gehouden met de
mogelijkheid dat er strategische interactie op kan treden tussen de ondernemingen die
een kartel vormen. Ondernemingen kunnen namelijk de kartelovereenkomst verbreken
door middel van self-reporting.
Motta en Polo (2003), Spagnolo (2000), Malik (1993), en Aubert et al. (2004) zijn de
belangrijkste bijdragen in de literatuur op het gebied van optimaal beleid ten aanzien van
het overtreden van de antitrust wetten in de aanwezigheid van clementieprogramma’s.
De meeste van deze papers gebruiken een setting in discrete tijd. Hoewel in deze pa-
pers het samenwerkingsgedrag van ondernemingen wordt beschouwd in een dynamische
omgeving, worden de bronnen van de onderliggende dynamiek, die de speerpunten zijn
van deze dissertatie, buiten beschouwing gelaten. Deze referenties laten bijvoorbeeld niet
toe dat de vaststelling van een kartel en de sanctie afhankelijk zijn van hoe de onderne-
ming prijzen vaststelt, nu en in het verleden. Er zijn al wel een aantal papers dat zich
hebben beziggehouden met dit probleem, te weten Hinloopen (2004), Harrington (2003)
en Harrington (2004). Deze papers bestuderen settings waarin de kans dat een kartel
wordt ontmanteld afhankelijk is van het gedrag van de onderneming. Bovendien wordt
bekeken hoe deze kansen over de tijd veranderen. Echter, sancties die tijdsvariërend zijn
en proportioneel zijn met de mate van de overtreding en daardoor het meest aansluiten
bij de huidige antitrust regels, worden buiten beschouwing gelaten in de zojuist genoemde
papers. Hoofdstuk 5 behandelt het probleem van de invloed van de invoering van het
clementieprogramma op de duur van kartels onder twee verschillende boeteregimes (te
weten, vast en proportioneel). In dit hoofdstuk gebruiken we een continue-tijd dynamic
game, waarin de gecumuleerde winsten van prijszetting de toestandsvariabele is. We
onderzoeken intertemporele aspecten van dit probleem waarbij gebruik gemaakt wordt
van optimal stopping modellen en het instrument van dynamic continue-tijd pre-emption
games.
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In wezen wordt in hoofdstuk 5 een nieuwe aanpak voorgesteld om de efficiëntie van
van leniency programs te analyseren. Deze aanpak verschilt van eerdere papers en is
gebaseerd op het Reiganum-Fudenberg-Tirole model. Reiganum (1981) en Fudenberg
en Tirole (1985) pasten timing games toe op het probleem van de acceptatie van tech-
nische ontwikkelingen. Wij passen een vergelijkbare methode toe op het gebied van
kartelvormingsgame tussen twee ondernemingen in de aanwezigheid van een clemen-
tieregels. In deze setting kunnen we niet alleen de duur van kartelovereenkomsten onder-
zoeken, maar ook de optimale samenstelling van clementieprogramma’s. Een van onze
doelen is om uit te zoeken of, in het geval dat beide ondernemingen samenwerken met de
antitrust-autoriteit, deze ondernemingen gelijkwaardig behandeld moeten worden of dat
er een verschil in behandeling moet zijn, gebaseerd op het moment dat clementie wordt
aangevraagd. In het bijzonder vragen we ons af of de clementieprogramma’s strikter
moeten zijn en of de aanvraagprocedure voor leniency open of vertrouwelijk moet zijn.
We vinden dat kartelvorming minder waarschijnlijk zal zijn als de regels voor clemen-
tie strikter zijn en de aanvraagprocedure voor clementie vertrouwelijker is. Bovendien
concluderen we dat wanneer de aanvraagprocedure voor clementie niet vertrouwelijk
is, de duur van kartelovereenkomsten langer wordt in bepaalde gevallen. Dit gebeurt
wanneer boetes en de mate van wetshandhaving laag is. Een verrassend resultaat is
dat onder een systeem van vaste boetes, de invoering van een clementieprogramma de
effectiviteit van handhaving van de antitrust wetgeving niet zal verbeteren wanneer de
aanvraagprocedure niet vertrouwelijk is.
In hoofdstuk 6 van de dissertatie breiden we Motta en Polo (2003) uit door het in-
troduceren van asymmetrische ondernemingen en door het expliciet modelleren van de
effecten van de mate van striktheid van clementieprogramma’s op kartelstabiliteit. In
het algemeen verschillen ondernemingen in omvang en opereren ze in verschillende mark-
ten. In ons model vormen ze een kartel in slechts n markt. Deze asymmetrie leidt tot
additionele kosten in geval het kartel ontmanteld wordt. Deze additionele kosten worden
veroorzaakt door de asymmetrische reductie van verkopen in andere markten. Dit is te
wijten aan aan het negatieve reputatie-effect. Bovendien analyseren we de effecten van
de striktheid van clementieprogramma’s waarbij de bestaande regels van de bestaande
leniency programs in acht worden genomen. De striktheid van clementieprogramma’s
geeft de waarschijnlijkheid van volledige vrijstelling van de boete weer, zelfs in het geval
veel ondernemingen gelijktijdig self-reporten. Onze belangrijkste resultaten zijn dat,
ten eerste, clementieprogramma’s beter werken voor kleine (minder gediversificeerde)
bedrijven in de zin dat een lagere mate van wetshandhaving nodig is om kleinere on-
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dernemingen tot self-report te bewegen. Tegelijkertijd is het voor grote ondernemingen
minder waarschijnlijk dat ze een kartel opstarten vanwege mogelijke self-reporting in de
toekomst. Het tweede belangrijke resultaat is dat hoe meer kartelvorming er optreedt
in een economie hoe minder strikt de regels van clementieprogramma’s moeten zijn.
Hoofdstuk 7 behandelt de vraag hoe veelplegers optimaal gesanctioneerd kunnen wor-
den. Moeten ze strenger worden bestraft of is het beter om alleen de eerste overtreding
te bestraffen? In Emons (2003) wordt aangetoond dat het onder bepaalde voorwaar-
den optimaal is om alleen bij een eerste overtreding te straffen. Hoofdstuk 7 geeft een
uitbreiding van de 2-perioden analyse in Emons (2003) naar een n-perioden repeated
game. De resultaten die op deze manier worden verkregen zijn vergelijkbaar met die van
Emons (2003). We tonen aan dat voor agenten met een begrensd financieel vermogen,
die een criminele activiteit herhaaldelijk kunnen uitvoeren, de optimale sanctie bij een
eerste overtreding het gehele vermogen is en niets bij iedere herhaling. Het blijkt echter,
analoog aan Emons (2004) dat dit santieschema niet een strategie is die tijd-consistent
is voor een beleidsbepaler in een n-perioden setting.
